State v. John W. Wilcox ( 1999 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    FILED
    AUGUST 1999 SESSION
    October 19, 1999
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,            )                                Appellate Court Clerk
    )
    Appellee,                )    No. 03C01-9808-CR-00314
    )
    )    McMinn County
    v.                             )
    )    Honorable Carroll L. Ross, Judge
    )
    JOHN WILCOX,                   )    (Second degree murder)
    )
    Appellant.               )
    For the Appellant:                  For the Appellee:
    William J. Brown                    Paul G. Summers
    23 N. Ocoee Street                  Attorney General of Tennessee
    Post Office Box 1001                       and
    Cleveland, TN 37364-1001            Erik W. Daab
    Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Jerry N. Estes
    District Attorney General
    130 Washington Avenue, NE
    Post Office Box 647
    Athens, TN 37371
    OPINION FILED:____________________
    AFFIRMED
    Joseph M. Tipton
    Judge
    OPINION
    The defendant, John W ilcox, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in
    the McMinn County Criminal Court for second degree murder, a Class A felony. The
    defendant was sentenced to fifteen years confinement in the custody of the Department
    of Correction. On appeal, he raises the following issues:
    (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction;
    (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant the
    opportunity to cross-examine the pathologist regarding the
    identity of the body;
    (3) whether the district attorney committed prosecutorial
    misconduct by repeatedly referring to the defendant’s exercise
    of his constitutional rights; and
    (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing the district attorney
    to argue facts that had not been introduced into evidence
    regarding the county’s shoestring budget.
    We affirm the judgment of conviction.
    At trial, Chad Smith, a patrol officer with the McMinn County Sheriff’s
    Department, testified that on August 10, 1997, he was dispatched to the defendant’s
    house at around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. on the report of a burglary. Officer Smith testified
    that the defendant told him that someone had broken into his home but that he did not
    know who it could have been. Officer Smith said the defendant told him that he was
    missing an answering machine, a telephone and jewelry. He said the defendant
    showed him horse hoof prints and boot prints. He said the defendant stated that one
    boot print looked like a man’s, and the other looked like a woman’s.
    Officer Smith testified that he wrote a report and told the defendant that a
    detective would contact him the next day. He said he also told the defendant to call the
    sheriff’s department to report the value of the jewelry and to notify them if he had any
    leads. Officer Smith said he did not take fingerprints because he is not certified. He
    2
    said he notified Detective Jerry Wilson of the burglary that night. He testified that
    around midnight, he received a dispatch regarding a gunshot victim.
    Officer Smith testified that when he arrived at County Road 110, the scene of the
    shooting, he saw the victim, Terry Bohannon, lying on the road and struggling to
    breathe. He said the victim had several gunshot wounds and cuts. He said that after
    emergency services arrived, he examined the scene and noticed a bloody horse that
    appeared to be dead. He said he also noticed a saddlebag containing a telephone and
    an answering machine. He said he did not find any knives or guns in the victim’s
    vicinity. He said he found shell casings and a long black sword sleeve in the middle of
    the road, about ten to twenty feet from the victim.
    Officer Smith testified that he did not speak with the defendant’s neighbors about
    the burglary because he received another dispatch and did not have time. He said that
    at the preliminary hearing, he testified that he called Detective Wilson around 10:00
    p.m. to notify him of the hoof and boot prints.
    Michael Guffey testified that the incident occurred about one and one-half miles
    from his house. He said he was friends with both the victim and the defendant. He
    said that on August 10, the victim came by his house on horseback with Melissa Linder
    around 11:00 p.m. He said the victim stayed about five minutes then left. He said the
    victim returned around midnight and said his horses had gotten loose and he needed
    help catching them. Mr. Guffey said he got his fourteen-year-old son David out of bed,
    and they found the horses in a neighbor’s field. He said that David and the victim
    caught the horses while he took Ms. Linder home in his van. He said that when he got
    back to the neighbor’s field, he told the victim to take the horses home. He said he did
    not recall seeing the victim armed.
    3
    Mr. Guffey said the defendant then stopped behind him. He said the victim and
    David were behind his van, but he could see them through the mirrors. He said David
    came to the window of the van, and then he heard three gunshots. He said David
    crawled into the van and said, “They’re shooting.” He said he pulled out, drove to a fork
    in the road, turned around, and headed back in the direction of the shooting. Mr.
    Guffey said the defendant also turned around in his van and pulled up beside him. He
    said the defendant stated that the victim had broken into his house and stolen his dead
    mother’s jewelry. He said the defendant stated that he had left the victim lying in the
    road and that he hoped the “son-of-a-bitch” was dead. Mr. Guffey said the defendant
    then stated, “I’m going after her.” Mr. Guffey said he pulled out and saw the victim lying
    in the road. He said he drove to his mother’s house to call 9-1-1, then he went back to
    the scene. He said the defendant acted angry but not crazy. He said the defendant did
    not mention anything about the victim attacking him. He said the victim was calm that
    night and seemed as if he had been drinking but was not drunk.
    Mr. Guffey testified that when he was interviewed by the police on August 12, he
    did not tell them that the victim had stopped by his house earlier in the evening on the
    night of the incident. He said he did not remember the defendant driving behind him
    and asking him to stop as he was driving back toward the victim after dropping off Ms.
    Linder. He said he told an investigator that he could not see the altercation between
    the defendant and the victim, but he could tell that a fight was occurring. He testified
    that he heard three shots fired. He said the defendant never accused him of being
    involved in the burglary. Mr. Guffey testified that when he drove by the victim’s body
    after the shooting, the victim was not breathing or moving, and he thought the victim
    might be dead.
    David Guffey, the fourteen-year-old son of Michael Guffey, testified that on
    August 11, his father awoke him to help the victim find his horses because the victim
    4
    and Ms. Linder had fallen off the horses, and the horses had gotten loose. David said
    he was friends with both the defendant and the victim. He said he and the victim
    caught the horses while his dad drove down the road to look for Ms. Linder. He said he
    and the victim caught up with his father, who told the victim to take the horses home.
    He said the defendant then arrived. David said that he was on a horse at the back right
    side of his father’s van, and the defendant said, “Get off your horse; you don’t need to
    see this.” David said he got off the horse, and the victim remained on his horse. He
    said the defendant then stated that some things were missing from his house and that
    some neighbors had seen the victim around the area. He said the defendant and victim
    began to argue, and the defendant began to hit the victim with what appeared to be a
    three-foot long black stick. He said the victim asked, “What’s going on?”
    David Guffey said that he did not see the victim pull out any weapon. He said he
    lost sight of the two for a moment, then he saw the defendant walk toward his van and
    reach inside the van. David said his horse then stepped on his foot, and he turned his
    head away. He said he then heard gunshots. He said he did not know how many
    gunshots he heard. He said he jumped into his father’s van and told him to leave. He
    said his father drove down the road and turned around. He said that when they drove
    toward the scene, the defendant pulled beside them. He testified that the defendant
    said his dead mother’s jewelry was stolen and that he hoped “the s.o.b. was dead.”
    David Guffey said his father pulled away and turned around. He said they drove past
    the victim, who was lying on the road and appeared to be breathing. He said they went
    to his grandmother’s house and called 9-1-1. David testified that he had previously
    worked for the defendant at the defendant’s house. He said he had heard the
    defendant say that he would kill anybody who stole from him.
    David Guffey admitted that he did not tell the police about the defendant’s threat
    to kill anyone who stole from him until the Friday before trial. He said that the victim
    5
    appeared intoxicated and was staggering. He said he never saw Ms. Linder that night.
    He said he did not see a duffel bag, chainsaw, sword or jewelry. He said he did not
    understand what the defendant and victim were saying to each other during the
    altercation. He said he did not remember whether the defendant accused his father of
    stealing.
    Detective Jerry Wilson of the McMinn County Sheriff’s Department testified that
    he received a call from Officer Chad Smith reporting a break-in at the defendant’s
    house. He said he told Officer Smith to continue to take the report and to call him if he
    received any other pertinent information. He said he told Officer Smith that he would
    contact the defendant the next day. He testified that only two detectives were on duty
    that week.
    Detective Wilson testified that between 12:00 and 1:00 a.m., he received a page
    regarding a possible shooting victim. He said he found three spent shells, a watch face
    and a scabbard in the road at the scene. He said he found a dead horse lying on the
    side of the road with a saddle, saddlebags, and a black bag hanging on it. He said a
    one-hundred-ten-foot blood trail linked the scabbard to the horse. Detective Wilson
    said that he spoke with the defendant in jail, and the defendant said that “the son-of-a-
    bitch had on my faggot bag.”
    Detective Wilson said that if he had seen the victim riding around town with the
    defendant’s belongings, he would have stopped the victim and investigated. He said
    that if the victim had used force, he would have used equal force. He admitted that he
    did not send the saddlebag to the crime laboratory for analysis. He said that a search
    of the area revealed only three spent shells. He said that he did not know until the day
    before his testimony that the victim’s body had four bullet holes. He said that he did not
    send the rifle or the four unspent shells that were recovered from the defendant’s rifle to
    6
    the crime laboratory. He said that one of Mr. Guffey’s children found the defendant’s
    missing items in a field. He said he turned over the evidence to Detective Miller, who
    was handling the burglary investigation. He admitted that he did not dust the items for
    fingerprints, nor did he perform a serology test on any sword. He said he did not test
    for blood on the defendant’s clothing because the defendant had changed clothes by
    the time he was arrested. He said that he obtained clothes from the defendant’s home
    that matched what the defendant was purportedly wearing and that he sent them to the
    crime laboratory along with the spent shells.
    Detective Wilson admitted that at the preliminary hearing, he testified that he did
    not take the defendant’s clothing out of the bag because the clothes were wet and
    bloody. He admitted at trial that he could not see any blood on the clothes. He said
    that in one of the bags on the dead horse, he found a flashlight, a telephone and a tape
    recorder belonging to the defendant. He said these items were not clearly visible
    because they were in the bottom of the bag.
    Dr. Ronald Toolsey, the Bradley County Medical Examiner, testified that he
    performed the autopsy of the victim on August 11. He said that Dr. William Foree, the
    McMinn County Medical Examiner, referred the case to him because Dr. Foree is not a
    pathologist and does not conduct post-mortem examinations. He said that he spoke
    with Dr. Foree before he conducted his examination and that Dr. Foree told him that the
    victim had multiple gunshot wounds. He said Dr. Foree did not mention chop wounds.
    Dr. Toolsey testified that he discovered six bullet wounds incurred from a total of
    four shots, as well as two chop wounds. He testified that four of the bullet wounds were
    entrance wounds to the right side of the body, and two of the wounds were exit wounds.
    He said that two projectiles remained in the body, and only one was retrievable.
    7
    Dr. Toolsey testified that the recovered bullet had entered the right side of the
    chest, passed through the liver, and stopped in the lung. He said the second bullet
    entered at the back of the buttock, hit the hip bone and shattered. Dr. Toolsey testified
    that the other wounds were to the right lower extremity. He said that one bullet exited
    through the thigh, and the other exited through the upper right calf.
    Dr. Toolsey testified that he found two major chop wounds. He said the wound
    to the back of the upper left leg was very deep and had gone through the muscles and
    outer bone, causing near amputation. He said the second wound was to the back of
    the right wrist and went completely through both bones such that the hand was
    connected to the arm by only a few tendons. He said the wounds would have
    completely incapacitated the victim’s right hand and left leg, and the victim would have
    been unable to stand.
    Dr. Toolsey testified that the victim died from blood loss due to the multiple
    gunshot and chop wounds. He testified that every wound was fatal except the bullet
    wound to the right leg, the other wounds being fatal because they would have caused
    the victim to bleed to death. He said the gunshot wound to the right buttock could have
    been fatal because the bullet tore through the intestines, causing feces to leak into the
    abdominal cavity. He said death would have taken days from this injury, and the victim
    could possibly have survived with proper medical care. Dr. Toolsey said he did not
    expect to discover chop wounds, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish chop
    wounds from gunshot wounds. He said it would be difficult to ascertain that the victim
    had chop wounds by just looking at the wounds. He said he did not determine that the
    victim had chop wounds until he pulled the edges of the wounds together.
    Dr. Toolsey testified that the bullet trajectories were backwards and upwards.
    He said that if the victim were on a horse when the bullet wounds were inflicted, the
    8
    shots would have been fired from the right going upward by someone on the ground.
    He said that the chop wound to the left leg was inflicted from behind the victim to the
    left. Dr. Toolsey testified that the victim’s blood alcohol content was .10 and that the
    victim tested positive for Valium.
    Dr. Toolsey testified that he did not take photographs of the autopsy. He stated
    that Dr. Foree’s report identified the chop wounds as gunshot wounds. Dr. Toolsey
    iterated that it is difficult to determine the type of inflicting instrument until one physically
    pulls the tissue together, which is typically not done until the post-mortem examination.
    He testified that if the victim’s injuries were sustained within ten minutes of each other,
    death would have occurred within ten minutes, if not sooner. He said that the
    combination of alcohol and Valium can cause a slower thought process and impaired
    judgment. He testified that the gunshot wounds were not aligned with the victim turning
    around to ride away, although the wounds would be consistent with the victim riding
    away from an attacker if the victim were turned around looking at the attacker.
    Danny Blevins testified that the victim worked for him as a carpenter in the late
    1980's and that they had been friends since then. Mr. Blevins said that he had asked
    the victim to tame his horse, No-Bo, for riding and that the victim was on No-Bo when
    he was killed. Mr. Blevins said he had never known the victim to be violent, although he
    said the victim drank too much and took drugs. He said that at one point, the victim
    was addicted to cocaine. He said he knew the victim had been in jail for assaulting the
    victim’s former mother-in-law. Mr. Blevins testified that although the victim had access
    to his house and buildings, he never noticed anything missing. He testified that the
    victim was right-handed.
    Mr. Blevins testified that he knew the victim had been charged with horse theft
    but that the victim told him he was innocent. He said he did not know that the victim
    9
    had been convicted. Mr. Blevins said that for the two months preceding the victim’s
    death, the victim performed carpentry work for a man in Cleveland. He said he did not
    know the victim had Valium in his system at the time of the incident. He admitted
    posting bond for Ms. Linder.
    Detective Gary Miller of the McMinn County Sheriff’s Department testified that he
    arrested the defendant about one and one-half hours after the incident. He said the
    defendant was calm and cooperative. He said that when he asked the defendant why
    he shot the victim, the defendant replied, “W hy did they break into my house?” He said
    the defendant then stated, “I don’t care if they give me the electric chair.” Detective
    Miller said the defendant did not appear angry. He testified that he recovered an SKS
    rifle and ammunition from the defendant’s house. He said that when he asked the
    defendant what items were taken in the burglary, the defendant responded that his
    “faggot bag” was taken. Detective Miller said that the defendant then stated that he did
    not want to talk anymore.
    Detective Miller testified that he spent three hours at the scene of the altercation,
    but no one reported that the victim had chop wounds, only gunshot wounds. Detective
    Miller said that he did not find any blood in the defendant’s van. He said that at the time
    of arrest, the defendant was wearing jeans and a t-shirt. He said that at the victim’s
    home, he saw a handle protruding from beneath a blanket on a bed. He said he did not
    uncover it and did not obtain a search warrant to look for a sword. He stated that he
    never located a sword that fit the scabbard found at the scene. He testified that he was
    primarily involved in the burglary investigation, not the homicide investigation.
    Detective Jerry Wilson was recalled. He admitted that he testified earlier that he
    inspected the horse at the scene and saw a bullet hole through the saddle. He said
    10
    that after examining the saddle during his testimony, he could see that the saddle had
    no bullet hole. He testified that the saddle was bloody when he first examined it.
    The defendant testified that he had previously worked with the victim at a
    construction site. He said the victim told him that he had just been released from jail,
    and the victim showed him scars from shootings and knifings. He said the victim
    seemed to be bragging about how mean he was. He said that by the end of the week
    on the job, the victim had been arrested three times for DUI.
    The defendant testified that one year later, he saw the victim and Ms. Linder,
    and the victim had a vodka bottle. He said the victim got into a fight and dropped a
    knife on the ground. He said he agreed to take the victim home to prevent the victim
    from being arrested. The defendant said that after that incident, he occasionally saw
    the victim riding horses with Ms. Linder, with them often appearing drunk. He said he
    heard that the victim had been charged with horse theft. The defendant testified that
    Michael Guffey’s sons had helped him on his farm with carpentry work. He denied
    telling David Guffey that he would kill anyone who stole from him.
    The defendant testified that on August 10, he went to Knoxville and returned
    around 6:00 p.m. to find his home burglarized. He said he noticed horse hoof prints, a
    beer can and horse droppings around his house. He said the house was completely
    ransacked and was muddy. He testified that in his father’s room, a dresser drawer
    holding family heirlooms had been pulled out. The defendant stated that he called 9-1-1
    around 8:00 p.m. He said he was angry and wanted the police to investigate. He said
    he told Officer Smith that he did not know exactly what was missing and that he had not
    touched anything in order for the police to take fingerprints. He said Officer Smith told
    him he would take a report and turn it over to a detective. The defendant said Officer
    Smith stated he would watch for anyone on horseback and told the defendant to call
    11
    him if he had any leads. The defendant testified that he was angry that no investigation
    was being performed.
    The defendant testified that when he determined which items were stolen, he
    was particularly angry about the missing family heirlooms. He said he was also missing
    two swords, a bag, a chainsaw, and a scabbard. He said he asked his neighbor, Gene
    Belk, if he had seen anyone riding horses that day, and Mr. Belk said he had seen the
    victim and Ms. Linder. The defendant said it was getting dark, and he grabbed his SKS
    rifle and loaded it with six rounds. He said he wrote a note to his family that said, “Dear
    family, I think I know who did this. Here’s my checkbook, and if I don’t come back . . .”
    He said he suspected that the victim committed the burglary. He said he went to find
    the victim because he wanted to retrieve his belongings, not to kill the victim. He said
    he was wearing jeans and a black t-shirt.
    The defendant said that he left his house at 11:00 p.m. and took the rifle with
    him for protection. He said he saw Mr. Guffey on the road and tried to stop him to ask if
    he had seen anyone on horseback, but Mr. Guffey would not stop. The defendant said
    Mr. Guffey was driving fast as if he was trying to get away from the defendant. The
    defendant said Mr. Guffey drove to where David Guffey and the victim were sitting on
    horseback. The defendant said he left his van and said to the victim, “Hey neighbor, I
    came to visit you.” The defendant said he did not have anything in his hand, and the
    victim was fifteen feet away. The defendant said the victim had the defendant’s sword
    inside the scabbard, and the defendant said, “You broke in my house too, didn’t you.”
    He said he walked closer to the victim and identified his black fanny pack, and the
    victim said, “Yes.” The defendant said he told the victim to get off the horse because
    he was going to make a citizen’s arrest. He said David Guffey got off his horse and ran
    away. He denied saying anything to David Guffey.
    12
    The defendant said he approached the victim, who tried to strike him with a
    bottle. He said he grabbed the horse’s head and tried to knock the victim off the horse.
    He said that during the scuffle, the victim pulled out a sword. The defendant said he
    grabbed the sword from the victim and struck the victim’s left arm. He said the fight
    then became more aggressive, and the victim came toward him on the horse. He said
    he struck the victim again on the thigh. The defendant testified that the victim
    continued to charge toward him, then backed away. The defendant said he thought the
    fight was over, but the victim then dug into the saddlebag. The defendant said he went
    to his van and grabbed his rifle. He said he looked up, and the victim was holding a
    gun in his right hand aimed at him. The defendant said he fired three shots, and the
    victim fell off the horse. He said the horse remained standing and did not appear to
    have been struck by any bullets. The defendant said he shot the victim in self-defense.
    The defendant testified that he put the sword that he had grabbed from the
    victim into his van. He said the victim had another of the defendant’s swords that was
    tied to the horse with webbing, but he left it at the scene. The defendant testified that
    Mr. Guffey drove to an intersection, turned around, and came back to the scene. The
    defendant said he turned around and followed the Guffeys. He said that the victim was
    moving on the ground as he drove past him and that the horse was still standing. The
    defendant said Mr. Guffey turned around, drove toward him and stopped. He said Mr.
    Guffey asked him, “What’s the matter?” The defendant said he told Mr. Guffey, “You all
    knew he stole from me.” The defendant said Mr. Guffey then sped off.
    The defendant testified that he thought Mr. Guffey was involved in the burglary.
    He said he continued driving and found Ms. Linder in the victim’s trailer. He said he
    grabbed her by the shirt and asked her why she broke into his house. He said Ms.
    Linder denied breaking into his house. The defendant said he then heard sirens, and
    13
    he went home. He said he did not return to the scene because he was scared. He said
    he took the rifle and sword inside his house.
    The defendant testified that officers arrived at his house about thirty minutes
    later and he surrendered. He said that the officers read him his Miranda rights and that
    he told them he wanted to exercise his rights to silence and to counsel. He said
    Detective Miller told him that would only make it harder on him. He denied telling the
    detective that he did not care if he got the electric chair. The defendant testified that at
    the police station, the officers continued to try to persuade him to waive his rights. He
    said they continued to question him, and he continued to assert his rights.
    The defendant testified that he learned about self-defense as a Green Beret. He
    said he had trained in self-defense and martial arts for fifteen years. He said he never
    had any previous trouble with the victim. He stated that he did not know about the
    victim’s assault on the victim’s former mother-in-law. He said he had ridden horses with
    the victim and other men one time, and the victim had not given him any trouble. The
    defendant stated that he did not take any of his martial arts equipment with him for
    protection on the night of the offense. He said he did not report to the police his
    suspicion that the victim had committed the burglary. He stated that he did not recover
    his stolen property from the scene because he was “disillusioned.”
    The defendant denied causing the victim’s chop wounds. He said that his rifle
    holds only six rounds and that he fired only three shots at the victim, leaving three
    unspent bullets in the rifle. He acknowledged that the police retrieved four unspent
    bullets from his rifle, but he did not know where the extra bullet came from. He denied
    taking the second sword from the scene. He said he did not call 9-1-1 because he was
    “disillusioned.” He said he searched for Ms. Linder because he wanted answers about
    the burglary. He said he believed that when the Guffeys left the scene, they were going
    14
    back to his house to steal more items. He said he suspected that the Guffeys were the
    other burglars, not Ms. Linder. He admitted that he did not try to effect a citizen’s arrest
    on the Guffeys.
    Ersie Walker testified that she is the victim’s former mother-in-law. She testified
    that on July 19, 1995, she picked up her granddaughter, who said that the victim had hit
    her on the arm. Ms. Walker said she told him the victim to move out. She said the
    victim had been drinking, and he followed her home. She said the victim approached
    her as she was standing beside her car. She said the victim saw a baseball bat in the
    car and tried to get it. She said a struggle ensued as she tried to stop him, and the
    victim pulled out a knife and stabbed her three times, puncturing her lung. She said
    she then pulled out a gun that was not in working condition and hit the victim in the
    head. She said the victim was convicted of assault.
    Jimmy Simpson testified that the victim came to his house one day and said he
    had pawned a gun to Simpson’s son and wanted the gun back. Mr. Simpson said the
    victim stated that if he did not get the gun back, he would return and kill all of them. Mr.
    Simpson said the victim called his house later that night and threatened to come and kill
    everyone. Mr. Simpson said he watched for the victim outside, and the victim came by
    and fired shots. Mr. Simpson admitted that he had a felony drug conviction.
    Gene Belk testified that he was the defendant’s neighbor. He testified that on
    August 10, the defendant came to his house around 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. and asked him if
    he had seen anyone on horseback. He said he told the defendant that he had seen the
    victim and Ms. Linder. Mr. Belk said the defendant then told him he had to go meet
    with law enforcement.
    15
    Detective Jerry Wilson was recalled. He loaded the rifle retrieved from the
    defendant’s home and demonstrated that the rifle held twelve rounds. The defendant
    was recalled and testified that he did not know the weapon would hold twelve rounds.
    He testified that he had never loaded more than six rounds and that the gun normally
    jams when one puts more than six rounds in it. Upon the foregoing proof, the jury
    convicted the defendant of second degree murder.
    I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    The defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction
    for second degree murder. He argues that the state failed to prove that the injuries he
    inflicted on the victim caused the victim’s death, and he argues that the evidence, at
    most, supports a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. The state contends that the
    evidence is sufficient.
    Our standard of review when the sufficiency of the evidence is questioned on
    appeal is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789 (1979). This means that we do not reweigh the evidence but presume that
    the jury has resolved all conflicts in the testimony and drawn all reasonable inferences
    from the evidence in favor of the state. See State v. Sheffield, 
    676 S.W.2d 542
    , 547
    (Tenn. 1984); State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1978).
    A. Causation
    The defendant contends that the state failed to prove that the injuries he
    inflicted on the victim caused the victim’s death. First, he argues that Doctors Foree
    and Toolsey may have examined different bodies. Next, he argues that no proof exists
    to show that the injuries he inflicted caused the victim’s death. He argues that the
    16
    evidence shows that only three shots were fired from his rifle but that there were four
    gunshot wounds, that the state failed to prove that these three shots killed or even
    struck the victim, and that the chop wounds were not fatal.
    We believe the evidence sufficiently supports the defendant’s conviction. First,
    the defendant’s argument that Doctors Foree and Toolsey may have examined two
    different bodies is not supported by the record. The defendant correctly asserts that Dr.
    Foree’s initial report and Dr. Toolsey’s autopsy report are somewhat inconsistent
    regarding the types of injuries. However, Dr. Toolsey explained at trial that it is difficult
    to determine the type of inflicting instrument until one physically pulls the tissue
    together, which is typically not done until the post-mortem examination. The defendant
    argues that Dr. Toolsey could not identify the body upon which he performed the
    autopsy as being that of Terry Bohannon. However, Dr. Toolsey was able to identify
    and discuss photographs of the victim’s injuries, not made during the autopsy, as being
    those of the person upon whom he performed the autopsy.
    The defendant also contends that no evidence exists to show that the injuries he
    inflicted upon the victim caused the victim’s death. He argues that the evidence shows
    that he fired only three shots and that no evidence exists to show that the three shots
    struck or killed the victim. He further argues that Dr. Toolsey testified that the chop
    wounds would not have caused the victim’s death.
    We disagree with the defendant’s interpretation of the trial record. The
    prosecutor asked Dr. Toolsey which of the victim’s wounds was sufficient to cause
    death. Dr. Toolsey responded, “Well, I think probably the better question would be to
    ask which one would not. With the exception of probably one, each of them would have
    proved eventually to be fatal.” Dr. Toolsey testified that the only injury that would not
    have been fatal was the gunshot wound to the right leg. The evidence shows that the
    17
    defendant fired at least three shots at the victim. The shots obviously hit the victim
    because the defendant’s own testimony was that the victim toppled off the horse after
    the shots were fired.
    With respect to the chop injuries, Dr. Toolsey testified that they were “very
    significant and deep wounds, chopping their way almost all the way through to the bone
    . . . . And it is possible to bleed to death from any one of these.” Although Dr. Toolsey
    testified that sometimes clean chop wounds that completely sever an artery are less
    lethal or less dangerous, he never testified, as the defendant states in his brief, that the
    victim’s chop wounds would not have caused his death. The evidence shows that the
    defendant shot and chopped the victim. All but one of the victim’s wounds were lethal.
    The defendant’s argument to the contrary is not supported by the record.
    B. Provocation
    The defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding
    that he knowingly killed the victim. He argues that the killing was, at most, voluntary
    manslaughter because he was provoked by the victim’s burglary of his home and by the
    victim’s attack upon him when he went to retrieve his property. We hold that the
    evidence is sufficient to support the second degree murder conviction.
    Second degree murder is defined as a knowing killing of another. Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 39-13-210. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(b) provides that:
    “Knowing” refers to a person who acts knowingly with respect
    to the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct
    when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that
    the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect
    to a result of the person’s conduct when the person is aware
    that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
    18
    In the light most favorable to the state, the evidence shows that the victim
    returned to his home around 6:00 p.m. to find that it had been burglarized. Testimony
    from the defendant’s neighbor, Gene Belk, suggests that the defendant suspected the
    victim before he called the police. However, the defendant told Officer Smith that he
    did not have any suspects. Several hours after learning of the burglary, the defendant
    armed himself with a loaded SKS rifle and set out in search of the victim. When he
    found the victim, he told David Guffey, “Get off your horse; you don’t need to see this.”
    The defendant then confronted the victim about the missing items and attacked the
    victim, shooting and chopping him such that the victim bled to death. No evidence
    exists, other than the defendant’s testimony, that the victim was armed or that the victim
    initiated the attack. No weapons were found in the vicinity of the victim. The jury
    obviously chose to discredit the defendant’s testimony, as is their prerogative, rejecting
    his theory that he was lawfully trying to recover his property when he was attacked by
    the victim. Although the defendant claims that he searched for the victim only to
    recover his property, he admitted that he did not retrieve the property after
    incapacitating the victim.
    The defendant cites several cases in support of his argument that he acted upon
    adequate provocation. See State v. Thornton, 
    730 S.W.2d 309
     (Tenn. 1987); Smith v.
    State, 
    370 S.W.2d 543
     (Tenn. 1963); Cooper v. State, 
    356 S.W.2d 405
     (Tenn. 1962);
    Wright v. State, 
    497 S.W.2d 588
     (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). Cooper, Smith and Wright
    are factually distinguishable because they concern situations in which the victim was
    the original aggressor or an intruder. Thornton is also dissimilar to the present case. In
    Thornton, the defendant shot the victim, his wife’s lover, when he discovered the two in
    the midst of sexual intercourse. Our supreme court stated that “the commission of
    unlawful sexual intercourse . . . is an act obviously calculated to arouse ungovernable
    passion,” and held that the killing of the adulterer under such circumstances in the heat
    of passion is voluntary manslaughter. The present case, however, concerns no such
    19
    circumstances, and no credible evidence exists to suggest that the victim was the
    original aggressor. In sum, the evidence supports a conviction for second degree
    murder.
    II. LIMITATION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
    The defendant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing him to cross-
    examine Dr. Toolsey as to his knowledge of the identity of the body upon which Dr.
    Toolsey performed his autopsy. He argues that the discrepancies between Dr.
    Toolsey’s autopsy report and Dr. Foree’s initial report show that the two may have been
    examining different bodies and that he should have been allowed to explore the issue
    on cross-examination of Dr. Toolsey. The state contends that the trial court properly
    limited the cross-examination.
    The Sixth Amendment provides that the accused shall have the right “to be
    confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Cont. amend. VI. The right of
    confrontation includes not only the right to confront the witness at trial but also the
    “‘opportunity for effective cross-examination.’” State v. Howell, 
    868 S.W.2d 238
    , 252
    (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 
    474 U.S. 15
    , 20, 
    106 S. Ct. 292
    , 294
    (1985)). However, “a defendant’s right to confrontation does not preclude a trial court
    from imposing limits upon cross-examination which take into account such factors as
    harassment, prejudice, issue confusion, witness safety, or merely repetitive or
    marginally relevant interrogation.” State v. Reid, 
    882 S.W.2d 423
    , 430 (Tenn. Crim.
    App. 1994). “Appellate courts may not disturb limits on cross-examination except when
    there has been an unreasonable restriction on the right.” State v. Fowler, 
    213 Tenn. 239
    , 253, 
    373 S.W.2d 460
    , 466 (1963).
    20
    In the present case, the defendant sought to cross-examine Dr. Toolsey on the
    identity of the body upon which he performed the autopsy. The following colloquy
    occurred:
    ATTORNEY: First of all, how do you know that this was
    Terry Bohannon?
    DR. TOOLSEY: How do I know? I don’t.
    ATTORNEY: Did you know Terry Bohannon before this
    date?
    DR. TOOLSEY: No, I don’t.
    ATTORNEY: You don’t know whether or not this was Terry
    Bohannon?
    DR. TOOLSEY: I know that there was a deceased-
    The state then objected, stating that it would identify a picture of the deceased if identity
    was an issue. In a jury-out hearing, Dr. Toolsey referred to photographs of the victim
    and stated, “Now the face, I don’t remember, but I did document that he had this tattoo
    and it’s in my autopsy protocol. This is a distinguishing mark and it is mentioned in my
    protocol.” After argument, the trial court ruled that the defendant’s attorney could
    question Dr. Toolsey about discrepancies between his findings and Dr. Foree’s report
    but that the attorney could not question Dr. Toolsey about the identity of the body.
    We believe that the trial court erred by limiting the defendant’s cross-examination
    of Dr. Toolsey. Considering that Dr. Toolsey made no photographs during his autopsy,
    no one from the sheriff’s department was present during the autopsy, and
    discrepancies between the doctors’ reports existed, the defendant was entitled to cross-
    examine Dr. Toolsey on the identity of the body he examined. Having concluded that
    the trial court erred, we must now determine whether it is reversible error. In State v.
    Howell, 
    868 S.W.2d 238
    , 253 (Tenn. 1993), our supreme court stated as follows:
    In determining whether the constitutionally improper denial of
    a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness is harmless
    under the [Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 824
    (1967)] standard, the correct inquiry is whether, assuming that
    the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully
    21
    realized, the error was nonetheless harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt. [Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    ,
    684-85, 
    106 S. Ct. 1431
    , 1438 (1986)]. A number of factors
    are relevant to this inquiry including the importance of the
    witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, the cumulative
    nature of the testimony, the presence or absence of evidence
    corroborating or contradicting the witness on material points,
    the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the
    overall strength of the prosecution’s case. Id.
    We hold that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Our supreme
    court’s directive in Howell is to consider the question of harm assuming that the
    damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized. In the present case,
    the damaging potential was realized. Dr. Toolsey admitted that he could not identify the
    body as that of Terry Bohannon. The defendant does not articulate what more he
    hoped to achieve from further cross-examination, other than his argument that the
    discrepancies between the two reports show that the doctors may have been examining
    two different bodies. However, the trial court ruled that the defendant was free to
    explore these discrepancies on cross-examination of Dr. Toolsey. Thus, the defendant
    was allowed to and did question Dr. Toolsey on the fact that Dr. Foree did not note any
    chop marks and noted different injuries than those found by Dr. Toolsey. In light of Dr.
    Toolsey’s admission that he did not know whether the body he autopsied was that of
    Terry Bohannon and the trial court’s ruling that the defendant could explore the
    discrepancies between the two reports, we cannot say that the trial court’s erroneous
    limitation of cross-examination more probably than not affected the judgment.
    III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
    The defendant contends that the district attorney committed prosecutorial
    misconduct during cross-examination and closing argument by repeatedly referring to
    the defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to silence upon arrest. He argues
    that the prosecutor’s repeated comments violated his right to a fair trial. The state
    contends that the defendant never asserted his right to silence, rather the defendant
    22
    made a statement upon arrest that was contradictory to his trial testimony, and the
    prosecutor was entitled to question the defendant about the contradictions.
    Due Process generally prohibits the prosecution from questioning a defendant
    regarding his post-arrest silence. Doyle v. Ohio, 
    416 U.S. 610
    , 618, 
    96 S. Ct. 2240
    ,
    2245 (1976). The obvious reason is that a defendant should not be told that he has a
    right to remain silent that cannot be held against him only to have that very thing
    happen should he decide to testify at trial. The United States Supreme Court has held
    that it is “impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment
    privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not,
    therefore, use at trial the fact that [a defendant] stood mute or claimed his privilege in
    the face of accusation.” Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 468, 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 1625
    (1966). However, a defendant cannot use his post-arrest silence to shield himself from
    the effect of patently inconsistent testimony at trial. Thus, a defendant who elects to
    testify may be subject to the impeaching effect of proof of any prior inconsistent
    statement. Braden v. State, 
    534 S.W.2d 657
    , 660 (Tenn. 1976).
    The evidence shows that Detective Gary Miller testified that upon arrest and after
    Miranda warnings, the defendant stated that he did not care if he got the electric chair
    and that the defendant told him the location of the rifle. Detective Miller also testified
    that when he asked the defendant why he shot the victim, the defendant replied, “Why
    did they break into my house?” The defendant elected to testify at trial, and during
    direct examination, he denied making the statements attributed to him by Detective
    Miller. The defendant testified extensively about his invocation of his right to remain
    silent, stating that although the officers continued to try to persuade him to waive his
    rights, he continued to invoke them.
    23
    The defendant takes issue with four instances in which the prosecutor
    commented on the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence. Two of the comments
    occurred during cross-examination of the defendant, and two occurred during closing
    argument. First, the defendant challenges the prosecutor’s question during cross-
    examination, “When was it, the first time, Mr. Wilcox, that you told the version of the
    events of August 10th? When’s the first time that you told that as you’ve told it here
    today to this jury?” Later during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant
    why he did not try to make a citizen’s arrest of Mr. Guffey, to which the defendant
    responded that he heard sirens and thought it best to go home. The prosecutor then
    stated, “And seize on your, your rights as you did.”
    During closing argument, the prosecutor stated as follows:
    And now, you know, Mr. Bohannon (sic) seemed to know quite
    a little bit about his legal rights and that’s. . . something he
    should be commended for. He knew what they were and he
    knew how to exercise them and that’s great. I don’t have, I
    can’t criticize him, wouldn’t criticize that. We all ought to. He’s
    very concerned about things like due process, things like trials
    like this.
    Later, the prosecutor stated, “That’s the entirety of the evidence that brought us here to
    this case, with this man so conscious of the rights of due process of himself and
    others.”
    We do not believe that the circumstances of this case are of the type
    contemplated in Doyle and subsequent Tennessee cases. See Braden, 534 S.W.2d at
    660; Ware v. State, 
    565 S.W.2d 906
    , 908 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978); Honeycutt v. State,
    
    544 S.W.2d 912
    , 918 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); Parks v. State, 
    543 S.W.2d 855
    , 857
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); The defendant correctly argues that the state is prohibited
    from commenting at trial on a defendant’s silence upon arrest. The rationale is that it is
    unfair to provide the defendant with a right to silence, then use the defendant’s
    invocation of that right at trial to infer guilt. In the present case, however, the state did
    24
    not introduce the defendant’s invocation of his right in order for the jury to infer guilt. In
    fact, the defendant himself testified extensively on direct examination about how he
    asserted his right to silence.
    An analysis of the prosecutor’s questioning and argument shows that the
    comments were not calculated to permit an inference of guilt from the defendant’s
    silence. In context, the prosecutor’s cross-examination questioned the defendant’s
    veracity and credibility in light of Detective Miller’s testimony that the defendant did not
    exercise his right to silence but made a statement. In this respect, we believe that a
    defendant who voluntarily testifies that he invoked his right to silence can be cross-
    examined regarding contradictory proof adduced at trial that the defendant made a
    statement. See, e.g., Braden, 534 S.W .2d at 660. In addition, the second two
    comments are not calculated to permit an inference of guilt but rather to show the irony
    in the defendant’s testimony that he was concerned about rights, when he obviously
    had no concern for the victim’s rights. We do not view the prosecutor’s comments to be
    prejudicially improper.
    IV. COMMENT DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT
    The defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to
    state during closing argument that the sheriff’s department was working on a shoestring
    budget. He argues that the statement was offered to rebut the defendant’s claim of
    sloppy investigation by the sheriff’s department but that no evidence exists in the record
    to support the prosecutor’s claim. The state contends that the prosecutor’s statement
    was a proper summary of the evidence.
    The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that “argument of counsel is a
    valuable privilege that should not be unduly restricted.” Smith v. State, 
    527 S.W.2d 737
    , 739 (Tenn. 1975). However, closing argument must be “temperate, must be
    25
    predicated on evidence introduced during the trial of the case and must be pertinent to
    the issues being tried.” Russell v. State, 
    532 S.W.2d 268
    , 271 (Tenn. 1976). Improper
    statements made during closing argument constitute reversible error if the statements
    affected the verdict.” State v. Sutton, 
    562 S.W.2d 820
    , 823 (Tenn. 1978).
    In the present case, the prosecutor stated the following:
    Okay. So we didn’t send some things off for chemical
    analysis. What we try to do with your tax money is preserve
    those services for cases where it’s needed. Look at the
    anatomy of this case . . . . They get a burglary report that we’re
    going to talk about here in a few minutes from Mr. Wilcox.
    Within a few hours- we’re not talking days and we’re not talking
    Monday through Friday. W e’re talking Sunday, you know. I
    mean even Detective Wilson ought to have a little time on
    Sunday. He’s on call but he doesn’t sit at his desk on Sunday
    night at eight o’clock to just wait for Mr. Wilcox to come in and
    report this burglary. You’ve got a couple of deputies out there
    on a stringshoe (sic) budget servicing the entire county-
    The state argues that the prosecutor’s statement was a proper summary of the
    evidence. Specifically, it points to testimony from trial that (1) the investigating officer
    was not trained to lift fingerprints; (2) no detective was on duty at the time of the
    burglary; (3) the entire county has only three detectives, one is on call on the
    weekends, and none actually work on the weekends; and (4) the McMinn County
    Medical Examiner is not a pathologist and does not conduct post-mortem examinations.
    We question whether the previous testimony allows for a reasonable argument that the
    county was on a shoestring budget. Nevertheless, we believe that the defendant has
    failed to demonstrate that the statement affected the verdict. The comment was
    isolated and innocuous, the evidence against the defendant is great, and no evidence
    exists regarding the prosecutor’s improper intent. See Judge v. State, 
    539 S.W.2d 340
    ,
    344 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
    26
    In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the
    judgment of conviction.
    ________________________________
    Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
    CONCUR:
    _____________________________
    John Everett W illiams, Judge
    _____________________________
    Alan E. Glenn, Judge
    27