State v. Charles Bledsoe ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
AUGUST SESSION, 1997 December 2, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9705-CC-00166
)
Appellee, )
) MADISON COUNTY
)
V. )
) HON. WHIT LAFON, JUDGE
CHARLES GWYNNE BLEDSOE, )
)
Appe llant. ) (RESISTIN G ARRE ST)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JOSEPH L. PATTERSON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
225 West Baltimore, Suite B
Jackson, TN 38301 KENNETH W. RUCKER
Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
JAMES G. WOODALL
District Attorney General
JAMES W. THOMPSON
Assis tant D istrict Atto rney G enera l
225 Martin Lu ther King Drive
P.O. Box 2825
Jackson, TN 38302-2825
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defen dant, Ch arles Gw ynne B ledsoe , appea ls as of right from his
conviction of resis ting arre st follow ing a ju ry trial in the Madison County Criminal
Cou rt. In this a ppea l, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to susta in the conviction. He also argues that the indictment failed to allege an
essential element of the offense o f resistin g arres t and w as the refore a void
indictme nt. W e affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court.
S UFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence,
the standard is wh ether, after re viewing the evid ence in the ligh t mos t favora ble
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essen tial
eleme nts of the crim e beyon d a reas onable doubt. Jackson v. Virgin ia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979 ). On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view
of the evidenc e and a ll inference s therefro m. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832,
835 (Tenn. 197 8). Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of
innocence and rep laces it with a presum ption of guilt, the accused has the
burden in this court of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.
1982); State v. Grace, 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 197 3).
Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight an d value to
be given the evidenc e, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence , are
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resolved by the tr ier of fac t, not this court. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Ten n. 198 7). No r may this court
reweigh or reevalu ate the ev idence . Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835. A jury verdict
approved by the trial judge accredits the State’s witnesses and re solves all
conflicts in fa vor of the S tate. Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.
Three police office rs testified for th e State. T erry Halfo rd, an office r with
the Jackso n Police D epartm ent, was on duty on July 29 , 1994 . He re ceived a call
that a blac k ma le was cutting window screens off windows at an apartment inside
the housing area of L incoln C ourts. W hile en rou te to the apartment, Halford saw
a black male in the bushes in the apartment complex. Because he had previous
contact with the Defendant, he recognized the man as the Defendant. Defendant
was crouched down with a knife in one hand and two crushed beer cans in the
other hand. Halford approached the Defendant, and the Defendant stood up.
Because Defendant had the knife in his hand and Halford did not know the
Defen dant’s inte ntions, H alford dre w his we apon fo r his own safety.
Halford asked the D efendant to dro p the knife severa l times, but he
continued to approach Halford while holding the knife. The Defendant was
mumbling something undeterminable, then began cussing and yelling for Halford
to go ahead and shoot him. When Defendant got approximately eight (8) to ten
(10) feet away from Halford, he stopped walking and Halford called for backup.
Two other officers, Jenkins and Pollack, arrived within one or two minutes.
These officers wa lked up b ehind the Defen dant, and they also drew their weapon
when they saw the Defendant holding a knife . Defe ndan t still refus ed to d rop his
weapon, so Officers Halford and Pollack holstered their weapons and Jenkins
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kept his w eapon out. Pollack used a che mica l weap on ca lled “Fr eeze ” to help
disarm the Defendant. Halford ran towards him and hit his hand with a flashlight
to knock the knife out of his hand. Defendant was told he was under arrest. The
Defendant becam e very violent, kicking, scratching a nd biting, and the o fficers
were forc ed to wre stle him to the grou nd to plac e him in h andcu ffs.
After the officers got Defendant into the patrol car, Halford drove Defendant
towards the police station. Defendant was kicking the screen and side glass so
hard that the plexi-glass screen was coming up and hitting the back of Halfor d’s
seat. Because Halford was afraid that he would kick the window out, he stopped
the car and got into the back seat w ith the Defend ant. Halford app lied pressure
to several nerve pressure points on Defendant’s body until he stopped kicking.
Halford admitted that Defendant was bleeding, but stated that he had already
begun bleeding from the earlier strug gle with the officers prior to being arrested.
He stated that Defendant could possibly have continued to bleed from the
altercation in the car. After Defendant was taken to booking, he threatened the
lives of the officers and their families.
Officer Pollack also testified regarding the events of July 29, 1994. He and
Officer Jenkins were dispatched to the Lincoln Court housing project to take a
report from the woman who called complaining that an individual had threatened
her and h ad cu t her win dow s creen . Wh ile talking with this woman , he heard
over the radio th at Halford had the suspect at gunpoint. Pollack and Jenkins
imm ediate ly went to that location and found Halford th ere with the subject backed
against a building . When they saw the knife in Defendant’s hands, they drew
their weapons. Pollack also thought he saw some beer cans in the D efend ant’s
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other hand. When Defendant refused to drop the knife, he and Halford holstered
their weapons. He got out his Fre eze a nd sp rayed the De fenda nt in the face in
order to shut his eyes. After struggling with the Defendant to handcuff him, they
tried to get him up and walk to the car, but Defendant refused to comply and the
officers had to pick him up an d literally carry him to Halford’s car. On the way
back to the station, he saw the Defendant try to kick the window out of the patrol
car. At one point, Halford had to stop the ca r and ta lk to the Defe ndan t to settle
him down. After they arrived at the station, the Defendant made threats on the
officers’ lives an d their families. Officer Jenkins confirmed the occurrence of
these sa me eve nts in his tes timony.
Charles Gwynne Bledsoe then testified on his own behalf. On that day, he
was in Lincoln Courts and had played a prank on a friend by taking one of the
screens off of her window. He stated that he did not cut the screen, only pried
it off with h is hands. Defendant had been cutting the grass and was sitting down,
peeling and eating an apple when he saw the police approach. He recalled
seeing four offic ers, alth ough he co uld not identify th e fourth officer. Immed iately,
one of the o fficers p ut his service revolver in Defendant’s face and said to “drop
the knife.” Defendant stated that he did not have a chanc e to drop the knife
because he was then sprayed with mace. After being sprayed, he dro pped his
head and felt a burning sensation. Defendant was scared, and only became
angry with the officers w hen they drug him down the sidewalk to the police car.
Defendant admitted that he did not try to walk. After being placed in H alford’s
car, he told him to “[R]ead me my rights. Read me my rights, boy.” Defendant
thought that was why the officer stopped the car and hit him in his mouth and
face. Defendant stated that these injuries caused him to bleed.
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A person commits the offense of resisting arrest if he “intentionally
prevent[s] or obstruct[s] anyone known to the person to be a law enforcement
officer . . . from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search of any person,
including the defendant, by using force against the law enforcement officer or
anothe r.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(a). From the record, there is sufficient
evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the Defendant guilty of
resisting a rrest.
Each law enforcement officer who testified confirmed that the Defendant
refused to drop his we apon when they re ques ted him to do so. When they forced
him to drop his we apon after sp raying him w ith Freeze, the officers notified
Defendant he was under arrest and attempted to place him in handcuffs. The
Defendant would not co opera te with th eir efforts to ha ndcuff him, to such extent
that he bit, kicked, and scratched the officers. There was a continuing struggle,
and when the officers got Defendant handcuffed he refused to walk to the police
car. The D efend ant ad mitted during his testimony that he would n ot com ply with
the officers ’ orders to walk to the car, using his body weight to force the o fficers
to carry him to the car in order to effectuate the arrest. This issue is without
merit.
S UFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT
In his second issue, Defendant argues the indictment failed to charge that
the Defendant “used force against a law enforcement officer,” an element of the
offense . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602. The indictment reads as follows:
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Charles Gwynne Bledsoe o n or about Ju ly 29, 1994, in Madison
County, Tennessee, and prior to the finding of this indictment, in the
Coun ty and State aforesa id, did intentionally prevent or obstruct
officers of the Jackson Police Department, known to the said
Charles Gwynn e Bleds oe to be law enfor ceme nt perso nnel, from
effecting an arrest of the said Charles Gwynne Bledsoe by
struggling, kicking, an d resisting efforts to be taken into custo dy, in
violation of T .C.A. § 3 9-16-60 2 . . .
The Defendant contends that the indictment as written above is fatally defec tive
due to its wording. The fundamental purpose of an indictment is to convey
adequ ate notice of the offense to the defe ndant. See State v. Mayes, 854
S.W .2d 638 , 640 (T enn. 19 93).
W hile the indictment does not state the exact wording of the statute, there
are sufficient allegations to necessarily imply the element of “using force against
the law enforce ment o fficer.” In deter mining the sufficien cy of the ind ictmen t, a
court must consider the following factors: (1) whether the indictment contains the
eleme nts of the offense intended to be charged; (2) whether the indictment
sufficiently apprises the accused of the offense he is called upon to defend; (3)
whether the trial court knows to what offense it must apply the judgment; and (4)
whether the accused knows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former
acquittal or conviction in a subs equen t prosecu tion for the s ame o ffense. State
v. Tate, 912 S.W .2d 785 , 789 (T enn. C rim. App . 1995).
Upon review of the indictment under these factors, it is clear the indictment
contained the elem ents of the offense s uch that the Defenda nt was sufficie ntly
apprised of the offense he wa s called upon to defe nd. W hile the ind ictme nt did
not specifically state that the Defendant had “used force” against a law
enforcement officer, the indictment did specify that the Defendant had “struggled,
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kicked, and resisted efforts” by law enforcement personnel to arrest him. As a
general rule, it is sufficient to state the offense c harged in the word s of the sta tute
or words which are e quivalen t to the word s contain ed in the s tatute. Tate, 912
S.W.2d at 789. That the Defendant struggled, kicked and resisted the efforts of
the law enforcement personnel is equivalent to the Defendant’s using force
against the law enforcement personnel. Defendant was sufficiently apprised of
the nature of the offens e for wh ich he would have to defen d him self. Th is issue
is without m erit.
The State raises a third issue in its brief regarding the sentencing of the
Defendant in that the judgment form incorrectly reflects that he was convicted of
a Class B misde mean or when the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
possession of a deadly weapon, and therefore, this court should impose
judgment for a Class A misdemeanor conviction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-
602(d). It is true that the State proved that Defendant p osse ssed a dea dly
weapon during the commission of the offen se. How ever, durin g oral arg umen t,
in response to questio ning by th e court, the State conceded that possession of
a deadly weapon was not alleged in the indictment. This issue raised by the
State ha s no m erit.
We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
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THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
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CONCUR:
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DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
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JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
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