State v. Terry Copeland ( 1997 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    JANUARY 1997 SESSION
    FILED
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,             )                               July 23, 1997
    )     No. 02-C-01-9601-CR-00012
    Appellee,                 )                            Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    )     Shelby County           Appellate C ourt Clerk
    v.                              )
    )     Joseph B. Dailey, Judge
    TERRY W. COPELAND,              )
    )     (First Degree Murder)
    Appellant.                )
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                    FOR THE APPELLEE:
    ON APPEAL:                            John Knox Walkup
    Marvin E. Ballin                      Attorney General & Reporter
    200 Jefferson, Suite 1250             500 Charlotte Avenue
    Memphis, TN 38103                     Nashville, TN 37243-0497
    Mark A. Mesler                        Susan Rosen
    200 Jefferson, Suite 1250             Assistant Attorney General
    Memphis, TN 38103                     450 James Robertson Parkway
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    AT TRIAL:
    Edwin C. Lenow                        William L. Gibbons
    100 North Main Building               District Attorney General
    Suite 2325                            201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01
    Memphis, TN 38103                     Memphis, TN 38103
    Phillip G. Harris
    Assistant District Attorney General
    201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01
    Memphis, TN 38103
    Rhea Clift
    Assistant District Attorney General
    201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 3-01
    Memphis, TN 38103
    OPINION FILED: ________________________________
    AFFIRMED
    Joe B. Jones, Presiding Judge
    OPINION
    The appellant, Terry W. Copeland (defendant), was convicted of murder in the first
    degree by a jury of his peers. He was sentenced to life in the Department of Correction.
    The defendant presents two issues for review. He contends (a) the evidence is insufficient,
    as a matter of law, to support his conviction because the State of Tennessee failed to
    establish the elements of first degree murder, and (b) the trial court committed error of
    prejudicial dimensions by failing to give the defendant’s special request setting forth a
    definition of “passion.” After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and the law
    governing the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the
    trial court should be affirmed.
    On the evening of May 27, 1994, the defendant saw his mother’s vehicle parked at
    the Rugby Bar, which is located in the Frayser area of Memphis. He called the bar from
    across the street and asked for his mother. He wanted to know if Farrell D. “Doug”
    Goggins, the victim, was inside the bar. His mother asked him to come to the bar and have
    a beer with the people seated at her table. The defendant went across the street to the
    bar and visited with his mother, stepfather, and the other people who were at the table.
    The defendant saw the victim enter the establishment and take a seat at the bar.
    He exited through a side door. The defendant returned to the bar through the front door
    approximately ten minutes later. He was carrying a baseball bat. The victim had his back
    to the front door and apparently never saw the defendant enter the bar. The defendant
    brutally attacked the victim from the rear without warning. He repeatedly struck the victim’s
    head, shoulder, and leg with the baseball bat. One of the blows caused the victim to fall
    to the floor. The defendant continued to strike the victim while he lay on the floor.
    Patrons of the Rugby Bar on the night in question testified the defendant was armed
    with a baseball bat.    They identified a baseball bat found by police officers in the
    defendant’s backyard as the murder weapon.
    The victim was transported to a hospital. He died the following day due to the
    injuries he sustained at the hands of the defendant. An autopsy revealed the victim had
    sustained multiple injuries to the head. There were bruises, tears of the scalp’s skin, and
    2
    fractures of the skull. The victim’s brain was also injured as a result of the blows to the
    head. There were bruises to the underlying brain and there were hemorrhages to the
    surface of the brain between the covering of the brain and the brain. The pathologist
    opined the victim died as a result of the multiple blows to the head. He testified the injuries
    sustained by the victim were consistent with repeated blows with a baseball bat.
    The defendant testified in support of his defense. He stated that he and his brother
    had gotten into a fight with the victim and a friend of the victim, Jeff Austin, as they were
    leaving the Rugby Bar two weeks before the incident in question. Austin grabbed the
    defendant, held him around the head, and pinned him against a pool table. The victim
    allegedly struck the defendant from the rear with a pool cue while he was being held by
    Austin. When the defendant was able to break Austin’s hold, the defendant and his
    brother ran and exited the bar. The defendant stated the victim followed them into the
    parking lot with the pool cue. According to the defendant, the victim threatened to kill him
    and his brother.
    Supposedly, the defendant came in contact with the victim a few days later at a
    convenience store across from the Rugby Bar. The defendant testified the victim repeated
    the threat that he was going to kill him and his brother.
    The defendant testified the victim saw him inside the bar on the night in question,
    and the victim pointed his finger at him. Allegedly, someone came to the table and told the
    defendant to move his vehicle in the parking lot. The defendant exited the bar through the
    side door, but he did not move his vehicle. When he re-entered the bar, he stated the
    victim saw him. According to the defendant, he armed himself with a stick used to prop the
    front door open. He admitted striking the victim with the stick. He denied he intended to
    kill the victim. He claimed the killing was accidental. Moreover, he saw the victim standing
    or sitting on a bar stool before he left the bar.
    The defendant denied he used a baseball bat to strike the victim. He testified he
    had never seen the baseball bat found by the police in his backyard.
    It appears the defendant claimed self-defense because of his fear of the victim and
    his threat to kill him. However, a search of the victim’s body by the paramedics prior to
    removing the victim from the bar revealed the victim was not armed.
    3
    I.
    The defendant contends the evidence contained in the record is insufficient, as a
    matter of law, to support a finding by a rational trier of fact he was guilty of first degree
    murder beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues the State of Tennessee failed to prove the
    elements of deliberation and premeditation.
    A.
    When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, this Court
    must review the record to determine if the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient "to support
    the finding by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).
    This rule is applicable to findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, circumstantial
    evidence, or a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Dykes, 
    803 S.W.2d 250
    , 253 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1990).
    In determining the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, this Court does not
    reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779 (Tenn. Crim.
    App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1990). Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those
    drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence. Liakas v. State, 
    199 Tenn. 298
    ,
    305, 
    286 S.W.2d 856
    , 859, cert. denied, 
    352 U.S. 845
    , 
    77 S. Ct. 39
    , 
    1 L. Ed. 2d 49
     (1956).
    To the contrary, this Court is required to afford the State of Tennessee the strongest
    legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record as well as all reasonable and
    legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1978).
    Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be
    given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the
    trier of fact, not this Court. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835. In State v. Grace, 
    493 S.W.2d 474
    , 476 (Tenn. 1973), our Supreme Court said: "A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by
    the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all
    conflicts in favor of the theory of the State."
    4
    Since a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with
    a presumption of guilt, the accused, as the appellant, has the burden in this Court of
    illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts returned by the trier of
    fact. State v. Tuggle, 
    639 S.W.2d 913
    , 914 (Tenn. 1982). This Court will not disturb a
    verdict of guilt due to the sufficiency of the evidence unless the facts contained in the
    record are insufficient, as a matter of law, for a rational trier of fact to find that the accused
    is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914.
    B.
    As the defendant advocates in his brief, the death of a victim caused by the knowing
    act of the accused is presumed to be second degree murder. State v. Brown, 
    836 S.W.2d 530
    , 543 (Tenn. 1992). When the defendant killed the victim in this case, the State of
    Tennessee was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the murder was “intentional,
    premeditated and deliberate,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1), before the defendant
    could be convicted of murder first degree. A “deliberate act” was defined as “one
    performed with a cool purpose.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-201(b)(1). A “premeditated act”
    was defined as “one done after the exercise of reflection and judgment.” Tenn. Code Ann.
    § 39-13-201(b)(2).
    A killing is the result of a “premeditated act” when there is “a previously formed
    design or intent to kill.” State v. West, 
    844 S.W.2d 144
    , 147 (Tenn. 1992). A killing is the
    result of a “deliberate act” when the intent to kill is formed in the absence of passion.
    Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 540. A “deliberate act” requires some period of reflection during
    which the mind is free from the influence of excitement.” Id.
    The elements of premeditation and deliberation are questions for the jury to
    determine. These elements may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
    killing. State v. Gentry, 
    881 S.W.2d 1
    , 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), per. app. denied (Tenn.
    1994). In this case, the evidence was clearly sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the
    defendant killed the victim with premeditation and after deliberation. Tenn. R. App. P.
    13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
     (1979).
    5
    The defendant’s stepfather gave a statement to a police officer the morning after
    the defendant attacked the victim. The statement, inconsistent with his testimony at trial,
    was used to impeach the stepfather. The stepfather told the police that the defendant
    stated he was going to get even with the victim.1 When asked during cross-examination
    about the statement made by his stepfather, the defendant did not deny making the
    statement. He stated he did not make the statement immediately before hitting the victim.
    He opined the statement was made shortly after the victim had struck him. The facts in
    this case established the elements of deliberation and premeditation. Those present inside
    the club stated the defendant was calm and did not indicate any apprehension when the
    victim entered the club. Instead, the defendant saw an opportunity to get even with the
    victim as he had previously indicated. He calmly exited the side door of the club. He
    apparently did not want to alert the victim of his presence inside the club. If he was seen
    by the victim, it would destroy the element of surprise. He drove to his residence, obtained
    the bat, drove back to the club, approached the victim from the rear, and repeatedly struck
    the victim with the bat. Two weeks had passed after the fight with Austin and the victim.
    This was a sufficient period of time for the excitement of the event to subside. These
    circumstances establish the victim acted with a “cool purpose” after “reflection and
    judgment.”
    This issue is without merit.
    II.
    The defendant contends the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by
    refusing to include a special request submitted by him. The request was a definition of the
    term “passion.” The trial court denied the request.
    The term “passion” is a word commonly used by the general population of this State.
    Further, the term can be understood by the citizens who possess ordinary intelligence.
    1
    Although the State of Tennessee cites the stepfather’s prior statement to support
    its argument the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, such evidence is limited
    in scope to impeachment. The evidence cannot be used as substantive evidence to
    support the sufficiency of the evidence.
    6
    See State v. Raines, 
    882 S.W.2d 376
    , 383 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn.
    1994); State v. Braden, 
    867 S.W.2d 750
    , 761 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn.
    1993). Thus, the trial court was not required to give the special request offered by the
    defendant.
    As this Court stated in State v. Glenn Bernard Mann, Dyer County, No. 02-C-01-
    9502-CC-00046 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, August 16, 1996), no court has ever held an
    instruction on the definition of “passion” must be included in the charge given the jury. To
    the contrary, this Court held in State v. Kelley, 
    683 S.W.2d 1
    , 6 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per.
    app. denied (Tenn. 1984), a case factually similar to this case, the trial court was not
    required to give an instruction on the word “passion.”
    The charge given by the trial court was adequate. The court instructed the jury “[t]he
    mental state of the accused at the time he allegedly decided to kill must be carefully
    considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free from excitement
    and passion as to be capable of premeditation.”
    This issue is without merit.
    ____________________________________________
    JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    _________________________________________
    DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
    _________________________________________
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
    7