James Edward Hughes v. State ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
JULY 1997 SESSION
August 22, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
JAMES EDWARD HUGHES, ) NO. 01C01-9605-CC-00188
a.k.a. LARRY WAYNE HUGHES )
)
Appellant ) RUTHERFORD COUNTY
)
V. ) HON. J.S. DANIEL, JUDGE
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction)
)
Appellee )
)
FOR THE APPELLANT FOR THE APPELLEE
Cheryl J. Skidmore John Knox Walkup
629 East Main Street Attorney General and Reporter
Hendersonville, Tennessee 37075 450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
(appeal only)
Eugene J. Honea
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
William C. Whitesell
District Attorney General
Judicial Building, third floor
Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37130
OPINION FILED:______
AFFIRMED
William M. Barker, Judge
Opinion
The Appellant, James Edward Hughes, appeals as of right the Rutherford
County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On July 10,
1985, the Appellant pled guilty to robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. On
December 9, 1993, the Appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
The District Court used the robbery conviction to enhance the Appellant’s sentence.
The Appellant filed this post-conviction relief petition to overturn the Rutherford County
robbery conviction in order to have his sentence in the federal penitentiary reduced.
On March 21, 1996, without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the
petition, ruling that it was barred by the statute of limitations.
Pursuant to the now-repealed Post-Conviction Procedure Act, the statute of
limitation applicable to the Appellant’s post-conviction claims was three years.1 Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). That three-year period began running on
July 1, 1986, the effective date of the statute. The last day on which the Appellant
could have filed such a petition was in July of 1989. See e.g. State v. Mullins, 767
S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); Smith v. State, 757 S.W.2d 683, 685
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Masucci, 754 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1988); Abston v. State, 749 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The
Appellant’s petition was filed in March of 1996, more than six years after the statute
expired. Consequently, the trial court properly dismissed the Appellant’s petition.
Any contention by the Appellant that the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act,
effective May 10, 1995, provided him with a one-year window of opportunity within
which to file his post-conviction petition is meritless. Similar attempts to circumvent
the statute of limitations in this manner have been previously rejected by panels of this
1
Prior to the enactment of the 1986 Post-Conviction Procedure Act, no statute of limitations for
post-conviction applications existed.
2
Court. See Roy Barnett v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9512-CV-00394 (Tenn. Crim.
App., Knoxville, Feb. 20, 1997); Stephen Koprowski v. State, C.A.A. No. 03C01-9511-
CC-00365 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jan. 28, 1997); Johnny L. Butler v. State,
C.C.A. No. 02C01-9509-CR-00289 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Dec. 2, 1996). But
see Arnold Carter v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9509-CC-00270 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Knoxville, July 11, 1996).
Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of the Appellant’s petition for post-
conviction relief is affirmed.
__________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUDGE
CONCUR:
__________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
__________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
3