State v. Charles R. Mencer ( 2010 )


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  •            IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE             FILED
    JANUARY 1999 SESSION
    May 4, 1999
    Cecil W. Crowson
    Appellate Court Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,             )
    )    C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9712-CR-00582
    Appellee,            )
    )    DAVIDSON COUNTY
    VS.                             )
    )    HON. ANN LACY JOHNS,
    CHARLES R. MENCER,              )    JUDGE
    )
    Appellant.           )    (Suppression of Evidence)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                   FOR THE APPELLEE:
    JOHN S. COLLEY, III                  JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    P.O. Box 1476                        Attorney General & Reporter
    Columbia, TN 38402
    DARYL J. BRAND
    Asst. Attorney General
    John Sevier Bldg.
    425 Fifth Ave., North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III
    District Attorney General
    KYMBERLY HAAS
    Asst. District Attorney General
    Washington Square, Suite 500
    222 Second Ave., North
    Nashville, TN 37201
    OPINION FILED:____________________
    AFFIRMED
    JOHN H. PEAY,
    Judge
    OPINION
    The defendant was charged in the indictment with possession with intent
    to sell or deliver ten to seventy pounds of marijuana. He filed a motion to suppress the
    marijuana, which was denied. The defendant then entered a guilty plea, properly
    preserving for appeal two certified questions that the parties and the trial court agreed
    were dispositive of this case. He now presents one of those issues on appeal, that is,
    whether a search warrant affidavit that relies upon positive “alerts” to drugs by two trained
    drug dogs must include specific statements regarding the drug dogs’ training, past
    performance, and experience in order to establish probable cause. We affirm the trial
    court’s order denying his motion to suppress.
    According to the evidence at the suppression hearing, Drug Enforcement
    Agent (DEA) Mark Lockwood, who was on duty at the Nashville International Airport,
    received a call from an agent at the Houston airport. Agent Lockwood testified the
    Houston agent had told him that a drug detection dog had positively “alerted” for narcotics
    in the suitcase of a passenger flying to Nashville. The tag on the suitcase reflected the
    name “Ricky Miller,” who had flown from Nashville to Houston earlier that same day and
    had been scheduled to return to Nashville on a 4:35 p.m. flight but had changed his flight
    to 5:45 p.m.
    Agent Lockwood testified he first saw the defendant arrive at the incoming
    flight’s gate in Nashville at 7:40 p.m., while at the same time in the baggage tunnel, a
    second drug detection dog indicated the presence of narcotics in the suspected suitcase.
    Agent Lockwood testified he and other agents followed the defendant from the gate to
    the baggage carousel, where the defendant retrieved the suspected suitcase. According
    2
    to Agent Lockwood, he and the other agents approached the defendant, identified
    themselves, and asked to see the defendant’s personal identification, which reflected the
    last name “Mencer.” When asked whether the suitcase he was carrying was his, the
    defendant looked puzzled, said “Well, maybe it isn’t,” and put down the bag. The names
    on the luggage tag and the defendant’s identification were different, but the address on
    the luggage tag and the address on the identification were the same.
    Agent Lockwood testified he asked the defendant if he would consent to a
    search of his suitcase and the defendant replied, “No. I’d like to speak to my attorney.”
    The defendant agreed, however, to accompany the agents to the airport drug interdiction
    office. On the way there, the defendant asked for his Miranda rights to be read to him,
    and an agent complied. Once at the office, Agent Lockwood again asked the defendant
    to consent to a search of his suitcase, and again the defendant declined, asking to speak
    to his attorney. Within five minutes, the defendant was allowed to call his attorney. In
    the meantime, however, a NCIC computer check revealed an outstanding arrest warrant
    for the defendant issued by the Nashville Metro Police Department in an unrelated case.
    The defendant was placed under arrest on this unrelated arrest warrant.
    Agent Lockwood testified that because they were investigating whether the
    defendant was transporting narcotics, they decided to delay transporting the defendant
    for processing on the unrelated arrest warrant until they could execute a search warrant
    to search the defendant’s suitcase. While the defendant waited at the airport drug
    interdiction office, the agents prepared the search warrant. The affidavit in support of the
    search warrant reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
    ON JANUARY 11, 1996, OFFICER JAMES GOODMAN AND OTHER
    MEMBERS OF THE DRUG INTERDICTION UNIT AT THE NASHVILLE,
    3
    TN AIRPORT RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM OFFICER SUSAN
    HUGHES OF THE HOUSTON HOBBY DRUG INTERDICTION UNIT. THE
    INFORMATION WAS IN REGARD TO A PERSON FLYING FROM
    HOUSTON HOBBY TO NASHVILLE, TN. ON SOUTHWEST AIRLINES
    FLIGHT # 649. [sic] FLIGHT 649 WAS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN
    NASHVILLE, TN AT 7:30 PM, AND DID ARRIVE AT 7:40 P.M. OFFICER
    HUGHES RELAYED TO NASHVILLE OFFICERS THAT THE SUBJECT
    WAS FLYING UNDER THE NAME OF RICK MILLER, AND PROVIDED A
    DESCRIPTION OF THE SUBJECT. OFFICER HUGHES FURTHER
    ADVISED THAT THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS SUBJECT HAD
    CONDUCTED HIMSELF AT THE HOUSTON AIRPORT WAS OF A
    SUSPICIOUS NATURE IN THAT THE SUBJECT HAD FIRST BOOKED
    THE FLIGHT SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT 4:30 PM, BUT HAD
    CHANGED TO A LATER FLIGHT, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS AT THE
    AIRPORT IN TIME TO MAKE THE EARLIER FLIGHT. OFFICER
    HUGHES ALSO ADVISED THAT THE PERSON KNOWN AS MILLER AT
    THIS TIME HAD CHECKED ONE PIECE OF LUGGAGE AND HUGHES
    PROVIDED YOUR AFFIANT WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE LUGGAGE.
    BECAUSE OF THE SUSPICIOUS NATURE OF MILLER’S (LATER
    IDENTIFIED AS MENCER) ACTIONS OFFICER HUGHES HAD A DRUG
    DETECTING CANINE, “ROBBIE”, TO [sic] SNIFF THE LUGGAGE IN
    QUESTION FOR THE PRESENCE OF NARCOTICS INSIDE THE
    LUGGAGE. OFFICER HUGHES ADVISED YOUR AFFIANT THAT
    TRAINED DRUG DOG, “ROBBIE”, DID INDICATE POSITIVE FOR THE
    PRESENCE OF NARCOTICS. BASED ON THIS INFORMATION,
    OFFICERS OF THE NASHVILLE AIRPORT DETAIL MET SOUTHWEST
    FLIGHT 649 UPON ITS ARRIVAL IN NASHVILLE,TN. OFFICERS IN
    NASHVILLE WERE ABLE TO LOCATE THE BAG IN QUESTION, AS IT
    ARRIVED IN THE BAGGAGE AREA. CANINE OFFICER RICKY
    WINFREY AND HIS TRAINED DRUG DOG STALLONE CONDUCTED A
    SECOND SNIFF OF THE SUSPECT LUGGAGE THAT HAD BEEN
    CHECKED BY MILLER(AKA MENCER) IN HOUSTON. THE TRAINED
    DRUG DOG STALLONE INDICATED POSITIVE FOR THE PRESENCE
    OF NARCOTIC ODOR COMING FROM THE LUGGAGE. BASED ON THE
    ABOVE LISTED INFORMATION, THE AFFIANT BELIEVES PROBABLE
    CAUSE DOES EXIST FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT.
    At approximately 10:50 p.m., the signed search warrant was returned to the airport drug
    interdiction office, where the defendant was waiting. The search of his suitcase revealed
    two packages of marijuana wrapped in duct tape, each weighing approximately ten
    pounds.
    The defendant argues that the affidavit is insufficient because it fails to
    establish the dogs’ reliability in detecting drugs. According to the defendant, the dogs’
    reliability should have been established in the affidavit with information regarding the
    4
    dogs’ training, breeding, past performance in detecting narcotics, experience,
    certification, “pointing” techniques, and “other qualifications which would give rise to a
    probable cause finding based on their actions/reactions.” The defendant contends that
    because the affidavit did not contain such information, the portion of the affidavit
    regarding the drug detecting dogs “hitting” or positively indicating that his suitcase
    contained narcotics must be disregarded. Without this information in the affidavit, the
    defendant concludes, the affidavit fails to show probable cause, and accordingly, the
    marijuana found during the search must be suppressed.
    This is a case of first impression in Tennessee. A panel of our Court has
    previously held that the State had proven probable cause for a warrantless search by
    introducing evidence that a trained narcotics detection dog certified by the United States
    Police K-9 Association had “alerted” for the presence of narcotics in a vehicle lawfully
    stopped for violation of a license plate lighting law. State v. Dennis R. England, No.
    01C01-9702-CR-00064, Sumner County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed March 31, 1998, at
    Nashville), (citing State v. James Smith, Jr., No. 38, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App.
    filed December 14, 1988, at Jackson)(holding that an affidavit including information from
    two anonymous callers and stating that a trained and “reliable drug dog” had detected
    drugs in a vehicle provided probable cause to issue a search warrant)) rev. granted
    (Tenn. January 19, 1999). No Tennessee appellate court, however, has previously
    considered our issue here, i.e., whether a search warrant affidavit that characterizes
    narcotics dogs as “trained drug dogs” sufficiently delineates the dogs’ training and
    reliability in detecting drugs and thus establishes probable cause, even though the
    affidavit does not delineate the particulars of the dogs’ training, experience, and past
    performance.
    5
    A magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant requires the exercise of
    judicial discretion, and his or her judgment is entitled to great deference. State v. Melson,
    
    638 S.W.2d 342
    , 357 (Tenn. 1982); Hampton v. State, 
    148 Tenn. 155
    , 
    252 S.W. 1007
    (1923). Even so, an appellate court may invalidate a search warrant when the content
    of the underlying affidavit is insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the constitutional
    requirements of probable cause. State v. Longstreet, 
    619 S.W.2d 97
    , 98-99 (Tenn.
    1981).
    In reviewing a search warrant affidavit for probable cause, we must read the
    language “in a commonsense and practical manner,” Melson, 638 S.W.2d at 357, and
    the affiant’s words should be given their natural meaning and interpretation, State v.
    Smith, 
    477 S.W.2d 6
    , 8 (Tenn. 1972); State v. William Dorris Bucy, II, No. 02C01-9709-
    CC-00363, Henry County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed December 10, 1998, at Jackson). The
    probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie showing of a crime, is the standard for
    probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 
    379 U.S. 89
    , 96 (1964).
    Although the defendant urges us to follow cases of different jurisdictions
    that require varying specifics regarding a drug dog’s training and certification, we are
    persuaded by the holding in a United States Sixth Circuit case. In United States v. Berry,
    
    90 F.3d 148
    , 150 (6th Cir. 1996), the defendant challenged a search warrant affidavit that
    stated a “982 F.2d 146
    , 151 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
    defendant’s argument that an affidavit must show how reliable a drug-
    detecting dog has been in the past in order to establish probable cause);
    United States v. Venema, 
    563 F.2d 1003
    , 1007 (10th Cir. 1977)(stating that
    an affidavit in support of a search warrant need not describe the drug-
    detecting dog’s educational background and general qualifications with
    specificity to establish probable cause).
    Id.; see United States v. Cook, No. 89-5947, 
    1990 WL 70703
     (6th Cir. May 29,
    1990)(unpublished)(holding that an affidavit stated probable cause by referring to drug-
    sniffing dogs as “narcotic dog Moose and narcotic dog Bandit” because such references
    reasonably implied training).1
    In this case, the affidavit included the words “trained drug dog” to describe
    Robbie and Stallone, and one of the dogs, Robbie, was also described as a “drug
    detecting canine.” The affidavit specifically stated that both dogs had positively indicated
    the presence of narcotic odor emanating from the defendant’s suitcase. We believe this
    information was sufficient to establish the dogs’ training and reliability in this case. See
    Berry, 90 F.3d at 153.
    1
    The C olorado Suprem e Cou rt has no ted,
    Requiring “a formal recitation of a police dog’s curriculum vitae” could lead to endless
    challeng es to the fa cial sufficien cy of affidav its based on the failure to include in m inute
    detail information of dubious value about the background of the dog involved. For much
    the same reason we reject the assertion that common sense is incapable of supplying
    the connection between the dog’s reaction to the safe, as described in the affidavit, and
    the inference that the safe contained drugs.
    People v. Unruh, 
    713 P.2d 370
    , 382 (Colo. 1986)(citation omitted).
    7
    Given this as well as the other information contained in the affidavit, a
    magistrate exercising judicial discretion could find probable cause to issue a search
    warrant. In addition to independent “alerts” by two drug dogs,2 the affidavit stated that the
    defendant had acted peculiarly by booking a flight scheduled to depart at 4:30 p.m. and
    then changing to a later flight, even though he was at the airport in ample time to make
    the earlier flight. The affidavit also contained facts that the defendant was traveling under
    a false name, although the address on his luggage tag was correct. This information is
    sufficient to establish probable cause in this case.
    Finding that the language of the search warrant sufficiently established the
    drug dogs’ reliability and that the affidavit established probable cause to issue a search
    warrant, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. The
    defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
    _______________________________
    JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
    ______________________________
    THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
    2
    This is not an ordinary one-dog drug-sniffing case. This is a two-dog case, with one drug dog
    independently corroborating the other. Although the defendant argues that one unreliable source cannot
    corrob orate an other, no thing indica tes that R obbie an d Stallone were un reliable.
    8