Mark Griffis v. State ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
November 10, 1999
SEPTEMBER 1999 SESSION Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
MARK SHANE GRIFFIS, * C.C.A. No. 03C01-9811-CR-00397
Appellant, * ROANE COUNTY
VS. * Hon. E. Eugene Eblen, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. *
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Joe Walker Paul G. Summers
Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
Ninth Judicial District
P.O. Box 334 Todd R. Kelley
Harriman, TN 37748-0334 Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Alfred Lee Hathcock, Jr. 2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Assistant Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Ninth Judicial District
P.O. Box 334 Charles Hawk
Harriman, TN 37748-0334 District Attorney General
Ninth Judicial District
Walter Johnson P.O. Box 703
Assistant Public Defender Kingston, TN 37763-0703
Ninth Judicial District
P.O. Box 334 D. Roger Delp
Harriman, TN 37748-0334 Assistant District Attorney General
Ninth Judicial District
P.O. Box 703
Kingston, TN 37763-0703
OPINION FILED:__________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Mark Shane Griffis, appeals the trial court’s denial of
post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petition
was barred by the statute of limitations.
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We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On March 15, 1995, the petitioner entered a plea of guilt to the sale of
.5 gram of cocaine. On August 1, 1995, the petitioner received a sentence of eight
years in a community corrections program. He did not appeal. Later, the trial court
revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered the petitioner to serve the
term in the Department of Corrections. The order was upheld on direct appeal.
State v. Mark Griffis, No. 03C01-9708-CR-00358 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville,
Oct. 13, 1998.). Two years and four months after the imposition of sentence, the
petitioner filed this petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the prosecution
withheld exculpatory evidence, that his guilty plea was neither knowingly nor
voluntarily entered, and that his counsel was ineffective. The trial court dismissed
the petition on the basis that it was barred by the statute of limitations. The
petitioner asserts that the application of the statute of limitations would abridge his
right to due process. See Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1995); Burford v.
State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992).
Under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995, a petition must be
filed “within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate
court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the
date on which the judgment became final, or consideration of such petition shall be
barred.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a). The statute provides that the limitations
period “shall not be tolled for any reason, including any tolling or saving provision
otherwise available at law or equity.” Id. Thus, this petition, filed well past
limitations of the statute, is barred.
There are exceptions. If the claim is based upon a new rule of
constitutional law, upon new scientific evidence showing innocence, or upon a
sentence that was enhanced because of convictions that have subsequently been
found to be illegal, then the petitioner has recourse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
202(b).
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Neither ineffective assistance of counsel, the entry of an invalid guilty
plea, nor withholding exculpatory evidence qualify as new constitutional grounds for
relief. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969). Thus, the allegations in the petition do not satisfy any exception to
the statute of limitations. Moreover, the application of the statute of limitations in
this instance does not run afoul of due process principles.
In Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992), our supreme
court held that in certain situations the application of the statute of limitations in a
post-conviction proceeding might violate constitutional due process. In determining
whether there has been such a violation, the essential question is whether the time
period allowed by law provides the petitioner with a fair and reasonable opportunity
to file suit. Id. In Burford, the petitioner could not have filed within the three-year
limitation absent a determination on his prior post-conviction petition. Our supreme
court ruled that Burford was “caught in a procedural trap and unable to initiate
litigation ... despite the approach of the three-year limitation.” Id. There was no
such trap here.
In Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1995), our supreme court
further defined how to apply the Burford test. The requirements are to:
1) determine when the limitations period would normally
have begun to run;
2) determine whether the grounds for relief actually arose
after the limitations period would normally have
commenced; and
3) if the grounds are “later-arising,” determine if, under
the facts of the case, a strict application of the limitations
period would effectively deny the petitioner a reasonable
opportunity to present the claim. In making this final
determination, courts should carefully weigh the
petitioner’s liberty interest in “collaterally attacking
constitutional violations occurring during the conviction
process,” against the state’s interest in preventing the
litigation of “stale and fraudulent claims.”
Sands, 903 S.W.2d at 301 (citations omitted) (quoting Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 207,
208).
By the use of these guidelines, we have determined that the statute of
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limitations for this petitioner’s convictions expired in 1996. Because these claims
have always been available to the petitioner, none of the grounds fit within the
exception to the rule. The trial court did not err by dismissing the post-conviction
petition.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
CONCUR:
Jerry L. Smith, Judge
James Curwood W itt, Jr., Judge
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