State v. Quincy Love ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JUNE SESSION, 1999 FILED
July 19, 1999
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9809-CR-00282
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellee, ) Appellate Court Clerk
)
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JOSEPH B. DAILEY
QUINCY L. LOVE, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (Second Degree M urder)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
A.C. WHARTON, JR. PAUL G. SUMMERS
Shelby County Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
WA LKER GW INN CLINTON J. MORGAN
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue 425 Fifth Avenu e North
Memphis, TN 38103 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM GIBBONS
District Attorney General
PHILL IP GE RALD HAR RIS
Assistant District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301
201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of second degree
murder. In this ap peal h e argu es tha t the evid ence introdu ced a gains t him is
insufficient to support a finding that the killing was “knowing.” We disagree and
affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
The eviden ce intro duce d at trial clearly show ed that the victim died of a
single gunshot wound inflicted by the Defendant. The Defendant testified that the
victim owed him a little over a hund red do llars for c ocain e whic h he h ad so ld to
the victim. The Defendant saw the victim on the street and initiated a discussion
about the debt. When the victim told the Defendant that he really did not have
to pay the Defendant anything, the Defendant became angry an d hit the victim
in the face. During the ensuing fistfight, th e victim was s hot with the De fenda nt’s
pistol, which the De fendant had been carrying under his shirt in the waistband of
his pants. The bullet penetrated the victim’s chest area, resultin g in the victim’s
death fro m injury to h is vital organ s and inte rnal bleed ing.
The facts in this case are basically undisputed, except the Defendant
testified that during the struggle, his pistol accidentally discharged. He stated
that the pis tol fell ou t of his p ants d uring th e alterc ation. H e said he picked up the
gun while th e two w ere still fighting , and h e hit the victim “u pside the head” w ith
the gun. H e state d, “Th e gun caug ht in m y finger and th at’s wh en it had went
off.”
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The Defendan t argue s that th ere is in sufficie nt proo f that he know ingly
killed the victim. Tenn essee Rule of A ppellate Procedure 13(e) prescribes that
“[f]indings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set
aside if the eviden ce is insuffic ient to sup port the findings by the trier of fact of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). In addition, because
conviction by a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocence and imposes
a presum ption of gu ilt, a convicted criminal d efenda nt bears the burden of
showing that the evid ence w as insufficie nt. McBe e v. State, 372 S.W .2d 173,
176 (Tenn . 1963); see also State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)
(citing State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1976), and State v. Brown,
551 S.W .2d 329 , 331 (T enn. 19 77)); State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914
(Tenn . 1982); Holt v. State , 357 S.W .2d 57, 61 (T enn. 1962 ).
In its review of the evidence, an a ppellate court m ust afford the State “the
strongest legitim ate view of the e videnc e as w ell as all reasonable and legitimate
inferences that may be d rawn therefrom .” Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d at 914 (citing
State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d 832 , 835 (T enn. 19 78)). The court may not “re-
weigh or re-evaluate the evidence” in the reco rd below . Evans, 838 S.W.2d at
191 (citing Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d at 836). Likew ise, should the review ing court
find particular conflicts in the trial testimon y, the court mus t resolve them in favor
of the jury ve rdict or trial cou rt judgm ent. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d at 914.
Second degree murder is defined as a knowing killing of another. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). Our legislature has defined knowing as follows:
“Knowing” refers to a person who acts knowingly with respect to the
nature of the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct
when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the
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circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a
result of the person’s conduct when the person is aware that the
condu ct is reaso nably ce rtain to cau se the re sult . . . .
Tenn. C ode Ann . § 39-11-106 (a)(20).
In the light m ost favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the
Defendant saw the victim, who he claimed owed him money from a prior drug
transaction. The Defendant, armed with a concealed pistol, approached the
victim abou t collecting this money. The victim’s response angered the
Defen dant, and he struck the victim in the face. A fistfight then began, and the
Defendant admitted that the victim was “ge tting the be st of [the D efenda nt].”
During his testimony at trial, the Defendant readily admitted that he struck the
victim with the pistol, b ut he a sserte d that th e firing o f the pis tol was accide ntal.
The only other person who witnessed the event testified that he saw the two men
fighting, heard the gunshot, and saw the victim fall to the ground. He stated that
the Defendant continued striking the victim after the victim was on the ground.
This witness stated that he never actually saw the firearm.
W e believe the factual disp ute in this case presented a classic jury issue.
The credibility of the Defendant and the weight to be g iven to his testimon y were
issues resolved by the jury in favor of the State’s theory of the case. Criminal
intent is a matter to be d etermined by the jury after a consideration of all the facts
and circums tances . State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1993). “A person can act knowingly irrespective of his or her desire that the
conduct or result will occur.” State v. Gray, 960 S.W.2d 598, 604 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1997) (citing State v. Rutherfo rd, 876 S.W.2d 118, 120-21 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 19 93)).
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In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we must
do on appeal, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the
Defendant’s conviction. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
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THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
___________________________________
NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE
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