State v. Robert Morton ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
FEBRUARY 1999 SESSION
March 24, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. No. 02C01-9807-CC-00230
)
Appellee, ) Carroll County
)
v. ) Honorable C. Creed McGinley, Judge
)
ROBERT THOMAS MORTON, ) (Aggravated Burglary, Arson,
) Setting Fire to Personal Property)
Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Billy R. Roe, Jr. John Knox Walkup
Assistant District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
117 North Forrest Avenue 425 Fifth Avenue North
Camden, TN 38320 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Clinton J. Morgan
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
G. Robert Radford
District Attorney General
111 Church Street
P. O. Box 686
Huntingdon, TN 38344-0686
Eleanor Cahill
Assistant District Attorney General
111 Church Street
P. O. Box 686
Huntingdon, TN 38344-0686
OPINION FILED: ____________________________
AFFIRMED
JAMES C. BEASLEY, SR., SPECIAL JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, Robert Thomas Morton, was found guilty by a Carroll County jury of
aggravated burglary, arson, and two counts of setting fire to personal property. In this
appeal as of right, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.
This case involves the burglary and burning of a house trailer located at 105 Green
Valley Road in Huntingdon, Tennessee. The trailer was owned by Charles and Irene
Pinkley who lived next door. The trailer was rented by Maria Morton, the appellant’s
estranged wife, and Kanya Knight. The two women, along with Mrs. Morton’s two children,
had been living in the trailer for a “couple of months” at the time of the fire.
On November 21, 1997 at approximately 8 p.m., as Sandra Leigh Sherrod was
leaving the Pinkley residence she noticed a flicker of light in a window of the trailer. She
walked closer to the trailer and saw a curtain burning. She alerted her aunt, Mrs. Pinkley,
and they called 911 and Mrs. Morton who was visiting nearby.
Ms. Sherrod testified that, after calling 911, she ran back to the trailer and attempted
to move Kanya Knight’s car but was unable to do so because the car was locked. As she
walked back across the yard, she saw the appellant and a girl drive by in a blue or gray car.
After the fire trucks arrived, she saw the appellant and the girl drive by again.
Michelle Leigh Davis testified that she was with the appellant on the day of the fire.
She drove him to the police stations in Bruceton and Hollow Rock. She thought he was
trying to get police assistance in recovering some personal items from his wife. Later, they
drove to the trailer where the appellant requested her to knock on the door and ask for
Maria or Kanya. She did so, but no one came to the door. Late that afternoon, she
dropped appellant off at his home in Bruceton. An hour or so later, she picked the
appellant up and drove him to the intersection of Green Valley and Grooms Road. The
appellant got out of the car at this point after telling her “that he was getting some clothes
or something, or see if the cops had showed up out there yet.” Sometime later, she
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returned to the intersection and found the appellant waiting there. She testified that the
appellant told her he broke the window because he wanted to get some of his belongings.
He could not get his things, but his fingerprints were on the window, so he took a lighter
and burned the curtain. Ms. Davis and the appellant then drove by the burning trailer twice
before leaving the area.
Robert Pollard, an investigator with the State Fire Marshall’s Office, testified that the
fire’s point of origin was the center of the trailer in the area of the windows. He found no
evidence of an accelerate or an electrical involvement. The investigator took a statement
from the appellant who admitted being let off at the stop sign at the intersection of Grooms
and Green Valley and walking up the street to see if the “law” or his wife were at his wife’s
house. He said this only took a couple of minutes and then he returned to the stop sign
and met Michelle. He denied setting the fire.
It was established that the site of the burned trailer was less than one-fourth of a
mile from the stop sign at the intersection of Grooms and Green Valley.
Irene Pinkley testified that she and her husband owned the subject trailer. Maria
Morton, her two children, and Kanya Knight were living there. Late in the afternoon on
November 21, Mrs. Pinkley saw the appellant sitting in a car in Maria’s driveway and a
woman knocking on Maria’s door. The appellant and the woman left, but drove by later
while the trailer was burning.
Kanya Knight testified that her personal property, including clothes, jewelry, furniture
and dishes, was in the trailer at the time of the fire. While the trailer was burning, she saw
the appellant and a woman drive by twice in a “little gray-blue looking” car.
Joyce Maria Self testified that on November 21, 1997 she was married to, but
separated from, the appellant. At the time of trial, they were divorced. She lived in the
trailer on Green Valley Road with her two children and Kanya Knight. She said her
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husband had never lived in that trailer and denied that he had any personal items there.
There was an ongoing dispute about the ownership of a washing machine which the
witness had brought from her former residence. She claimed it had been given to her by
the son-in-law of the appellant’s sister; however, the sister claimed that it still belonged to
her.
Appellant’s former wife further testified that everything she owned was lost in the
fire, including her dog, clothes, pictures, and furniture. She stated that while she and her
two children were standing by the road crying, the appellant drove by and “waved a peace
sign.”
Kay Darnell testified that her brother, the appellant, and his former wife, Maria, had
previously lived in a family-owned trailer. She stated that when Maria moved out, “she took
stuff that was mine and stuff that was my brother’s.” Ms. Darnell had contacted the police
for advice as to the steps she should take in recovering her property. On cross-
examination, the witness admitted she had never been in the trailer on Green Valley Road
and could not definitely say that it contained any of her brother’s property.
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must
determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560(1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The rule governing our review of the facts is applicable to
findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of
direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329 (Tenn. 1977)).
Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given
to the evidence, as well as factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier
of fact, not this Court. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1978). A guilty verdict
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rendered by the jury and approved by the trial judge accredits the testimony of the
witnesses for the State, and a presumption of guilt replaces the presumption of innocence.
State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1973). On appeal, the convicted defendant has
the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d
913 (Tenn. 1982).
In his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant does not contest
the proof of the essential elements of these crimes, but claims that the evidence is
insufficient to establish that he is the person who committed them. He argues that the jury
disregarded every possible alternative in accepting the State’s theory, even though logic
would dictate that the appellant did not burn the trailer. In support of this claim, the
appellant alludes to the opportunity of his estranged wife to frame him and claims that he
would have let his dog out before burning the trailer, would not have burned his sister’s
washing machine, and would never have driven by the trailer during the fire. Finally, the
appellant questions why would he have committed these crimes knowing he would be the
primary suspect.
The record reflects that these alternatives and this reasoning was presented to and
rejected by the jury and the trial judge. In approving the jury’s verdict and overruling the
motion for a new trial, the trial judge described the proof in this case as absolutely
overwhelming.
For its consideration, the jury had proof of the appellant’s acts and conduct at and
near the scene immediately before and shortly after the burglary and fire. Most damaging,
however, was the unimpeached testimony of Michelle Davis relating the admissions made
to her by the appellant. By its verdict, the jury obviously credited her testimony.
Great weight is given to the result reached by the jury in a criminal trial, and the
appellant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of guilt. State v. Matthews , 888
S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
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In our view, the appellant has failed to carry his burden of proof in demonstrating
that the evidence is insufficient. Accordingly, we must and do affirm the judgments of
conviction.
________________________________________
JAMES C. BEASLEY, SR., SPECIAL JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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