James Yates v. State ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
MAY SESSION, 1998 FILED
June 9, 1998
JAMES YATES, )
) No. 01C01-9707-CC-00299
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellant )
Appellate Court Clerk
) HICKMAN COUNTY
vs. )
) Hon. DONAL P. HARRIS, Judge
DON SUNDQUIST, Governor of, )
the State of Tennessee, ) (Writ of Habeas Corpus)
DONAL CAMPBELL, )
Commissioner of the )
Tennessee Department of )
Correction, DAVID MILLS, )
Warden of the Tennessee )
State Prison for Men, )
CHARLES TRAUGHBER, )
Chairman of the Tennessee )
Board of Paroles, THE )
TENNESSEE SENTENCING )
COMMISSION, in their )
individual and official )
capacities, )
Appellees
For the Appellant: For the Appellees:
Trippe Steven Fried John Knox Walkup
King, Turnbow & Brisby Attorney General and Reporter
203 Third Avenue South
Franklin, TN 37064 Daryl J. Brand
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Joseph D. Baugh
District Attorney General
P. O. Box 937
Franklin, TN 37065-0937
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, James Yates, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se
application for writ of habeas corpus. The appellant is currently incarcerated in the
Turney Center correctional facility in Hickman County, where he is serving concurrent
sentences of life imprisonment and nine years for his convictions for open rebellion with
the intent to kill and aggravated assault upon a corrections officer. These convictions
occurred in July, 1985, while the appellant was confined as an inmate in the Ft. Pillow
correctional facility in Lauderdale County. 1
The appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus challenges both his conviction
and resulting sentence for the crime of open rebellion based upon the following
grounds: (1) his confinement constitutes ex post facto punishment; (2) his sentence is
violative of equal protection; (3) incarceration has denied him due process of law; and
(4) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. On June 23, 1997, the trial
court, without conducting a hearing, entered a “Memorandum” and Order dismissing
the appellant’s petition. The appellant appeals this ruling.
BACKGROUND
On July 11, 1985, a state of open rebellion, instigated by the appellant and two
other inmates, existed at the Ft. Pillow State Prison in Lauderdale County. During the
confrontation and melee between inmates and correctional officers, three officers were
severely injured. The disturbance was eventually quashed by the prison’s TACT team.
It was later determined that the appellant was a leader in the prison riot and participated
in the assaults. The appellant was subsequently convicted by a jury of open rebellion,
aggravated assault, and simple assault. These convictions and sentences were
affirmed by this court on direct appeal. See State v. Willis, C.C.A. No. 3, (Tenn. Crim.
1
The a ppellant’s inc arcera tion in Laud erdale C ounty stem med from Shelby C ounty
convictions.
2
App., at Jackson, Jan. 21, 1987), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn., 1987).
ANALYSIS
The appellant argues that, under the current criminal code, which became
effective in 1989, “the term of the sentence applied to Open Rebellion [in 1985] was
significantly reduced from life imprisonment to an 8 to 30 year period of incarceration.”
Thus, he contends that the disparate punishment in the two criminal codes violates his
right of equal protection, imposes cruel and inhuman punishment, violates due process
and constitutes ex post facto punishment.
The appellant asserts that the trial court’s memorandum order addressed only
the issue of “equal protection.” Therefore, he contends that, because the court failed
to address the issues of ex post facto punishment, violation of due process and cruel
and unusual punishment, the case must be remanded for a determination of these
issues.2 For the following reasons, we disagree.
First, a state writ of habeas corpus will issue only in the case of a void judgment
or to free a prisoner held in custody after his term of imprisonment has expired. Tenn.
Const. Art. 1, §15; Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101 et. seq. (1990). A petitioner cannot
collaterally attack a facially valid conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. Potts v.
State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992). Unless it appears on the face of the judgment
or the record of the proceedings that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction or that the
defendant’s sentence has expired, a habeas corpus proceeding cannot be maintained.
2
In rejecting the appellant’s equal protection argument that he should have the benefit of
the redu ced pe nalties of the current law , the trial court p roperly foun d that “the 1 989 Ac t by its
express language did ‘not affect rights and duties that matured, penalties that were incurred, or
proceedings that were begu n before its effective date.’” See 1989 T enn. Pu b. Acts, C h.591, § 1 15.
See also State ex re l Crum v. Mc W herte r, et al, No. 02C01-9108-CC-00181 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
Jackson, May 13, 1992) (rejecting virtually the identical argument presented in this case and
holdin g tha t “soc iety ha s a st rong intere st in p rese rving the fin ality of c rim inal litiga tion re sultin g in
a conviction and sentence which w ere valid at the time of their imposition”).
3
See Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). Because the Circuit Court
of Lauderdale County had jurisdiction to try and decide the case and the record reflects
that the sentence imposed has not expired, habeas corpus relief is not available.
Moreover, if from the face of the petition, the reviewing courts finds nothing to indicate
that the appellant’s challenged convictions might be void, the court shall dismiss the
petition and refuse the issuance of the writ. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-101; - 109.
Again, the appellant argues “that when the Tennessee Sentencing Reform Act
of 1989 was incorporated into law, the term of the sentence applied to Open Rebellion
was significantly reduced from life imprisonment to an 8 to 30 year period of
incarceration consistent with its classification as a Class B felony.” This argument is
misplaced. The crime of Open Rebellion as codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-5-712(1982) was repealed upon enactment of the 1989 Criminal Code. There is no
equivalent or corresponding crime found in our current criminal code for the repealed
offense of open rebellion. An indictment charging the conduct previously proscribed
for the crime of open rebellion would require the charging of multiple offenses under our
current criminal code.3 The statutory provision referred to by the appellant simply
provides that, “for . . . sentencing purposes after November 1, 1989,” in determining
the classification of a felony committed prior to November 1, 1989, i.e., “[r]ebellion by
a convict with the intent to kill or escape shall be classified as a class B felony in
establishing the appropriate sentence range.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-118 (1990).
Finally, the appellant attempts to utilize habeas procedures as a vehicle for direct
appeal. Indeed, in the appellant’s direct appeal to this court, he presented the same
issue as in the instant petition, i.e., “[w]hether the imposition of a life sentence,
3
Open rebellion as codified a t 39-5-71 2, was d efined as follows:
Rebellion with intent to kill or escape. - If any convict confined in the penitentiary
for a term less than life, openly rebel with intent to kill the warden or any other
officer thereof, or with intent, by open violence to escape, he shall, on conviction
thereof, be imprisoned in the penitentiary for life.
4
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-5-712, is violative of the appellant’s Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” Willis, C.C.A. No. 3.
Not only is this issue inappropriate for consideration, it is res judicata. Similarly
presented are the issues of due process and ex post facto punishment. A petition for
habeas corpus relief is an inappropriate procedure in which to review potential errors
of a trial court. Richmond v. Barksdale, 688 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1984)
(quoting State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d 284 (Tenn. 1979)). Moreover, we
note that the factual allegations of this case do not permit invocation of an ex post facto
challenge.
For these reasons, we find summary dismissal of the appellant’s writ for habeas
corpus proper. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
________________________________
GARY R. WADE, Presiding Judge
________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
5