State v. Sue Tidwell ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
NOVEMB ER SESSION, 1997 March 4, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk
C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9610-CR-00445
)
Appellee, )
)
) DAVIDSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. THOMAS H. SHRIVER
SUE ANN TIDWELL, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (Assau lt & Disord erly Con duct)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JEFFREY A. DEVASHER JOHN KNOX WALKUP
On Appeal Attorney General and Reporter
Senior Assistant Public Defender
GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER
JEFFERSON T. DORSEY Assistant Attorney General
At Trial 425 5th Avenu e North
Assistant Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243
1202 Stahlman Building
Nashville, TN 37201 VICTOR S. JOHNSON
District Attorney General
PAMELA ANDERSON
Assistant District Attorney General
1202 Stahlman Building
Nashville, TN 37201
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defe ndan t, Sue A nn T idwell, a ppea ls as of r ight pu rsuan t to Ru le 3,
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. She was convicted after a bench trial
of one count of simple assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and one count of
disord erly conduct, a Class C misde meano r.1 She was sentenced to six months,
suspended with probation, for the assault conviction and orde red to pay a fifty-
dollar ($50) fine fo r the disord erly cond uct conv iction. She appea ls both of h er
convictions and the sentence for assault, raising two issues: (1) That the
evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of guilt for assault or for disord erly
condu ct, and (2 ) that the trial cou rt erred in imposing the maximum sentence for
assa ult and failing to grant judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
On January 19, 1996, Willie Burks2 with the Metropolitan Animal Control
office in Nashville, Tennessee was conducting a routine patrol. His duties
included patrolling for and picking up stray animals as well as issuing citations or
summons to animal owners. He was driving on Louisiana Avenue and noticed
two loose do gs, a black Labrador Retriever and a German Shepherd mix. They
were located in front of a residential dwelling at 6009 Louisiana. While he was
attempting to apprehend the dogs, the Defendant emerged from her house
across the street a t 6006 L ouisiana . Burks asked the Defendant about the dogs
1
Tenn. Code A nn §§ 39-13-101(a)(3), 39-17-30 5(b).
2
W e not e tha t in the reco rd, he has b een altern ately re ferre d to a s “Bu rks ” and “Bur k.” W e will
refer to the witness as “Burks” in this opinion.
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and she replied that she owned the Shepherd mix. Burks informed the
Defendant that he would have to issue her a citation or pick up the dogs.
The Defendant attempted to put the Lab inside the fence around the 6009
property. Burks told her she could not do that because it was not her dog and
that if the owner was not home, he would have to pick up the dog. The
Defendant started talking loudly and cursing Burks . The D efend ant told him that
he had no right to be o n the ne ighbor’s p roperty. Burks went into the yard to get
the Lab and the Defendant distracted him. The dog ran away. Burks informed
the Defendant that he was going to write her a summons for interfering and for
letting her dog run loose . She told h im he “w asn’t gon na write h er anythin g.”
Burks aske d for pro of of the Shep herd m ix’s vaccinations and the De fenda nt said
Burks would have to call the animal clinic. The Defendant told Burks that she
was not going to let him pick up the dogs. The Defendant continued to “rant and
rave” at Burks, so he called his office to dispatch a police officer to the scene. He
informed the Defendant that he was going to call the police and she told him she
did not care and went back across the street to her house.
Burks sat in his truck w hile he waited for an officer to arrive. He observed
a “Chihuahua lookin g dog ” runnin g bac k and forth be tween the De fenda nt’s
property at 6006 and the property at 6008 Louisiana. Both houses were
surrounded by a fence. There was a fence dividing the two houses with an
opening between them through which the dog was running. Officer Georg e
Espinoza of the Na shville Me tropolitan P olice De partme nt arrived. Burks
explained the situation to Espin oza. The Defendant ran up to the police car and
told Espinoza that the y did not know the law and that Burks could not enter the
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neigh bor’s property. Burks asked who owned the property adjacent to the
Defe ndan t’s where he saw the little dog running and she told him she did not
know who owned the property. The house at 6008 appeared to be vacant. The
Defendant went inside her house. Burks tried to catch the “Chihuahua” and the
Defendant yelled “if he don’t leave my dog alone I’m gone(sic) bust him in his
damn head.” The D efenda nt bega n to run off her front porch, down a few steps.
Officer Espinoza, who was standing at the bottom of the porch steps, stood
between the De fenda nt and Burks and to ld the D efend ant tha t she d id not need
to do that. The Defendant pushed Officer Espinoza with both hands. He then
decided to arrest the Defendant and grabbed her left arm and walked her towards
his cruiser. T he De fendan t was yelling that she would not lea ve her elderly
mother and aunt alone in the house. She dropped herself to the ground and
yelled at passing cars that Espinoza and Burks were trying to hurt her and take
her dogs. A neighbor came by and offered assistance with the elde rly ladies if
that was needed.
Officer Espinoza radioed for backup. Officer Suel arrived on the scene and
also had no luck in gaining the Defendant’s cooperation. The offic ers dec ided to
contact Sergeant Ogren. Sergeant Ogren could hear the Defendant yelling in the
background during the conversation. When Ogren arrived, the Defendant went
back inside her house. Ogren went to the door and knocked and told the
Defendant that he needed to come in. The Defendant allowed Sergeant Ogren
inside and he requested to see her driver’s license so Burks could issue the
citations. The Defendant apologized and attem pted to dem onstra te how lightly
she had pushed Officer Espinoza. Sergeant Ogren took the license outside and
the Defendant again locked herself inside and would not open the door. No
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arrest was made at that tim e bec ause of con cern fo r the we lfare of th e elde rly
women in the home. The officers took her license to the property room for her
to retrieve rather than leaving it on the doorstep.
The Defendant testified at trial and presented a quitclaim deed indicating
that she wa s an ow ner of the property at 6008 L ouisiana Ave., the p roperty
adjacent to hers to which her dog was running. She described her small dog as
a Dachshund. When the dogcatcher, Mr. Burks arrived, the Defendant said she
assisted him in locating the owner of the black Lab that was running loose. The
Defendant also said she attempted unsuccessfully to put the Shepherd mix dog
in her yard, b ut did not s tate that it belonged to her. She testified that the Lab
started to growl and she was telling B urks “y ou ain ’t supposed to be in this yard,
get out of the yard so he said lady go on in your house and shut up, so I kind of
stepped back and he said he was going to call the police.” When Officer
Espinoza arrived, the Defen dant state d that she did not b elieve that Burks had
a right to go in to the neighbor’s yard. The Defendant then noted that Burks was
stating that he was going to get her Dachshund that he observed runnin g
between the yards. She went inside her house and saw Burks w ith his “dog pole”
talking with Espinoza. When she saw Burks and Espinoza enter her yard, she
came out of the house and told B urks to lea ve. She s aid “Mak e him sto p” to
Espinoza and was standing near him on the porch steps. She testified that she
bumped Espinoza to get to her dog, which she was afraid would be hurt by the
“dog pole.” When Espinoza arrested her, she dropped to the ground and
screamed. The D efenda nt denied threaten ing to “bust” Burks’ head. She also
denied pushing Officer Espinoza, but stated that “they kind of hit hands” as she
ran by because she was holding them up to protect her chest. She denied
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screaming at passing cars. The Defendant denie d interfering with Burks’
attemp ts to catch the dogs, specifically that she did not physically step in front of
him. Sh e adm itted that sh e told him to leave the dog alon e.
Bench warrants were issued in the Dav idson C ounty Metropolitan General
Sessions Court on behalf of Willie Burks and Officer Espinoza for two counts of
assa ult and one c ount o f disord erly conduct. The Defendant was convicted on
March 25, 1996 in General Sessions Court of both counts of assault and the
count of disorderly conduct. She appealed to the Criminal Court of Davidson
Coun ty on March 29, 1996. A bench trial was conducted, after which the
Defendant was convicted of one count of assault on Officer Espinoza and one
count of diso rderly conduct. She was sentenced to six months on probation and
a fifty-dollar ($50) fine, respectively. The D efenda nt filed a no tice of app eal to
this Court on October 1, 1996. She also filed a petition to this Court for
extraord inary appea l pursuan t to Rule 1 0, Ten nesse e Rules of Appe llate
Procedure, to stay execution of her sentence pending her appeal. This Court
ordered, under Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, governing
conditions of release pending appeal, that the petition be granted because the
appeal would become moot in the absence of a stay of execution.
W e now consider the merits of the Defenda nt’s issues in this app eal. In
her first issue, the Defenda nt conten ds that the evidenc e was ins ufficient to
support her convictions. When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the
convicting evidence, the standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the
light mos t favora ble to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reas onable doubt. Jackson v.
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Virgin ia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Questions concerning the credibility of the
witnesses, the we ight an d value to be g iven the eviden ce, as well as all factual
issues raised by the evide nce, are resolved by the trier of fa ct, not this co urt.
State v. Pappas, 754 S .W .2d 62 0, 623 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 987). N or ma y this
court reweigh or reevalu ate the ev idence . State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832,
835 (T enn. 19 78).
In a case tried without a jury, the verdict of the trial judge is entitled to the
same weight on appea l as a jury verd ict. State v. H atchett, 560 S.W.2d 627, 630
(Tenn. 1978 ). On a ppea l, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of
the evidenc e and a ll inference s therefro m. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835.
Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces
it with a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of
illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the
trier of fact. State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); Grace, 493
S.W.2d at 476.
The Defendant argues that the eviden ce was insufficient to suppo rt a
verdict of guilt for assault. She was convicted based on the following provisions
regarding the offense of assault: “(a) A person commits assault who: (3)
Intentio nally or knowingly causes physical conta ct with a nothe r and a reaso nable
perso n wou ld rega rd the c ontac t as extre mely offensive or provocative.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a )(3). She contends that the State failed to prove that
she intentionally or knowingly committed the assault. “‘Intentional’ refers to a
person who acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a
result of the conduct when it is the person’s conscious objective or de sire to
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engage in the conduct or cause the re sult.” Tenn. Co de Ann. § 3 9-11-106(a )(18).
“Knowing refers to a person who acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or
to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature
of the conduc t or that the circum stance s exist. A pe rson ac ts know ingly with
respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the person is aware that the
conduct is reasonably ce rtain to cause the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-
106(a)(2 0).
The Defendant argues that any contact with Officer Espinoza was an
unintentional result of her rushing down the sta irs to give aid to her do g. Yet,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it reflects that
the Defen dant actively pushed the officer. Willie Burks testified that as the
Defendant was running off the porch, Officer Espinoza told her to stop and
stepped in front o f her. H e furthe r testified that “she pushed him and almost
knocked him off his feet.” Officer Espinoza testified that the Defendant came
down the ste ps an d he to ld her n ot to go toward Burks . He ste pped in front of her
and she pushed him “[j]ust opened hand, just pushed me backwards [with] two
hands .” The Defendant herself testified that she knew her body would touch the
officer’s if she tried to go around him on the steps. She testified that she
anticipated him getting in front of her and admitted that she h eld her hands up.
From the testimony presented at trial, there is sufficient evidence to establish that
the Defe ndan t either intentio nally or k nowin gly eng aged in con duct th at wou ld
result in an assault as indicated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-
101(a)(3).
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The Defendant also argues that the State failed to prove that the contact
made with Office r Espino za was “extreme ly offensive o r provoca tive.”
Specifically, she contends that the officer did not testify that it was offensive or
that he felt prov oked . How ever, e stablis hing th is element of the offense does not
require proof tha t a certain individual experience d the act as extrem ely offensive
or provocative, but that a “reasonable person” would consider the act as such.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a)(3). This is an ob jective standard
measu red by what a reasonable person would think if he or she were pushed
backwards. With this in m ind, it is like ly that a re ason able p erson would consider
being shoved by som eone w ith two hands as offens ive or provo cative. In
addition, Officer Es pinoza did testify that he felt angry “[w]hen she pushed me
yes, I was angry, caus e if I pus hed h er she ’d be angry.” The Defendant testified
that after she pushed him the officer said “‘you don’t touch me’ and he pushed
me back. He said ‘you keep your hands off of me’ and his mouth started
quivering real bad.” This we believe is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt for
the offens e of assa ult.
The Defendant also charges that the evidence was insufficient to sus tain
her conviction for disorde rly condu ct. She was convicted under the provision of
the statute that reads: “(b) A person also violates this section who makes
unreasonable noise wh ich preve nts other s from c arrying on lawful activities .”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-305(b). The Defendant argues that the State failed to
prove that she made unreasonable noise although she yelled at passing cars.
Furthermore, she claims that her behavior was protected speech as provided for
in the Firs t Ame ndm ent to th e Con stitution of the United S tates and Article I,
section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Defendant cites two cases from
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this Court for the proposition that her verbal communications constituted
legitimate opposition to police action rathe r than “f ighting words ” that wo uld
susta in a convictio n for disord erly cond uct. See Garvey v. State, 537 S.W.2d 709(Tenn. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Ina C. S cott, C.C.A. N o. 17, Me igs Cou nty
(Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Mar. 16, 1989). In Garvey, the Defe ndant y elled
“sooey” at a police officer, which was not considered to be “fighting words.”
Garvey, 537 S.W.2d at 711. In Scott, the defen dant, with the assistance of two
compatriots, objected to her husband’s arrest and “mounted a loud, profane and
lewd verbal as sault on th e sheriff.” Slip op. at 2. A crowd of 30 or 40 persons
gathered, her friends eve n tried to get he r to calm down , yet she eventu ally
“‘slung a cup of ice across the lot’ and called the sheriff ‘a fat son of a bitch.’” Id.A panel of this Court found her words to be protected speech, noting that she
never threatened any form of physical assault. Slip op. at 5. The State cites
State v. Creasy, 885 S .W .2d 82 9 (Te nn. C rim. App. 1994), in which the
defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct when, in response to a patrol
officer’s attempt to issue him a parking citation, he placed himself between the
officer and the car, hu rling ep ithets, c lench ing his fist, and pointing at the officer.
Id. at 831. This Court distinguished Creasy from Scott, noting that the
defen dant’s behavior was threatening such that it would support a diso rderly
condu ct convictio n. Id. at 832.
We note that the opinions cited address differen t portion s of the disord erly
conduct statute than that with which we are concerned. While the
aforementioned cases dealt with whether the defendants’ speech rose to the
level of threate ning conduct, the case sub judice involves the determination of
whether the Defendant’s conduct prevented Burks and Espinoza from carrying
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on lawful activity. There is evidence in the record that the Defendant approached
Burks when he first attempted to catch the Lab and the Shepherd mix. He
testified that the Defendant tried to put the Lab inside the neighbor’s fence and
when he went in to catch the dog, she began talking loud and cursing at him.
She distracted Burks, which resulted in the dog running off. Burks told the
Defendant he was going to write her a citation and she disagreed. The
Defendant told Burks she would not allow him to pick up the dogs. When Officer
Espinoza was dispatched to the scene, the Defendant continued to object loudly.
Burks’ attempts to ca tch the Dach shund run ning betwee n the Defen dant’s yard
and the adjacent house were thwarted when the Defendant threatened to “bust
your damn head,” and later ran toward him. T his culm inated in the a ssau lt
against Espinoza. Afterwards, the D efendant co ntinued to yell at pass ing cars
and res isted prod ucing he r driver’s licens e by lockin g herse lf in the hou se.
The Defen dant’s co urse of co nduct, w hich con sisted of ye lling, cursing
and threatening Burk s, resulted in his failure to engag e in his ass igned d uty to
procure the stray dogs.3 We believe there was sufficient proof to establish that
the Defendant engaged in disorderly conduct prohibited by Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-17 -305( b). Th erefor e, we c onclu de tha t this issu e is
without m erit.
In her seco nd issue , the Defe ndant c ontends that the trial court erred by
impo sing the maximum sentence for assault and for failing to grant judicial
diversion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. The
Defe ndan t’s conviction for assault by engaging in extremely offensive or
3
See Nashville, Tenn., Code §§ 8.04.010, 8.04.120.
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provocative contact constitute s a Clas s B mis deme anor. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-1 01 (a)(3), (b). She was sentenced to six months probation, the
maximum length of senten ce for that m isdem eanor c lass. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-35-11 1(e)(2).
When an accused challenges the length, range, or the manner of service
of a senten ce, this cou rt has a du ty to conduct a de novo review of the sentence
with a presum ption that the determ inations mad e by the trial court are correct.
Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-4 01(d). This pre sumption is "conditioned upon the
affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing
principles and all relevant fa cts and c ircums tances ." State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d
166, 169 (T enn. 1991 ).
In conducting a de novo review of a sentence, this court must consider: (a)
the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the
presentence report; (c) the princip les of sen tencing a nd argu ments as to
sentencing alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct
involved; (e) any statutory mitigating or enhancement factors; (f) any statement
that the de fenda nt ma de on his ow n beh alf; and (g) the p otentia l or lack of
potential for rehab ilitation or treatm ent. Ten n. Cod e Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103,
and -21 0; see State v. S mith, 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1987 ).
If our review reflects that the trial court followed the statutory sentencing
procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after having given due consideration and
proper weight to the factors and principles set out under the sentencing law, and
that the trial c ourt's findings of fact are adequately supported by the record, then
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we may not modify the sentence even if we would have preferred a different
result. State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1991 ).
The misdemeanant, unlike the felon, is not entitled to the presumption of
a minim um se ntence . State v. Creasy, 885 S.W .2d 829 (Te nn. Crim. Ap p.1994).
The Crim inal Sentence Reform Act of 1989 requires trial judges sentencing
misdemeanor defendants to set a percentage of the sentence after which a
defendant is eligible for certain rehabilitative release programs, such as wo rk
release, furloughs, and trusty status. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(d). The
percentage must be between zero and seventy-five percent. In determining the
percentage of the sentence, the court should consider enhancement and
mitigating factors as well as the legislative purposes and principles related to
sentencing. State v. Palmer, 902 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1995); see also Tenn.
Code Ann. § 4 0-35-30 2(d). Furthermore, the trial judge has the authority to place
the defendant on probation immediately after sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
35-302 (e)(2).
The Defendant charges that the trial court failed to consider and to place
on the record the a pplicable statutory enhancement and mitigating factors when
determining the length of her sentence. However, we find no statutory
requirement that a trial judge document consideration of the enhancement and
mitigating factors unless ordering a term of confine ment a s part of a
misdemeanor sentence. T he Code provision govern ing misdem eanor sentences
states that, when imp osing a m isdemea nor sentenc e, the trial court “shall fix a
spec ific numb er of mo nths, day s or hou rs . . . The court shall impose a sentence
consistent with the purposes and principles of this chapter.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
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40-35-302 (b). When confinement is ordered, “[i]n determining the percentage of
the sentence to be served in actual confinement, the court shall consider the
purposes of this chapter, the principles of sentencing, and the enhancement and
mitigating factors set forth herein, and shall not impose such percentages
arbitrarily.” Te nn. Co de Ann . § 40-35 -302(d); Palmer, 902 S.W .2d at 393 -94.
W e observe that the trial judge failed to state on the record his sentencing
decis ion in reference to the purposes and principles of the Act, thus warranting
a de novo review. Ye t, the misd emea nant, un like the felon , is not entitled to the
presum ption of a m inimum senten ce. State v. Buck meir, 902 S.W.2d 418, 424
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The Defendant was convicted of assaulting a police
officer as he attempted to prevent another possible assault by the Defendant on
an anim al con trol officia l. With the circ ums tance s of the case in mind, we cannot
conclude that a six-m onth sentence was excessive. Nor can we conclude that
the trial cou rt erred by failing to con sider e nhan cem ent an d mitigating factors
because the Defendant was placed on full probation. Cons ideration of the factors
is only required when a term of confinement has been ordered. Therefore, we
find this issu e to be w ithout me rit.
The Defenda nt also charge s that the trial court erred by failing to order
expun gable probatio n, or in othe r words, jud icial diversion . We note initially that,
because the Defe ndant h as failed to cite authority to support her argum ent, this
issue is waived. T enn. C t. Crim. Ap p. R. 10(b ); State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d
228, 231 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988 ). The Defendant notes that the General
Sessions judge ordered such expu ngable prob ation. The reco rd indicates that
the Criminal Court judge stated: “I sentence her to six months not on a 40-35-313
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as was below . . . The six months will be on supervised probation . . . .” Yet, we
have found nothin g in the record that indicates that the Defendant requested
judicial diversion at the Criminal Court level. Under these circumstances, we
cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion.
Accord ingly, the jud gmen t of the trial cou rt is affirmed .
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
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