Ralph Dean Purkey v. State ( 1999 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    FILED
    AT KNOXVILLE                     July 16, 1999
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    MARCH 1999 SESSION               Appellate C ourt
    Clerk
    RALPH DEAN PURKEY,                 *    C.C.A. # 03C01-9808-CC-00268
    Appellant,            *    BLEDSOE COUNTY
    VS.                                *    Hon. Thomas W . Graham, Judge
    JAMES A. BOWLEN, WARDEN, and       *    (Habeas Corpus)
    THE TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTION,                     *
    Appellees.            *
    For Appellant:                          For Appellees:
    Ralph Dean Purkey, pro se               John Knox Walkup
    No. 110256                              Attorney General and Reporter
    STSRCF, Unit 6
    Route 4, Box 600                        Todd R. Kelley
    Pikeville, TN 37367                     Assistant Attorney General
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    James W. Pope, III
    Assistant District Attorney General
    District Attorney General's Office
    Twelfth Judicial District
    265 Third Avenue, Suite 300
    Dayton, TN 37321
    OPINION FILED:__________________________
    AFFIRMED
    GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
    OPINION
    The petitioner, Ralph Dean Purkey, appeals the trial court's denial of
    his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The single issue presented for our review is
    whether the petition was properly dismissed. We find no error and affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    On September 25, 1986, the petitioner was convicted of grand larceny
    in Cocke County and received a ten-year sentence. Because he was found to be a
    habitual criminal, his sentence was enhanced to a term of life in prison. Defense
    counsel filed a motion for a new trial but the motion was dismissed because the
    petitioner escaped from custody after his conviction. No appeal was taken. Ralph
    Dean Purkey v. State, No. 03C01-9607-CC-00257, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
    at Knoxville, Oct. 8, 1997). The petitioner was eventually apprehended and,
    afterward, filed numerous petitions for post-conviction relief, all of which were
    dismissed as time-barred. See id. (ruling that the third petition was barred by the
    statute of limitations).
    On May 29, 1998, the petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas
    corpus alleging that his convictions were obtained as a result of violations of the
    Tennessee and United States Constitutions. He contended that his conviction for
    grand larceny over $200.00 is void because it is based on insufficient evidence. The
    petitioner argued that the victim testified at trial to a loss in cash and food stamps
    totaling only $150.00, less than the $200.00 minimum required at that time to
    support a grand larceny conviction. The petitioner points out that the presentence
    report, which includes the victim's statement, documents a loss of only "$150.00 in
    cash and food stamps as a result of this offense."
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    The trial court observed that the petition would have been barred by
    the statute of limitations had the petitioner sought post-conviction relief and ruled
    that habeas corpus relief was not warranted because the petitioner was unable to
    establish that his term of imprisonment had expired or that the judgment was facially
    invalid. In this appeal, the petitioner complains that there was insufficient evidence
    to support a conviction of grand larceny in an amount over $200.00 and the
    enhancement of the sentence to a term of life due to habitual criminality was,
    therefore, improper.
    In this state, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only when a
    petitioner has established lack of jurisdiction for the order of confinement or that he
    is otherwise entitled to immediate release because of the expiration of his sentence.
    See Ussery v. Avery, 
    432 S.W.2d 656
     (Tenn. 1968); State ex rel. Wade v. Norvell,
    
    443 S.W.2d 839
     (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969). A "person imprisoned or restrained of his
    liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, ... may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus,
    to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment...." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101.
    The writ of habeas corpus, however, is available only when it appears on the face of
    the judgment or the record that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict or
    sentence the defendant or that the sentence of imprisonment has otherwise expired.
    Archer v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 157
    , 164 (Tenn. 1993); Potts v. State, 
    833 S.W.2d 60
    ,
    62 (Tenn. 1992).
    In John Wayne Slate v. State, No. 03C01-9201-CR-00014 (Tenn.
    Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 2, 1994), a panel of this court granted post-conviction
    relief based upon insufficient evidence of deliberation, an essential element of first
    degree murder. Because the insufficiency qualified as a violation of due process,
    the conviction was declared constitutionally "void" and was modified to second
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    degree murder. On October 21, 1994, our supreme court denied application for
    permission to appeal, yet concurred in results only. The ruling in Slate was based
    upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
     (1979). In Jackson, a federal habeas corpus case, the
    Supreme Court ruled that due process of law is violated when a conviction results
    from evidence which is insufficient under the reasonable doubt standard. 443 U.S.
    at 317-18, 99 S. Ct. at 2788. The high court held that federal habeas corpus relief is
    available "if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational
    trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S. at
    324, 99 S. Ct. at 2791-92.
    .
    At the time of this offense, petit larceny, then defined as a theft of less
    than $200.00, was not among those listed offenses which would trigger a life
    sentence based upon habitual criminality. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-801 (1982).
    Basically, the petitioner contends that the evidence at his trial was insufficient to
    support a conviction of grand larceny. Certainly, the presentence report and a
    portion of the transcript provided by the petitioner and included in this record
    suggests that the restitution ordered was less than $200.00, an indication at least
    that the value of the stolen items was less than the $200.00 threshold.
    An exhibit presented from the sentencing hearing establishes that
    counsel for the defense objected when a witness testified that the amount of money
    and food stamps approximated $150.00. At that point, the trial judge observed as
    follows:
    She is estimating under $200.00[.] I don't know why you
    would object. Let the record show you object, and I
    overrule.
    Our inference from this is that the trial court observed that the petitioner's counsel
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    could hardly complain since the request for restitution was for an amount less than
    that established at trial. The statement, of course, was made after the jury had
    returned a verdict of guilt under the petit larceny indictment.
    A transcription of the trial is not included in this limited record. The
    burden is always on the appellant to supply an adequate record on appeal for a
    determination of the issues presented. Without the trial record, it would be
    impossible to determine whether the evidence was sufficient. In consequence, this
    court must presume that the trial court correctly ruled. Smith v. State, 
    589 S.W.2d 811
     (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Vermilye v. State, 
    584 S.W.2d 226
     (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1979).
    Habeas corpus relief under the Tennessee statute is limited. In
    several cases, it has been held that a claim of insufficient evidence does not fall
    within the definition of facial validity. See, e.g., Shepherd v. State, 
    533 S.W.2d 335
    ,
    338 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975). Because the inadequacy of the record dictates the
    result, it is not necessary for this court to consider whether state habeas corpus
    relief would be available based on insufficient evidence in accordance with the
    rulings in Jackson and Slate.
    Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
    ________________________________
    Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
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    CONCUR:
    _____________________________
    Norma McGee Ogle, Judge
    _____________________________
    Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
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