State v. Antwain Spears ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MARCH SESSION , 1998 FILED
July 1, 1998
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9705-CC-00170
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
Appellee, )
)
) CARROLL COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. C. CREED MCGINLEY
ANTWAIN LAMAN SPEARS, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (Direct Ap peal)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
RAYMOND L. IVEY JOHN KNOX WALKUP
P. O. Box 229 Attorney General and Reporter
Huntingdon, TN 38344
ELIZABETH T. RYAN
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
ROBERT RADFORD
District Attorney General
ELEANOR CA HILL
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 686
Huntingdon, TN 38344
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
Appellant Antwain Laman Spears was indicted on May 6, 1996 by the
Carro ll Coun ty Grand Jury for po ssessio n of coca ine with intent to sell or deliver,
possession of marijuana w ith intent to sell or deliver, and possession of unlawful
drug paraphernalia. Concluding that Appellant lacked standing to contest the
search warra nt, on J une 2 5, 199 6, the tria l court d enied Appe llant's motion to
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, which had been
executed at the residence of Margo Taylor. Moreover, the court determined that
even if Appellant had standing, the sea rch warra nt appe ared to b e valid on its
face. Appellant was convicted on September 16, 1996 , by a jury in the C arroll
Coun ty Circuit Co urt of poss ession o f cocaine and m arijuana w ith intent to sell
or deliver and possessio n of unlawful drug paraphernalia. The jury fined
Appellant $15,000.00 for cocaine po ssession, $2 ,500.00 for m arijuana
possession, and $7 50.00 fo r posse ssion of d rug para pherna lia. As a R ange II
multip le offende r, Appella nt was sentenced to concurrent sentences of fifteen
years incarceration with the Tennessee Department of Correction, three years,
and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively. The trial court also
revoked Appellant's probation resulting from a prior conviction. Appellant
presen ts three issues for our consideration on this direct appeal: (1) whether the
trial court erred in concluding that Appellant lacked standing to challenge the
search of Mar go T aylor's r eside nce; (2 ) wheth er the tr ial cou rt impro perly denied
Appe llant's motion to suppress the evidence seized during execution of the
search warrant; and (3 ) wheth er the e videnc e was sufficie nt to su stain A ppella nt's
convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to sell or deliver
and possession of drug paraphernalia.
After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The proof shows that on February 23, 1996, Deputy Lester McCaleb
executed a search warrant at 42 Cherry Blossom Drive, a duplex in Huntingdon,
Carro ll Coun ty. At this time , Ms. Ma rgo Ta ylor leased the dup lex. The search
warrant was for cocaine and drug paraphernalia seen in the residence by a
confiden tial informa nt.
At the suppression hearing, Appellant testified that he did not reside at the
Cherry Blossom Drive addres s. He stated tha t he had purc hased a bedroom
suite and need ed a p lace to store it until he obtained a place to rent. Appellant
also stored some of his clothing at Ms. Taylor's residence, as he was in the
process of moving from one place to another. At the suppression hearing,
Appellant testified that h e spen t only two co nsecu tive nights 1 at the Taylor
residence. Moreover, he stated that he never signed either a lease or a rental
agreem ent. Finally, App ellant adm itted that although the bedroom door had a
privacy lock , he neve r used it.
Ms. Margo Taylor testified at the suppression hearing that she signed the
lease to the duplex with Marshanna2 Barnhill. Howeve r, Mr. Barnhill vacated the
premises around the middle of January 1996. In the middle of F ebruary,
Appellant moved his clothes and bedroom suite into the duplex. Ms. Taylor
testified that Ap pellant kep t his belongings at her residence only with her
permission.
At Appellant's trial, Deputy Lester McCaleb testified that no one was at
home when h e arrived to execute the sear ch warra nt. Appro ximately th irty
minu tes late r, howe ver, Mr . Haro ld Miller, the lan dlord, arrive d. After procuring
1
At trial, however, Appellant testified that he stayed only one night at the Taylor residence.
2
At trial, Mr. Bar nhill's first nam e is said to b e "Marc an."
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a key to the front doo r, Mr. Miller authorized D eputy McCale b and Sergeant
Randal Dunn to enter the duplex. During Mr. Miller's absence, Appellant
approached the area. Deputy McCaleb testified that Appellant seemed nervous
and also appeared to Deputy McCaleb as though he was attempting to avoid the
officers. De puty Mc Caleb th en serve d Appe llant with the s earch w arrant.
Sergeant Dunn testified that once inside, he and his drug dog proceeded
to search the home. The dog alerted on the rear bedroom. The door to the
bedroom was lock ed from the inside , and Mr. M iller opene d it by using a coat
hanger. Upon entering the room, the dog indicated on Appellant's dresser and
the headboard of his waterbed.
Deputy McCaleb searched the room a nd found insid e a dresser a box of
plastic baggies and a cigar box containing a pack of rolling pap ers. Additionally,
McC aleb's search revealed a brown paper bag located under a baseball cap
which sat on the headboard of the bed. Inside the bag, Deputy McCaleb
discovered two loose bags o f crack co caine, a film canister conta ining o ne sm all
bag of crack cocaine, and two bags of marijuana.
Sandra Romanek, a special agent forensic scientist with the Tennessee
Bureau of Investiga tion, teste d the items found both in the dresser and on the
headboard. Her analysis disclosed the items to be 13.9 grams of cocaine base
and 27.4 grams of marijuana.
Margo Taylor testified that she and Marcan Barnhill rented the duplex from
Haro ld and Barbara Miller. Barnhill and Ms. Taylor lived together until the midd le
of January 1996. During the middle of F ebruary, App ellant moved some furn iture
and clothes into the room form erly occupied b y Mr. Barnhill. Som e of Mr.
Barn hill's clothes re maine d in the be droom closet even afte r he had left.
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According to Ms. Taylor's testim ony, Ap pellant sp ent only o ne and one-ha lf nights
in the dup lex, had n o key, an d paid no rent.
Tracy Willis, Appellant's former girlfriend, testified that Appellant resided
with her from December 1995 until April 1996. Willis stated that Appellant
maintained all of his personal items, i.e., furniture, clothes, shoes, and toiletries,
at her ho use. W illis was aware that App ellant had purcha sed a b edroom suite
and that he had stored it at Ms. Taylor's house.
At his trial, Appellant testified that he was living with Ms. Willis at the tim e
the search warrant was executed. He explained that he stored his rec ently
purchased bedro om s uite at M s. Tay lor's residence because he had no room for
it at Ms. Willis' home and was attem pting to locate a plac e for him self an d his
daughter. Appellant disclaimed any knowledge of the drugs that were found on
the dresser and headboa rd but admitted that some of the baseball caps found on
the headboa rd belonged to him. Appellant confirmed that he neither possessed
a key to the dup lex nor paid rent to M s. Taylor.
II. STANDING
Appe llant's first conten tion on this direct app eal is that th e trial court
erron eous ly conclud ed that he lacked s tanding to challenge the search of Margo
Taylor's residence. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "The
rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pape rs, and effects,
again st unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warran ts shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . ." U.S. Const. amend 4.
Simila rly, Article I, § 7 of th e Ten nesse e Con stitution gu arantee s, "That th e
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peop le sha ll be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from
unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7.
The trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress are conclusive on
appeal unless the evidenc e prepo nderate s agains t them. State v. Woods, 806
S.W .2d 205 , 208 (T enn. C rim. App . 1990); State v. Tate, 615 S.W.2d 161, 162
(Tenn. Crim . App. 1981). It is axiomatic that "One who challenges the
reasonableness of a search or seizure has the initial burden of establishing a
legitimate expectation of privac y in the place where p roperty is se arched ." State
v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U .S. 98, 10 0 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980)). This Court has
held that an individual ma y have a legitimate expe ctation of privacy even where
the property belonged to anothe r. Oody, 823 S.W .2d 554 , 560; State v. Turn bill,
640 S.W .2d 40, 45 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 1982).
In United States v. Haydel, the United States Court of A ppeals for the Fifth
Circu it articulated a seven-factor analysis applicable to the standing inquiry. 649
F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981). This Court has adopted and employed the Haydel
factors in num erous c ases. See, e.g., Oody, 823 S.W .2d 554 , 560; Woods, 806
S.W .2d 205 , 208; Turn bill, 640 S.W.2d 40, 46.
W e now address ourselves to the task of applying the seven factors
enunciated in the Haydel decision to the case at bar. These seven Haydel
factors are the following: (1) property ownership; (2) whether the defendant has
a posse ssory inte rest in the property seized; (3) whether the defendant has a
possesso ry interest in the place searched; (4) whether the defendant has "a right
to exclude others from that place"; (5) whether the defendant has "exhibited a
subjective expec tation th at it would remain free from governmental invasion"; (6)
whether the de fenda nt "took norm al prec aution s to m aintain his privacy"; and (7)
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whether the defendant was "legitimately o n the pre mises ." Haydel, 649 F.2d
1152, 1154-55. First, H arold Miller, not Appellant, owned the duplex located at
42 Cherry Blossom Drive. Second, Appellant disclaimed any knowledge of the
marijuana and cocaine that were found in the bedroom on the headboard.
Appellant denied having a possessory interest in the baseball caps which
concealed the drugs. However, Appellant admitted owning two of the hats on the
headboard. Third, Appellant had no possessory interest in the place searched.
At the suppression hearing, Appellant admitted that he never signed a lease. At
trial, Appe llant tes tified that he paid no rent to Ms. Taylor for the use of the
bedroom and that she did not give him a key to the residence. Fourth, Appellant
confirmed that he did not reside at the Cherry Blossom address when the search
warrant was executed. Moreover, Ms. Taylor testified at the suppression hearing
that Appellant stored his possessions in the bedroom only with her permission.
As Appellant was not a co-tenant of Ms. Taylor's, kept his possessions at her
residence only by her permis sion, and spent on ly a couple of nights in the duplex,
it seems obvious that he did not have the right to exclude others. Fifth, Appellant
testified at the supp ressio n hea ring tha t he ne ver lock ed the bedro om d oor in
whic h his possessions were stored. Although the door was locked when th e
police arrived to search the residence, Appellant stated that he had no t locked it.
Therefore, Appellant apparently had no subjective expectation that the bedroom
would remain free from governmental invasion. Sixth, Appellant did not take
normal precautions to maintain his privacy, such as ensuring that the bedroom
door remained locked in his absence. As previously stated, Appellant testified
that he ne ver use d the lo ck on the be droom door. F inally, it appears that
Appellant was legitimately on the premises because Ms. Margo Taylor granted
him permission to store his belongings in the bedroom.
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In weighing the Haydel factors, we conclude that it is fairly obvious that
Appellant lacked standing to challenge the validity of the search.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT
Appe llant next complains that in the affidavit in support of the search
warran t, the affiant made knowing m isrepresentation s of fact. Specifically,
Appellant alleges that the affiant made an intentional, if not reckless, statement
to establish probable cause by referring to the premises as those of Appellant
when they did not belong to him. We disagree.
The affidavit in support of the sea rch warrant refers to the premises to be
searched as tho se of A ntwain Spea rs. App ellant c onten ds tha t withou t this
statement, probable cause would not have existed.
The trial court's findings of fact in a hearing on a mo tion to suppress are
conclusive on appeal unless the evide nce pre ponde rates ag ainst them . Turn bill,
640 S.W.2d 40, 45-4 6. In the present case, the trial court did not find "any false
statements or stateme nts that we re mad e with reck less disre gard su ch as to
invalidate the search in question." The court also concluded that the search
warrant was valid both in the issuance and in the execution.
To buttress his argument, Appellant relies upon Deputy McCaleb's trial
testimony that he consulted the 911 co mpute r listing directo ry for Carro ll County
which showed the Cherry Blossom residenc e to be under the name of Ms. Margo
Taylor. However, this evid ence was not before the trial court at the suppression
hearing.
In State v. Little, the Tennessee Supreme Court sta ted tha t "the law is
settled that a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact will invalidate a
search warrant." 560 S .W .2d 40 3, 406 (Ten n. 197 8). An affidavit th at is
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sufficient on its face may be impeached in two circumstances: "(1) a false
statement made with intent to d eceive the Court, whether material or immaterial
to the issue of probable cause, and (2) a false statement, essential to the
establishment of proba ble caus e, reckles sly mad e." Id. at 407. Neither of these
two circumstances is present in the instant case. The search warrant is valid.
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appe llant's final contention is that because the evidence in this case was
entirely circum stantia l, it is insufficient to sustain his convictions for possession
of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to sell
or deliver, and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia. We disagree.
W e begin by observin g that Ap pellant d oes not strengthen his argument
by contending that the evidence is insufficient because it is circ ums tantial in
nature. Tennessee law permits convictions based upon circumstantial evidence.
State v. Tharpe, 726 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tenn. 1987). Additionally, both direct and
circum stantia l eviden ce we re pres ented at App ellant's trial.
This Court is obliged to review challenges to the sufficiency of the
convicting evidence accord ing to certa in well-settled principles . A verdict o f guilty
by the jury, appro ved by the trial ju dge, a ccred its the te stimo ny of the State's
witnesses and res olves all co nflicts in the tes timony in favor of the State. State
v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253 , 259 (T enn. 19 94); State v. Harris , 839 S.W.2d 54, 75
(Tenn. 1992). Although an accused is originally cloaked with a presumption of
innocence, a jury verdict removes this presumption and replaces it with one of
guilt. State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the
burden of proof rests with Appellant to demonstrate the insufficiency of the
convicting evidenc e. Id. On appeal, "the [S]tate is entitled to the strongest
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legitimate view of th e evide nce a s well a s all reason able an d legitima te
inferences that ma y be draw n therefro m." Id. (citing State v. Cabbage, 571
S.W.2d 832, 83 5 (Ten n. 1978 )). W here the sufficie ncy of th e evide nce is
contested on appeal, the relevant question for the reviewing court is whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris , 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 ; Jackson v.
Virgin ia, 443 U .S. 307, 3 19, 99 S .Ct. 2781 , 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (19 79). In
conducting our eva luation of the c onvictin g evide nce, th is Court is precluded from
reweighing or recon sidering th e eviden ce. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383
(Tenn. Crim. App. 19 96); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1990). Moreover, this Court may not substitute its own inferences "for those
drawn by the trier of fact from circums tantial evide nce." Matthews, 805 S.W.2d
776, 779. Finally, T ENN. R. A PP. P. 13(e) provides, "Findings of guilt in criminal
actions whethe r by the trial co urt or jury sha ll be set asid e if the evidenc e is
insufficient to support the findings by the trier o f fact of g uilt beyo nd a re ason able
doubt." See also Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 780.
Tenn . Code Ann. § 3 9-17-41 7 provide s in pertine nt part:
(a) It is an offense for a de fendant to kno wingly:
(4) Possess a controlled substanc e with inten t to
manufacture, deliver or sell such controlled substance.
(c) A violation of subsection (a) with respect to:
(1) Cocaine is a Class B felony if the amount involved is point
five (.5) grams or more of any substance containing cocaine
and, in addition thereto, may be fined not more than one
hundred th ousand d ollars ($100,000 ).
(g)(1) A violation of subsection (a) with respect to a Sche dule
VI contro lled substance classified as marijuana containing not
less than one-half (1/2) ounce (14.175 grams) nor more than
ten pounds (10 lbs.) (4535 g rams) of m arijuana, or a
Sche dule VI controlled substance defined as a non-leafy,
resinous material containing tetrahyd rocannab inol (hashish),
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containing not more than two pounds (2 lbs.) (905 grams) of
hashish is a Class E felony and, in addition thereto, may be
fined not mo re than five thousa nd dollars ($5,00 0).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417.
Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-17-4 19 perm its the jury to infer "from th e amo unt of a
controlled substance or substance s possess ed by an offen der, along w ith other
relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the controlled substance or substances
were poss esse d with th e purp ose o f selling or otherwise dispensing." Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-17-419.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-425(a)(1) provides:
(a)(1) Except when used or posse ssed w ith the inten t to use
by a person authorized by this part and title 53, chapter 11,
parts 3 and 4 to dispense, prescribe, manufacture or possess
a controlled substance, it is unlawful for any person to use, or
to posse ss with inte nt to use, drug paraphernalia to. . . pack.
. ., store. . ., inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human
body a c ontrolled s ubstan ce in violation of this part.
Tenn. C ode Ann . § 39-17-425 (a)(1).
The State wa s require d to prove each and every element of the charged offenses
beyond a reaso nable d oubt.
Respecting Appellant's convictions for possession of cocaine and
marijuana with intent to s ell or de liver, the d rug do g indic ated o n App ellant's
dresser and on the hea dboard of his wate rbed. Depu ty McCaleb testified that he
found c rack coc aine an d mariju ana un dernea th a baseball hat which lay on the
headbo ard of the waterbed. Inside a brown paper bag was a Crown Royal bag
containing two loose bags o f crack co caine an d a film ca nister with anoth er sm all
bag of cocaine. Deputy McCaleb also discovered two bags of marijuana inside
the Cro wn Ro yal bag.
Sandra Romanek, a special agent forensic scientist with the Tennessee
Bureau of Investiga tion, testified th at she pe rformed various tes ts on the items
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retrieved in the se arch. H er resu lts revea led 13.9 gra ms of cocaine base and
27.4 gra ms of m arijuana.
The jury obviously concluded that Appellant possessed these substances
and intended to sell or otherwise dispense of the cocaine and marijuana because
of the amounts recovered. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-419 permits such an
inference .
Finally, we address the evidence supporting Appellant's conviction for
possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
17-425(a)(1). Deputy McCaleb testified that during the search of the bedroom,
he found a pack of rolling papers inside a cigar box. Deputy McCaleb found a
box of plastic baggies in A ppellant's dresser drawers. Deputy McCaleb explained
that both rolling papers and plastic baggies are used to package, store, and
inhale controlled substances. The jury properly could infer that the baggies and
rolling pape rs belo nged to App ellant, a s thes e item s were discov ered in side h is
dresser in a bedroom used by him to store his furniture.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
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CONCUR:
(See below )
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
___________________________________
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
The H onorab le Joe B . Jones d ied May 1, 1998 , and did n ot participa te
in this Opinion. We acknowledge his faithful service to this Court, both as a
member of the Court and as its Presiding Judge.
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