State v. Anthony Parker ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
MAY SESSION, 1997 October 1, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
ANTHONY DEWAYNE PARKER, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9605-CR-00146
)
Appe llant, )
) SHELBY COUNTY
)
V. )
) HON. JOSEPH B. DAILEY, JUDGE
STATE OF TE NNE SSE E, )
)
Appellee. ) (POST-C ONVIC TION)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
ANTHONY DEWAYNE PARKER JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Reg. #13620-076 Attorney General & Reporter
F.C.I., M emp his
P.O. Box 34550
Memphis, TN 38103 M. ALLISON THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243
JOH N W. P IERO TTI
District Attorney General
JAME S MO RTO N LAM MEY , JR.
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 301
Memphis, TN 38103-1947
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petitioner, Anthony Dewayne Parker, appeals the order of the Shelby
Coun ty Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for p ost-con viction relief.
In this appe al, Petitioner raises numerous issues which can collectively be
summarized as challenging the trial court’s ruling that the petition for post-
conviction relief is time-barred. The Petitioner’s primary argument is that the
Post- Con viction Procedure Act th at bec ame effective May 1 0, 199 5, gives him
a new o ne-ye ar time period in which to file a Petition for Post-C onviction R elief.
After a review of the record, we affirm the lower court’s denial of post-conviction
relief.
Petitioner pled guilty and was convicted of the following offenses on the
following dates : Shoo ting a M issile Calculated to Produce Bodily Harm or Death,
convicted on March 6, 1986; Ro bbery with a Deadly Weapon, convicted on
August 7, 1989; Unlawful Possession of a Sawed-Off Shotgun, convicted on
August 7, 1989 ; Assau lt with Intent to Commit Robbery with a Deadly Weapon,
convicted on August 7, 1989; and Assault to Murder in the First Degree,
convicted on August 7, 1989. On March 5, 1996, Petitioner filed a Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief an d Certiora ri on Direc t Review . The trial court
subs eque ntly dismissed the petition as being barred by the three-year statute of
limitations.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that the petition is time- barred.
In July 1986, the Tennessee Legislature enacted a three-year statute of
limitations on post-conviction petitions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed
1995); see also Passa rella v. State , 891 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Ten n. Crim. App .),
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perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Nov. 28, 1994). Petitioner’s convictions and
sentences were e ffective o n Mar ch 6, 1 986 a nd Au gust 7 , 1989 , and h e did not
appeal any of the convictions. Under the 1986 statute, Petitioner had 3 years
from July 1, 198 6, to file a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief of the 1986
conviction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). Furthermore, since
Petitioner did not appeal the 1989 convictions, he had three years from August
7, 1989 to petition for pos t-conviction relief. See Wa rren v. State , 833 S.W.2d
101, 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). The three-year period ended on August 7,
1992. Petitioner did not file his petition for both the 1986 and 1989 convictions
until March 5, 1996, well past the three-year statute of limitations. Thus, the
Petitioner is barred from seeking post-conviction relief for the 1986 and 1989
convictions.
Petitioner argues that the new Post-Con viction Procedu re Act, effective
May 10, 1995, grants an additional one-year period, until May 10, 1996, for him
to file a post-co nviction pe tition. Howeve r, in Arnold C arter v. State , our supreme
court held: “petitioners for whom the statute of limitations expired prior to the
effective date of the new Ac t, i.e., May 10, 199 5, do not have an additional year
in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief.” ____ S.W.2d _____, No. 03-S-
01-961 2-CR -00117 , slip op. at 2 (T enn., at K noxville, Se pt. 8, 1997 ).
According ly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and hold that the
Petition er’s petition for post-conviction relief is time- barre d by the applic able
three-yea r statute of lim itations.
____________________________________
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THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
GARY R. WA DE, Judge
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
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