State v. Tina Swindle ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY 1999 SESSION
April 30, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee, ) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9805-CR-00202
)
vs. ) Davidson County
)
TINA SWINDLE, ) Honorable Seth Norman
)
Appellant. ) (Facilitation of Rape of a Child,
) 2 counts; Aggravated Sexual
) battery, 2 counts)
)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
TERRY J. CANADY PAUL G. SUMMERS
Suite 400, 211 Printer’s Alley Bldg. Attorney General & Reporter
Nashville, TN 37201
ELIZABETH B. MARNEY
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243
LILA STATOM
BILL REED
Asst. District Attorneys General
Washington Sq.Two - Ste. 500
222 Second Avenue, North
Nashville, TN 37201
OPINION FILED: _____________
AFFIRMED
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Tina Swindle, appeals from two of the four convictions
she received after a jury trial in the Davidson County Criminal Court. The defendant
was convicted of the following offenses:
Count: Offense: Sentence:
(1) Facilitation of rape of a child 10 years
(2) Facilitation of rape of a child 8 years
(3) Aggravated sexual battery 8 years
(4) Aggravated sexual battery 8 years
All of the convictions constitute Class B felonies, and the defendant was sentenced
as a Range I, standard offender. All of these sentences were imposed to run
concurrently. The defendant appeals only from the convictions of aggravated
sexual battery. The single issue on appeal is whether the defendant was denied her
rights to a trial by jury when the trial court failed to instruct the jury as to the offense
of assault. After a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The charges originated in an indictment that charged the defendant
and Daniel Hall with the commission of various sexual offenses. The victim of all
these offenses is the defendant’s daughter, who was nine years of age at the time
the offenses were committed. The charges against Daniel Hall were severed from
the defendant’s charges.
The defendant and the victim’s father were divorced, and the
defendant exercised visitation with the victim on alternate weekends. Sometimes
during these visitations, Daniel Hall, the defendant’s boyfriend, was present in the
defendant’s home. On one such occasion, the victim was in bed with the defendant
and Daniel Hall while Hall was performing cunnilingus on the defendant. The victim
testified that the defendant asked Hall, “Why don’t you do it to [the victim] for a little
while?” The victim testified that Hall then moved over and “done it to me.” She said
the defendant assisted Hall by grabbing the victim on the thighs and opening her
2
legs. The state elected this episode as the basis for count (1). For count (2), the
state elected a separate episode in which defendant opened the victim’s legs in
order to accommodate Hall’s act of cunnilingus. To establish the aggravated sexual
battery charged in count (3), the state elected an episode in which the defendant
took both of the victim’s hands, put them on Hall’s penis and made the victim “pull
up and down on it.” To establish the aggravated sexual battery charge contained
in count (4), the state elected an episode which was described by the victim as the
defendant placing her hand on the victim’s “front private part and . . . rubbing it up
and down.”
The defendant offered no proof; however, during the state’s case in
chief, the investigating officer introduced a tape of the defendant’s pretrial
statement. She generally denied involvement in the crimes.
The defendant contends with respect to counts (3) and (4), the trial
court should have instructed the jury as to the lesser included offense of assault.
On the other hand, the state contends that there was no basis in the proof to
warrant the charge on assault. The state also maintains that, if the failure to give
the assault instruction was error, the error was harmless.
As used in the present case, aggravated sexual battery “is unlawful
sexual contact with a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim [when]
. . . the victim is less than thirteen (13) years of age.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
504(a)(4) (1997). “‘Sexual contact’ includes the intentional touching of the victim’s,
the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts . . . if that intentional touching
can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(6) (1997).
Assault is committed by a person who “intentionally or knowingly
causes physical contact with another and a reasonable person would regard the
3
contact as extremely offensive or provocative.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a)(3)
(1997). An assault defined in section 39-13-101(a)(3) is a Class B misdemeanor.
The trial court is obliged to instruct the jury on all lesser offenses when
the evidence contains facts that “‘are susceptible of inferring guilt of any lesser
included offense.”’ State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting
State v. Wright, 618 S.W.2d 310 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)). However, when “the
evidence in a record clearly shows that the defendant was guilty of the greater
offense and is devoid of any evidence permitting an inference of guilt of the lesser
offense, the trial court’s failure to charge on a lesser offense is not error.” State v.
Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 550 (Tenn. 1994).
In support of his claim that assault should have been charged, the
defendant relies upon State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106, (Tenn. 1998).
In Howard, “the evidence adduced at trial established that the defendant rubbed the
victim’s buttocks, legs and back . . . [and] tried to place his hands between the
victim’s legs and to force the victim to suck this thumb.” Howard, 926 S.W.2d at
584. Howard claimed the trial court “erred by refusing to instruct the jury on assault,
a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery.” Id. at 585. This court held
that assault as defined in code section 39-13-101(a)(3) is “clearly a lesser included
offense” of aggravated sexual battery and that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct on the lesser offense of assault. Id. at 586-87.
To be sure, Howard is emblematic of a number of Tennessee cases
which have held that assaultive offenses are lesser included offense of various
forms of sexual offenses. See State v. Jeffrey Edward Pitts, No. 01C01-9701-CC-
00003, slip op. at 15, n. 8 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Mar. 18, 1999) (parties
agreed that, under Howard, assault is a lesser included offense of sexual battery);
Terry Lewis v. Metropolitan General Sessions Ct., No. 01C01-9410-CC-00355, slip
4
op. at 14, (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 13, 1996) (“Assault and battery was a
lesser included offense of sexual contact.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1997); State
v. Grady E. Shofner, No. 03C01-9403-CR-00113, slip op. at 10 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Knoxville, June 27, 1995) (“Assault has long been considered a lesser-included
offense of rape and sexual battery in Tennessee.”); State v. Banes, 874 S.W.2d 73,
79 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (under circumstances, jury should have been instructed
that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser included offense of aggravated rape);
Hershel Clark v. State, No. 02C01-9112-CR-00273, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Jackson, June 2, 1993) (“Assault and battery has been held to be a lesser included
offense of rape in this state.”) (citations omitted); State v. Reed, 689 S.W.2d 190,
193-94 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (aggravated assault as alleged in the indictment
was a lesser included offense of aggravated rape); State v. Johnson, 670 S.W.2d
634, 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that the aggravated assault offense
alleged in the indictment was a lesser included offense of aggravated rape).
We have concluded, however, that later cases have implicitly
overruled Howard. Resolution of this issue hinges on the approach taken to
determining lesser included offenses. In Howard v. State, 578 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn.
1979), the dissent described three approaches: (1) the statutory approach, (2) the
pleadings approach, and (3) the evidentiary approach. Howard, 578 S.W.2d at 86
(Henry, C.J., dissenting). The Howard v. State majority held that “an offense is
necessarily included in another if the elements of the greater offense, as those
elements are set forth in the indictment, include, but are not congruent with, all the
elements of the lesser.” Howard, 578 S.W.2d at 85 (emphasis added). Howard v.
State rejected an evidentiary approach and has been construed to mandate a
pleadings approach in comparing the elements of greater and lesser offenses.
Reed, 689 S.W.2d at 193-94 (aggravated assault “may or may not” be a lesser
included offense of aggravated rape, “depending upon the allegations in the
indictment,” citing Howard v. State) (emphasis added); Johnson, 670 S.W.2d at 637
(aggravated assault included in offense of aggravated rape, based upon allegations
5
in the indictment); but see State v. Gregory Coulson, No. 01C01-9709-CR-00397,
slip op. at 3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 15, 1998) (commenting that
Howard v. State took the statutory approach to element analysis). Under a
pleadings approach, “a lesser offense may be included in the greater if the
language in the charging instrument . . . sets forth the elements of the lesser
offense even though under the statutory definitions it would be possible to commit
the greater offense without committing the lesser.” Coulson, slip op. at 4 (italics in
original). Under the statutory approach the elements contained in the proscriptive
statutes are analyzed in the abstract.
For purposes of the present case, the earlier meanderings of our
appellate courts were brought to a halt by our supreme court in State v. Cleveland,
959 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. 1998). In Cleveland, the court, apparently taking the
statutory approach, analyzed in the abstract the respective statutory elements of
aggravated assault and aggravated rape to determine that the latter is not a lesser
included offense of the former. Cleveland, 959 S.W.2d at 553. Further, the court
said that “of the remaining offenses charged by the trial court, attempted rape,
aggravated sexual battery, attempted aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery, and
attempted sexual battery are lesser grades or classes of the offenses [sic] of
attempted aggravated rape . . . [and f]or the same reasons described . . . [in the
analysis of statutory elements], assault is neither a lesser grade of offense or [sic]
a lesser included offense” of aggravated rape. Cleveland, 959 S.W.2d at 554, n.
5. Although it may be argued that Cleveland did not eliminate assault as a lesser
included offense of aggravated sexual battery,1 we note that Judge Wade, the
author of this court’s opinion in Howard has recently opined, based on Cleveland,
1
Cleveland and Howard may be viewed as harmonious. Footnote 5
in Cleveland does not necessarily reject the Howard holding because Cleveland
includes aggravated sexual battery in the listing of “lesser grades or classes” of
offenses of attempted aggravated rape and does not purport to say that the
former is a lesser included offense of the latter. Therefore, the fact that assault
is neither a lesser grade nor lesser included offense of attempted aggravated
rape does not necessarily exclude it as a lesser included offense of aggravated
sexual battery. Howard says that section 39-13-101(a)(3) assault is a lesser
included offense of aggravated sexual battery.
6
that “assault is neither a lesser grade nor a lesser included offense of sexual
battery.” State v. Edward L. Davis, No. 02C01-9712-CC-00480, slip op. at 10
(Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Mar. 19, 1999). In light of these recent developments,
we conclude that assault is not a lesser included offense of the offense of
aggravated sexual battery.
Even if assault were a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual
battery, the record reflects no basis for instructing the jury as to the misdemeanor
offense of assault. In the present case, the record is devoid of any evidence to
support an inference that the defendant committed assault. In State v. Howard, this
court observed that the evidence did not “establish that the touching was clearly of
a sexual nature, as is the case in the ‘all or nothing’ line of cases which do not
require instruction on a lesser included offense.” Howard, 926 S.W.2d at 586. In
other words, Howard did not deny touching the victim; rather, he averred that any
touching was devoid of sexual meaning.
Despite the defendant’s equivocal acknowledgment in her pretrial
statement that Hall possibly manipulated the defendant’s hand while the defendant
was unconscious, the jury was left with two options: they could accredit her pretrial
statement that she neither intentionally nor knowingly committed an offense against
her daughter, or they could accredit the testimony of the victim that the defendant
intentionally committed the crimes. See State v. Sylvester Smith, No. 02C01-9202-
CR-00028, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, July 15, 1992). Based on the
description of the offenses in the evidence, any unlawful contact was clearly
unlawful sexual contact -- from the inception and throughout the activity. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-501(6), -504(a) (1997).
As in Hershel Clark, “no evidence was offered that the attack was a
simple assault devoid of sexual intent.” See Hershel Clark, slip op. at 7. Had
assault been a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery, the trial court
7
would not have been required to instruct the jury as to such a lesser offense
because the defendant “did not, either through [her] own testimony, or through
argument place this issue before the jury.” Id. The proof “clearly shows that the
defendant was guilty of the greater offense and is devoid of any evidence permitting
an inference of guilt of the lesser offense.” Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 550.
Having concluded that no error was committed, we need not address
the state’s argument that any error was harmless.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge
CONCUR:
____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
____________________________
JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge
8