State v. Bradley Green ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JULY 1999 SESSION
FILED
August 16, 1999
BRADLEY GREEN, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate Court Clerk
Appellant, ) No. 02C01-9809-CR-00300
)
) Shelby County
v. )
) Honorable Carolyn Wade Blackett, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Michael E. Scholl Paul G. Summers
200 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 202 Attorney General of Tennessee
Memphis, TN 38103 and
R. Stephen Jobe
Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
425 Fifth Avenue North
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
William L. Gibbons
District Attorney General
and
Michael H. Leavitt
Assistant District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301
201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner, Bradley Green, appeals as of right from the Shelby County
Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 1993 convictions for felony
murder and especially aggravated robbery for which he is presently serving an effective
sentence of life imprisonment. The petitioner contends (1) that his guilty pleas were not
knowingly and voluntarily entered and (2) that he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel by his attorney’s misadvice regarding parole eligibility. We affirm the trial court.
The petitioner and a co-defendant, Darryl Wallace, were jointly indicted for
and pled guilty to first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and criminal
trespassing. The guilty plea hearing transcript reflects that on May 30, 1992, the victim,
Erving Manis, was closing the Bargain Center at the Southgate Shopping Center. He
carried a money bag with the day’s receipts, and an unarmed security guard had gone
to the car. While the victim was locking the door, the petitioner and Wallace, each
armed with a revolver, approached him. Wallace took the money from the victim and
shot the victim several times while he was on the ground. The state’s proof would
circumstantially show that the petitioner tried to fire a shot but that the gun misfired.
The two ran from the scene and broke into an apartment, where they were arrested.
The petitioner had prior convictions involving the use of or the threat of violence, an
aggravating circumstance that exposed him to the death penalty. The petitioner’s
sentences of life for the first degree murder, fifteen years for the especially aggravated
robbery, and thirty days for the criminal trespass are to be served concurrently.
The gist of the petitioner’s claims is that the trial court intimidated him and
that one of his attorneys told him that he would only have to serve 19.6 years and
maybe as little as twelve years, both of which were incorrect. At the evidentiary
hearing, the petitioner testified that he had no trouble with his attorneys and was
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satisfied with their preparation before trial. He said that he rejected the state’s offer of
consecutive sentences. He also said that he knew he was going to lose the case
because of the evidence against him. He stated that on the morning of trial, the state
offered concurrent sentences. He said that Brett Stein, one of his attorneys, said that
he would serve 19.6 years and that with good and honor time, he might serve as little
as twelve years. The petitioner testified that when he got to prison, he found out that he
would not be released for “thirty something years.” He said that he would not knowingly
have pled guilty with that much time in confinement.
The petitioner testified that when he was testifying at the guilty plea
hearing, the trial judge intimidated him by advising him of the crime of perjury and of the
consequences of him committing perjury in his testimony. The petitioner said that he
was not threatened by the trial judge but that the judge was intimidating, and the
petitioner wanted to get off the witness stand in a hurry.
Brett Stein testified that he and Larry Nance were appointed to represent
the petitioner. He said that an office fire destroyed his file regarding the case, and he
had very little independent recollection of the events. However, he stated that he made
no mention of 19.6 years or twelve years to the petitioner. He said he mentioned no
numbers, although he acknowledged on cross-examination that some mention might
have been “possible.” Regarding parole, he said that he usually would tell a defendant
that the defendant would “see daylight again.” He said that the petitioner pled guilty to
avoid exposure to the death penalty. Finally, he said that he did not find the trial judge
to be intimidating and, in any event, thought his remarks regarding perjury were
irrelevant to the plea process.
Larry Nance testified that he had no recollection of a discussion regarding
any specific number of years before parole. He said he never mentioned nineteen
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years to the petitioner and did not recall Mr. Stein mentioning any figure. He testified
that it was his practice to tell inquiring defendants that he could not say when they
would be paroled and that it was up to the parole board. Mr. Nance testified that he
believed that the petitioner pled guilty because of the possibility of the death penalty.
He said that the shell casing in the petitioner’s gun had an impression as if the
petitioner had attempted to shoot but that the gun had not fired.
The guilty plea hearing transcript reflects that the trial court and Mr. Stein
discussed with and questioned the petitioner at length regarding his understanding of
his constitutional rights, the consequences of waiving those rights, the nature of the
offenses, the sentences involved, the facts in the case, and the petitioner’s desire to
enter guilty pleas. Under oath, the petitioner stated that he understood the
proceedings, had no questions about them, and freely and voluntarily wanted to enter
guilty pleas. The petitioner also testified that he was pleading guilty because if he went
to trial, he would be found guilty and would get the death penalty.
In the present case, the trial court filed an eleven page Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law denying the petitioner post-conviction relief. Relevant to this
appeal, the trial court stated the following:
Turning to Petitioner’s allegations, Petitioner asserts
that the trial court was unduly coercive by asserting possible
criminal charges against the Petitioner if he were later to claim
his counsel ineffective. During the guilty pleas, the trial court
judge explained the importance of being truthful to Petitioner
while under oath and carefully explained to Petitioner that this
was his day in court. Therefore, Petitioner had an opportunity
to tell the truth, make any complaints about his legal
representation or ask any questions in open court.
The trial judge warned the Petitioner that he would be
committing perjury if he were dishonest with the court. There
is no evidence of the trial court being unduly coercive.
Therefore, this issue is without merit.
Petitioner further states that the alleged threat by the
trial court judge inhibited the voluntariness of the Petitioner’s
plea. However, the Petitioner was specifically asked by the
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Court and his legal counsel whether the guilty plea was
voluntary and the response by the Petitioner was in the
affirmative. Further, Petitioner clearly, stated at the beginning
of the guilty plea that his attorney had explained all of his
rights, explained the charges in the indictments, the lesser
included offenses and had specifically interviewed the
witnesses given by the Petitioner.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that
Petitioner’s attorney told Petitioner that he would receive
parole on a life sentence in nineteen (19) years. There was
also no evidence that Petitioner’s attorney attempted to tell
Petitioner about the exact time which would be served at the
Tennessee Department of Corrections. Therefore, these
allegations by Petitioner are without merit and are hereby
dismissed.
The trial court carefully explained to Petitioner his
constitutional rights before accepting his guilty plea. The trial
court advised Petitioner that he had a right to plead not guilty,
a right to a public and speedy trial by jury, a right to confront
and cross-examine any state witness, a right against self-
incrimination. In consideration of these facts, the evidence
establishes that the trial court took great care [i]n ensuring that
Petitioner was well advised and aware of his constitutional
rights. The Petitioner freely and voluntarily, understandingly,
knowingly, advisedly and intelligently waived his rights and
entered his guilty plea. Accordingly, this Court finds that
Petitioner’s allegation that he entered his guilty plea
involuntarily is without merit.
It is obvious that the trial court accredited the petitioner’s testimony at the
guilty plea hearing and the testimony of the petitioner’s attorneys at the evidentiary
hearing. The burden was on the petitioner in the trial court to prove his claims by clear
and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). On appeal, the trial court’s
findings are conclusive unless we determine that the evidence preponderates against
them. Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990). Questions concerning the
credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given their testimony, and the
factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the trial court. Black v.
State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
First, we note that the petitioner’s testimony at the guilty plea hearing
“constitutes a formidable barrier” to his claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty in
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that “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629 (1977). The guilty plea
hearing transcript fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s guilty
pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. In fact, the petitioner’s testimony at the
evidentiary hearing does not purport to show otherwise. As for the claim that the
petitioner was advised that parole eligibility would occur in 19.6 years, the trial court
was entitled to accredit the testimony of the petitioner’s attorneys. W ith such
accreditation, the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the
attorneys did not misadvise the petitioner about parole. In consideration of the
foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
__________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________
James Curwood W itt, Jr., Judge
___________________________
John Everett W illiams, Judge
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