State v. Rodney Jeffries ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MARCH 1999 SESSION
FILED
RODNEY L. JEFFRIES, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9807-CR-00214
Appellant, * SHELBY COUNTY
August 12, 1999
VS. * Hon. James C. Beasley, Jr., Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Post-Conviction)
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellee. *
Appellate Court Clerk
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Rodney Jeffries, Pro Se John Knox Walkup
L.C.C.X., Site 1 Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 1000
Henning, TN 38041 Clinton J. Morgan
(on appeal) Counsel for the State
425 Fifth Avenue North
Monica Simmons, Attorney Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor
200 Jefferson Avenue Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Memphis, TN 38103
(at trial) Scott Gordon
Assistant District Attorney General
Shelby County District
Attorney General's Office
201 Poplar Avenue, Third Floor
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Rodney L. Jeffries, appeals the trial court's denial of
several petitions for post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner
claims that his guilty pleas were neither knowing nor voluntary and were made
without the effective assistance of counsel.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On March 11, 1998, the petitioner filed a series of post-conviction
petitions attacking convictions resulting from guilty pleas entered February 3, 1997:
Offense Sentence
Attempted aggravated robbery Three years
Aggravated robbery Eight years
Aggravated assault Three years
Aggravated assault Three years
Aggravated burglary Three years
Aggravated burglary Three years
Especially aggravated kidnaping Fifteen years
First degree murder Life
Counsel was appointed, the petitions were amended, and the state
filed a response. At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner testified that his trial
counsel spoke with him only ten to fifteen minutes before the pleas were entered.
He claimed that when he entered his pleas he was depressed and did not
understand the consequences of his pleas. He maintained that his trial counsel
advised him to tell the truth and that the trial court would "go easy" on him. The
petitioner stated that he did not realize that he had pleaded guilty to first degree
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murder until he appeared at the sentencing hearing. He stated that he did not voice
his confusion and concern at the plea proceeding because he trusted his attorney
who had told him what to do.
On cross-examination, the petitioner conceded that the trial court had
imposed the minimum sentence for each conviction and ordered them to be served
concurrently. He admitted to having familiarity with the criminal justice system,
having entered pleas of guilt on four prior occasions, and he made no claim that he
misunderstood the rights he had waived in those proceedings. He acknowledged
that the trial court had informed him that he was not required to testify; that if he
proceeded through a trial, he would have had an appeal as of right; and that by
entering guilty pleas, he waived his right to appeal the convictions. He admitted that
he had no complaints with his trial counsel at the plea proceeding and he had been
informed by the trial court of the range of punishment for each conviction.
Trial counsel testified that he began practicing law in 1961 and had
tried many murder cases. He recalled having made eighteen court appearances on
behalf of the petitioner and having visited him in jail at least ten times. He
specifically remembered explaining to the petitioner the range of punishment for first
degree murder and asserted that the petitioner had voluntarily confessed. Trial
counsel stated that there were no alibi witnesses and that the petitioner entered his
plea because he wanted to "get this matter behind him and get on with his life."
While trial counsel did recall that the petitioner appeared to be depressed because
the murder victim had been a distant relative, he expressed certainty that the
petitioner had understood his choices and was aware that the minimum sentence
was a life term. Trial counsel testified that the state never offered the opportunity of
a plea agreement on reduced charges.
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The post-conviction court determined that the petitioner had been
advised of the range of punishment at the submission hearing and that the resultant
convictions could be used against him in the future. It determined that the petitioner
had understood his right not to testify and that he relinquished that right when he
entered his pleas of guilt. The post-conviction court found that the petitioner knew
that his right to appeal extended only to his sentences and not the convictions; that
if trial counsel had failed to inform the petitioner that he could appeal his sentences,
the trial court had done so; and that the indictments were facially valid. The trial
court also determined that the "heart" of the petitioner's complaint was his
displeasure with the life sentence:
The question of credibility comes to play in whether or
not Mr. Jeffries was advised that by cooperating, by
pleading guilty to the judge, by testifying, that he would
get a sentence less than life in prison. And, from an
overall view of the transcript, very specifically Judge Craft
points out that by pleading guilty to murder the only
punishment available is life or life without parole in this
case. That the possibility of consecutive sentencing still
existed when he entered the plea. The range[s] of
punishment[ ] were thoroughly explained to Mr. Jeffries
.... And an extensive voir dire for a guilty plea, one of the
most extensive ones I think I have ever seen. And, that
there is no question that Mr. Jeffries was aware of and
advised that by pleading guilty to the charge of murder,
the question of sentencing was going to be left to the
judge. And, the range of punishment for the murder
charge was either life or life without parole.
The trial court then made several observations about the quality of the
petitioner's trial counsel taking into account his reputation, his ability, and trial skills.
It ruled that the guilty pleas were freely, voluntarily, and knowingly entered and
based upon the effective assistance of counsel:
[It further appears to the court] after a full evidentiary
hearing on defendant's petitions, testimony from
defendant, Ronald Jeffries, his original Attorney, James
V. Ball, and the evidence adduced at the hearing,
consisting of the Plea Petition and Waiver, the Transcript
of the Plea Proceedings, and the Sentencing hearing,
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that the Petitioner's petitions are not well taken and
should be denied.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United States
Supreme Court ruled that defendants should be advised of certain of their
constitutional rights before entering pleas of guilt. Included among those required
warnings are the right against self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses, and
the right to trial by jury. Id. at 243. The overriding Boykin requirement is that the
guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. at 242-44. The plea must
represent a "voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
open to the defendant." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). If the proof
establishes that the petitioner was aware of his constitutional rights, he is entitled to
no relief. Johnson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tenn. 1992). "[A] plea is not
voluntary if it is a product of 'ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror,
inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats.'" Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897,
904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43).
In order to be granted relief on grounds of ineffectiveness assistance
of counsel, the petitioner must establish that the advice or the services provided
were not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases
and that, but for his counsel's deficient performance, the result of his trial would
have been different. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). This two-part standard, as it applies to guilty
pleas, is met when the petitioner establishes that, but for his counsel's errors, he
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on a trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Under our statutory law, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his
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allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). On
appeal, the findings of fact made by the trial court are conclusive and will not be
disturbed unless the evidence contained in the record preponderates against them.
Brooks v. State, 756 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The burden is on
the petitioner to show that the evidence preponderated against those findings.
Clenny v. State, 576 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
Here, the record supports the finding of the trial court. The petitioner
has been unable to establish that he would not have pled guilty or would have
insisted on a trial absent deficiencies in the performance of his trial counsel. In our
view, the proof clearly establishes that the guilty pleas were knowingly and
voluntarily made. Despite his prior record, the petitioner received concurrent
minimum sentences. The transcript confirms that the petitioner was fully aware of
the consequences of his pleas. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
See separate concurring opinion
Thomas T. Woodall, Judge
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