State v. Venson Terrell Taylor ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY 1999 SESSION
May 12, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee, ) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9803-CC-00133
)
) Robertson County
V. )
) Honorable John H. Gasaway, III, Judge
)
VENSON TERRELL TAYLOR, ) (Theft of Property Over $1,000.00)
)
Appellant. )
FOR THE DEFENDANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JOE R. JOHNSON, II JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Law Offices of Larry D. Wilks Attorney General & Reporter
506 West Court Square
Springfield, TN 37172
ELIZABETH H. MARNEY
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
JOHN WESLEY CARNEY, JR.
District Attorney General
DENT MORRIS
Assistant District Attorney General
500 South Main Street
Springfield, TN 37172
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,
Judge
OPINION
The defendant, Venson Terrell Taylor, was found guilty by jury verdict of
theft over one thousand dollars, and the Circuit Court in Robertson County
sentenced him to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial
court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, and his subsequent appeal to
this Court alleges insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We AFFIRM
the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
The defendant requested employment from Robert Neil Latham, who told
the defendant that work might be available in the near future. Later that week,
the defendant visited Latham's residence and offered to mow his yard. Latham
declined. Several days later, Latham found his residence's front door open. He
discovered that several firearms and a water jug containing coins were missing.
Latham valued the missing property between $2100 and $2700.
At trial, Latham's neighbor, Ora Lee Jones, testified that the defendant
approached her at her residence on the day of the burglary and advised her that
he was mowing Latham's yard. Several minutes later, Jones observed a blue
car, which had been parked with its trunk facing Latham's front porch, leave
Latham's residence. She observed the defendant in the vehicle.
Robertson County Deputy Sheriff Richard Head, after receiving a
description of the vehicle, stopped and searched a vehicle driven by Derrick
Dunn and occupied by the defendant. A water jug was in the trunk and quarters,
some rolled in wrappers, were under the passenger seat where the defendant
had been sitting. Dunn directed officers to the missing firearms, which were
stored in a building.
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Dunn pleaded guilty to burglary of Latham’s residence and testified at the
defendant's trial. According to Dunn, on the day of the burglary the defendant
asked him for a ride to Latham's house, where the defendant would be mowing.
The defendant advised Dunn that Latham had guns in his residence and asked if
Dunn would like to make some money. Dunn backed his vehicle into Latham's
driveway and parked the car. The defendant walked to another house, while
Dunn entered the residence and exited with the guns and a water jug of coins.
When the defendant returned, the firearms were on the porch. Dunn had
already loaded the jug. They wrapped the firearms in plastic, placed them in the
trunk, and drove from the residence. Dunn and the defendant later rolled the
quarters from the jug into wrappers and placed the rolls in the vehicle.
The defendant testified that he advised Jones that he was at Latham's
property. He and Dunn left when Latham's mower would not start. Dunn asked
the defendant to help return some property to Dunn's uncle. The defendant
testified that he did not recognize this property as firearms, because it was
wrapped in plastic. The defendant later helped Dunn roll quarters that the
defendant allegedly thought belonged to Dunn’s child.
The defendant denied that Latham refused his offer to mow the yard. He
further testified that he called Latham regarding the yard, instead of going to the
residence. The defendant denied telling Dunn about the guns and knowing that
Dunn had burglarized the residence.
The defendant testified that Latham had promised to provide the
defendant with a car and nice suits for an imminent job and that he and Latham
had ridden in Latham's truck and drank beer, during which time Latham drove by
his residence. Latham denied both the alleged promise and the alleged trip.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The defendant submits that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of
law to sustain his conviction. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence, this Court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tenn.
1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). This Court grants the appellee the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom. See State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
The credibility of witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the
reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusively to the
trier of fact. See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); see also
State v. Gentry, 881 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). A jury verdict for the
state accredits the testimony of the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in
favor of the state. See State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). A
guilty verdict also replaces the defendant’s presumption of innocence with a
presumption of guilt. See State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). A
defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence carries the burden of
illustrating why the evidence insufficiently supports the verdict. See State v.
Freeman, 943 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
ANALYSIS
“A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of
property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property
without the owner’s effective consent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103. Theft is
“[a] Class D felony if the value of the property . . . obtained is one thousand
dollars ($1,000) or more but less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).” Tenn.
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Code Ann. § 39-14-105(3). Therefore, this Court must determine if sufficient
evidence existed for the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant knowingly
obtained or exercised control over Latham’s property, that the defendant did not
have Latham’s effective consent for that dominion, and that the defendant
intended to permanently deprive Latham of that property. We find sufficient
evidence of each of these elements.
The trial court instructed the jury to determine whether Dunn was an
accomplice in the alleged crime. That court further instructed the jury to
determine whether sufficient evidence “independently l[ed] to the conclusion that
a crime was committed and that the defendant was involved in it.” In
Tennessee, a felony conviction may not be based solely on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice. See State v. Green, 915 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995). Although the defendant does not explicitly invoke this tenet,
his insufficiency of the evidence argument necessarily questions whether the
state presented sufficient independent evidence corroborating Dunn’s testimony,
which constituted a large portion of the state’s case.
The evidence showed that Latham’s property was taken from his
residence and that the defendant was at Latham’s residence, with neither
Latham’s approval nor permission, on the date of the crime. The defendant was
in Dunn’s vehicle with rolled coins, consistent with the property taken from the
residence, under his seat. The required corroborative evidence, which may be
worth little if considered on its own, must tend to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense. See McKinney v. State, 552 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1977). The jury determines “the degree of evidence necessary to
corroborate the testimony of an accomplice.” State v. Billingsley, No. 01C01-
9506-CC-00166 (Tenn. Crim. App. filed May 16, 1996, at Nashville). We find no
error in the trier of fact’s assessing sufficient corroborative evidence in this case.
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Although Dunn made false statements after his arrest and entered a plea
agreement with the state, at least partially in exchange for testimony against the
defendant, the trier of fact credited Dunn’s testimony. Further, the trier of fact
rejected the defendant’s testimony contrary to that of the witnesses against him.
We do not usurp the trier of fact’s responsibilities: that entity determines the
credibility of the witnesses and weighs the evidence. This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the judgment below is AFFIRMED.
_____________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
_____________________________
J. CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge
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