State v. Ruth Stanford ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JULY 1999 SESSION
FILED
October 6, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) Appellate Court Clerk
Appellee, ) No. 02C01-9812-CC-00365
)
) Henderson County
v. )
) Hon. Whit Lafon, Judge
)
RUTH STANFORD, ) (Sale of Schedule III Drug,
) Delivery of Schedule III Drug)
Appellant. )
CONCURRING OPINION
I concur in the majority opinion, except I view the juror issue somewhat
differently. First, I believe that the juror’s proffered testimony relates to a fact not in
evidence, i.e., the defendant’s middle name, that does not fall within the juror’s
generalized knowledge. This information could easily relate to the case because the
central issue was the identity of the drug seller.
Under the majority opinion’s analysis, as a fact not in evidence, it
constituted an external influence. This means that, procedurally, it was to be
presumed prejudicial, and the burden fell upon the state to rebut the presumption. See
State v. Young, 866 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Blackwell, 664
S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tenn. 1984); see also Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-
30, 74 S. Ct. 450, 451 (1954). Thus, the trial court would have erred by not allowing
the defendant the opportunity to have the juror testify.
However, I would uphold the trial court because I do not believe that the
record supports a conclusion that the fact not in evidence was an improper influence
upon the jury. The record in this case reflects that the defendant does not contend that
the juror learned the defendant’s middle name during the trial stage. Instead, she
assumes that the juror had pretrial knowledge of her middle name. In this respect, I
believe that a distinct difference exists when the juror having particular knowledge of
events related to the case is totally honest during voir dire and the defendant has a full
opportunity to question the juror about that knowledge. Under such circumstances, the
fact that the defendant failed to question the juror fully before accepting him or her as a
trial juror is of no consequence. Acceptance of the jurors effectively constitutes the
parties’ consent that the jurors, with all their knowledge and experiences, will decide
the case. See, e.g., United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120, 125 (6th Cir. 1995). If such
were not the rule, it would be difficult to select juries, particularly in rural venues.
The twentieth century American jury has moved a long way
from its medieval origins. Today’s juror must be “indifferent”
and “[h]is verdict must be based upon the evidence developed
at the trial.” Still we would not lightly assume that the jury’s
original role as the voice of the country may not sufficiently
persist that neither the specific guarantees of an impartial jury
and of confrontation nor the more general one of due process
would be violated simply because jurors with open minds were
influenced to some degree by community knowledge that a
defendant was “wicked” or the reverse, even though this was
not in evidence. One, although by no means the only,
purpose of the insistence on trial in the vicinage both in Article
III, § 2, and in the Sixth Amendment, must have been to
entitle a defendant to trial where he is known–and this may
sometimes work against him rather than in his favor. Indeed
there are still sections of the country where it might be
impossible to find twelve jurors who were totally ignorant
about a defendant.
United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1970) (citations and
footnote omitted).
Absent a showing that a potential juror failed to disclose facts after
questioning that should reasonably elicit those facts, I would hold that dissemination of
those facts to other jurors during deliberations would not be improper. In the present
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case, nothing indicates that the juror was not candid during voir dire. Therefore, I see
no juror impropriety.
_________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
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