State v. Charles Hames ( 1999 )


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  •                                                      FILED
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    July 20, 1999
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt
    MAY 1999 SESSION                      Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                   )
    )
    Appellee,                )      C.C.A. No. 03C01-9806-CC-00207
    )
    vs.                                   )      Bradley County
    )
    CHARLES HAMES,                        )      Hon. R. Steven Bebb, Judge
    )
    Appellant.               )      (Theft over $10,000)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                           FOR THE APPELLEE:
    ARVIN H. REINGOLD                            PAUL G. SUMMERS
    Attorney at Law                              Attorney General & Reporter
    Suite 401, Park Plaza Building
    1010 Market Street                           ELLEN H. POLLACK
    Chattanooga, TN 37402                        Assistant Attorney General
    425 Fifth Ave. N., 2d Floor
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    JERRY N. ESTES
    District Attorney General
    SANDRA N. C. DONAGHY
    Assistant District Attorney General
    P.O. Box 1351
    Cleveland, TN 37364
    OPINION FILED:________________
    AFFIRMED
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
    OPINION
    The defendant, Charles Hames, appeals from his jury conviction for
    theft over $10,000 but less than $60,0001 in the Bradley County Criminal Court.
    The trial court imposed a three year sentence in the Tennessee Department of
    Correction. In this direct appeal, the defendant challenges the admission of
    testimony by the state’s expert, Buddy Kimsey, regarding the amount of theft. After
    a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm.
    The following facts were gleaned from the record supplied by the
    defendant. The defendant was an employee of Beaty’s Feed and Farm Supply in
    Bradley County, Tennessee. Mr. Beaty suspected that the defendant was stealing
    money from his business through his position as a cashier. Mr. Beaty contacted
    Buddy Kimsey, a certified public accountant, to determine the amount of theft.
    Kimsey testified at trial regarding a 53 day period of time for which Kimsey
    calculated the amount of loss by the business. The defendant objected to Kimsey’s
    testimony as misleading and speculative. The trial court allowed Kimsey to testify
    to certain findings. After hearing all the evidence, the jury found the defendant
    guilty of theft over $10,000 but less than $60,000.
    Before Kimsey testified in front of the jury, the trial judge listened to
    his proposed testimony. Kimsey testified how he calculated the amount of theft.
    He reviewed daily reports over a 53 day period which showed the number of times
    the defendant voided transactions on his register. Kimsey assessed a dollar value
    to the voided transactions, which he maintained was the amount of theft committed
    by the defendant. Kimsey did concede that the void button can be used for
    legitimate reasons, but he assumed a theft occurred every time the void button was
    used by the defendant. The trial judge overruled the defendant’s objection to
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    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103, -14-105(4) (1997).
    2
    Kimsey’s testimony by finding the testimony was not misleading, and by noting that
    a full cross examination would be allowed. Kimsey’s testimony at the jury-out
    hearing was essentially the same in the jury’s presence.
    Additionally, during the jury-out hearing, Kimsey calculated the total
    sales during the 53 day period on the defendant’s register, then calculated the
    percentage of the total that constituted voided transactions. He applied this
    percentage to total sales during the period from 1991 through August 1996.
    Applying the percentage, he assessed a total amount of theft for that time frame.
    The defendant objected to this five and a half year projection, and the court
    sustained the objection. Kimsey did not testify to the jury regarding this projection.
    The defendant contends Kimsey’s testimony was confusing and
    unfairly prejudicial, and that the trial court should have excluded the testimony
    pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. Relevant evidence is generally
    admissible, unless “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
    unfair prejudice.” Tenn. R. Evid. 402, 403. In deciding whether evidence is more
    probative than prejudicial, the trial court must consider “the questions of fact that the
    jury will have to consider in determining the accused’s guilt as well as other
    evidence that has been introduced during the course of the trial.”             State v.
    Williamson, 
    919 S.W.2d 69
    , 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Dulsworth,
    
    781 S.W.2d 277
    , 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)). The standard of review applicable
    to the decision to admit evidence is abuse of discretion. See State v. Dubose, 
    953 S.W.2d 649
    , 652 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Baker, 
    785 S.W.2d 132
    , 134 (Tenn. Crim.
    App. 1980).
    The appellate record only contains the transcript of Kimsey’s
    testimony. The appellant must prepare a record which conveys a fair, accurate and
    3
    complete account of the proceedings below regarding the issues on appeal. See
    Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b); State v. Ballard, 
    855 S.W.2d 557
    , 560 (Tenn. 1993). If the
    appellant fails to file an adequate record, this court must presume the trial court’s
    ruling was correct. See State v. Richardson, 
    875 S.W.2d 671
    , 674 (Tenn. Crim.
    App. 1993).
    We are unable to determine the prejudice, or lack thereof, caused by
    Kimsey’s testimony without reviewing all the evidence adduced at trial. We do not
    know if this was the only evidence introduced at trial which indicated to the jury the
    amount of theft. The trial judge assessed Kimsey’s testimony at a jury-out hearing
    and found it was not misleading. We must presume the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in allowing Kimsey to testify.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ________________________________
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    _______________________________
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE
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