State v. Charles Woodruff ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JUNE SESSION, 1999 FILED
July 20, 1999
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9809-CC-00265
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellee, ) Appellate Court Clerk
)
) GIBSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JULIAN P. GUINN
CHARLES WOODRUFF, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (Sale of Cocaine)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF GIBSON COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
C. MICHAEL ROBINS PAUL G. SUMMERS
46 North Third Street Attorney General and Reporter
Suite 719
Memphis, TN 38103 R. STEPHEN JOBE
(ON APPEAL) Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenu e North
TOM C. CRIDER Nashville, TN 37243
District Public Defender
107 S. Co urt Square CLAYBURN L. PEEPLES
Trenton, TN 38382 District Attorney General
(AT TRIAL)
BRIAN W. FULLER
Assistant District Attorney General
110 S. College Street, Suite 200
Trenton, TN 38382
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defen dant, Ch arles W oodruff, w as indicte d by the Gibs on Co unty
Grand Jury on September 15, 1997 on four charges, all arising from a single drug
transaction: possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, delivery of
cocaine, sale of cocaine, and possession of cocaine. On May 22, 1998, the
Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty of th e sale of cocaine. The
trial court sen tenced him as a Rang e III persisten t offender to ten years
incarceration, and as fixed by the jury, he was fined $2,000. Pursuant to Rule 3
of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant now appe als his
conviction, presenting only one issue for our review: whether his indictment was
void for failure to sufficiently allege a culpable mental state. We affirm the
judgm ent of the tria l court.
The indictme nt at issue alleges th at “CHA RLE S W OO DRU FF did
unlaw fully sell a controlled substance, to wit: COCAINE, a schedule II controlled
substance, as classified in Section 39-17-408 of the Tennessee Code Annotated,
to Michael Jones, an undercover agent of the Milan Police Department, in
violation of T.C.A. 39-17-417.” The Defendant argues that the indictment does
not allege a culpable mental state as contem plated by Tenn essee laws, see
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301, and that it is therefore fatally deficient. He
contends that because the indictment fails to allege a culp able m ental s tate, it is
fatally deficien t.
Genera lly, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Con stitution
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“guarantee to the accuse d the right to be inform ed of the nature and cause of the
accusa tion.” State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997). In addition, an
indictment is generally valid “if it provides sufficient information (1) to enable the
accused to know the accusation to which answer is required, (2) to furnish the
court adequ ate bas is for the en try of a proper judgment, and (3) to protect the
accused from do uble jeop ardy.” Id. The Defendant relies upon Hill to sup port his
argum ent in th is app eal.
In Hill, the supreme court considered an indictment charging the defendant
with the offense of aggravated rape and concluded that the indictment was valid,
desp ite its failu re to alle ge a c ulpab le menta l state. Id. at 729. The court held
that for offense s which n either expressly require nor plainly dispense
with the requirement for a culpable mental state, an indictment
which fails to allege such m ental state will be sufficient to sup port
prosecution and conviction for that offense so long as
(1) the lan guag e of the indictmen t is sufficient to meet the
constitutional requirements of notice to the accused of the charge
against which the accused mus t defen d, ade quate basis for entry of
a proper judg ment, and protection from d ouble jeopa rdy;
(2) the form of the indictm ent meets the requirements of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-13-202; and
(3) the mental state can be logically inferred from the
conduct
alleged.
Id. at 726-2 7. The c ourt em phas ized th at “the p urpos e for the tradition ally strict
pleading requirement was the existence of common law offenses whose
eleme nts were not easily ascertained by reference to a statute” and pointed out
that “[s]uch co mm on law o ffenses no long er exist.” Id. at 728. The court also
indicated that “‘the growing inclination of this court [is] to escape from the
embarrassment of technic alities that are empty and without reason, and tend to
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defeat law and right.’” Id. (quoting State v. Cornellison, 59 S.W.2d 514, 515
(Tenn . 1933)).
In the case at hand, the Defen dant co ntends that “as to statutory offenses
which do spe cify a culpable mental state in the definition of the offense, m odern
criminal practice in Tennessee as elsewhere mandates that the required mental
state be expressly pleaded in the indictment.” He distinguish es the offe nse with
which he was charged, the sale of cocaine, from that ch arged in Hill, aggravated
rape, in two ways: He points out that the offense itself is different and argues that
the common law affecting the two crimes differs. He also stresses the fact that
the statute defining the crime charged in h is case does specify a culpable mental
state — tha t of “knowing.”
Contrary to the Defend ant’s assertions, the Tennes see Sup reme C ourt
held in Ruff v. Sta te, 978 S.W .2d 95 (T enn. 19 98), that the reasoning in Hill
applies “with ev en gre ater for ce” in c ases where the cu lpable men tal state is
provided in the st atute c ited in the indictme nt. Id. at 99. In a recent case, our
supreme court reaffirmed its holding in Ruff, stating tha t
an indictment which includes a reference to the criminal statute that
sets forth the mens rea is sufficient to give a defendant notice of the
applic able mental state. “Thus, where the constitutional and
statutory require men ts outlin ed in Hill are met, an indictment that
cites the pertine nt statute and us es its langu age will be sufficient to
suppo rt a convictio n.”
State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at
100).
This Court has recently applied the same reasoning in cases involving the
sale of drugs . See State v. Vincent Burris , No. 02C01-9703-CC-00087, 1999 WL
150866 (Tenn . Crim. A pp., Jackso n, March 22, 199 9); State v. Howard Kareem
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Atkins, No. 02C01-9805-CC-00155, 199 9 W L 2418 70 (Te nn. Crim . App.,
Jackson, April 26, 19 99); Bruce E dward L ittle v. State, No. 01C01-9710-CR-
00461, 1998 WL 918608, at *3-*4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec. 31, 199 8).
In the case at bar, the indictment specifically references Tennessee Code
Annotated § 39-17-41 7, which states in p ertinent part, “It is an offense for a
defendant to know ingly . . . [s]ell a controlled substan ce . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-17-4 17(a)(3) (emph asis add ed). In addition, we no te that the trial court
instructed the jury that in order for the Defendant to be found guilty of the offense
of which he was ultimately convicted, “the State must have proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defenda nt intentionally or know ingly sold [the]
Coca ine.” (Emphasis added.) The jury instructions included a definition of
“knowin gly.” We conclud e that the in dictment in this case meets constitutional
and statutory requirements of notice and form and is, therefore, valid.
Accord ingly, the jud gmen t of the trial cou rt is affirmed .
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DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
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THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
___________________________________
NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE
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