State v. Christopher D. Smith ( 1999 )


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  •                                                     FILED
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    July 12, 1999
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt
    MAY 1999 SESSION                        Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                  )
    )
    Appellee,                )      C.C.A. No. 03C01-9807-CR-00270
    )
    vs.                                  )      Knox County
    )
    CHRISTOPHER D. SMITH,                )      Hon.   Ray    L. Jenkins, Judge
    )
    Appellant.               )      (Burglary, Attempted Theft)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                          FOR THE APPELLEE:
    LAURIE S. ANDRIJESKI (at trial)             PAUL G. SUMMERS
    Attorney at Law                             Attorney General & Reporter
    800 S. Gay Street, Suite 800
    Knoxville, TN 37909                         TODD R. KELLEY
    Assistant Attorney General
    ALBERT J. NEWMAN, JR. (on appeal)           425 Fifth Ave. N., 2d Floor
    Attorney at Law                             Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    602 S. Gay Street, Suite 500
    Knoxville, TN 37902                         RANDALL E. NICHOLS
    District Attorney General
    ZANE SCARLETT
    Assistant District Attorney General
    400 Main, P.O. Box 1468
    Knoxville, TN 37901-1468
    OPINION FILED:________________
    AFFIRMED
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
    OPINION
    The defendant, Christopher D. Smith, appeals from his jury
    convictions for burglary and attempted theft in the Knox County Criminal Court.
    See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101(a), -14-103, -14-402(a)(1) (1997). The trial
    court imposed a twelve year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction
    for the burglary conviction and a concurrent six month sentence in the county jail for
    the attempted theft conviction. In this direct appeal, the defendant challenges the
    sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a review of the record, the briefs of the
    parties, and the applicable law, we affirm.
    On November 29, 1995, between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m., Angie Russell
    drove to Thorngrove Baptist Church to perform her duties as custodian. As she
    entered the parking lot, she saw a car parked near the lower entrance to the church.
    She called her husband, who suggested that she write the license number of the
    car. As she was writing the license number, she noticed the window next to the
    church door was missing the upper pane. Russell called 911 and drove to a nearby
    store, Pop-N-Go.     On her way to the store, she encountered the pastor of
    Thorngrove Baptist Church, Ted Padgett. Russell and Padgett returned to the
    church’s main entrance at the side of the church.
    Padgett retrieved a pistol from the trunk of his car. He crouched near
    the door at the main entrance and pulled the door open. Padgett was surprised by
    the alarm when he opened the door. The defendant ran out of a church office, and
    Padgett pointed the pistol at him. Padgett detained the defendant until the police
    arrived on the scene.
    Padgett testified that the office door frames had been broken with
    some kind of tool to obtain entrance to the locked offices. Both church offices were
    in disaray with papers strewn over the desks and on the floor. Someone had
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    rummaged through the file cabinets. Padgett’s electric typewriter was not in his
    office, but was found downstairs near the window by the lower entrance door, where
    it had been thrown on the floor and destroyed. Tape recorders and a radio, which
    belonged in classrooms downstairs, were stacked by the window. All these items
    were worth less than five hundred dollars.
    Officer T. Michael Cheaves testified that he arrived at the scene to
    start the initial investigation. There were no fingerprints found at the scene of the
    crime. He checked the license number on the Mercury Capri parked in the church
    lot, and the license number belonged to the defendant.
    Several witnesses testified for the defense. Angie Underwood testified
    that the defendant had spent the night at her residence with her four children. He
    helped her children get ready for school the morning of November 29, 1995. The
    defendant left her residence around 8:30 a.m. Allen Houser, a brick mason,
    testified that the defendant arrived at their job site around 9 a.m. They waited for
    materials to arrive, but the materials did not arrive that day. Everyone at the job
    site, including the defendant, left around 9:30 a.m. Carol Griffin, an employee at the
    Pop-N-Go, saw the defendant using the pay phone outside the store a few minutes
    after 10:00 a.m.
    The defendant testified that, after making phone calls at the pay
    phone outside the Pop-N-Go, he drove to the church parking lot to “kill time.” He
    exited his car to smoke a cigarette, and he noticed the window pane was missing.
    He heard a noise coming from inside the church, and he entered the church through
    the window to investigate. As he entered the church, he saw blinds on the floor
    near the window and a radio. The defendant walked up the stairs noticing a
    typewriter sitting on the floor. He testified that he never entered an office. Padgett
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    opened the door and pointed a gun at him.
    After hearing this evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty of
    burglary and attempted theft.
    The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his
    convictions. When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, an
    appellate court’s standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
    
    443 U.S. 307
    , 324, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2791-92 (1979); State v. Duncan, 
    698 S.W.2d 63
    , 67 (Tenn. 1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). This rule applies to findings of guilt
    based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of direct and
    circumstantial evidence. State v. Dykes, 
    803 S.W.2d 250
    , 253 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1990).
    Moreover, a criminal offense may be established exclusively by
    circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 
    505 S.W.2d 237
     (Tenn. 1973); State v.
    Jones, 
    901 S.W.2d 393
    , 396 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Lequire, 
    634 S.W.2d 608
     (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). However, before an accused may be convicted of a
    criminal offense based upon circumstantial evidence alone, the facts and
    circumstances "must be so strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable
    hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant." State v. Crawford, 
    225 Tenn. 478
    , 
    470 S.W.2d 610
     (1971); Jones, 901 S.W.2d at 396.          In other words, "[a] web of guilt
    must be woven around the defendant from which he cannot escape and from which
    facts and circumstances the jury could draw no other reasonable inference save the
    guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt." Crawford, 470 S.W.2d at 613;
    State v. McAfee, 
    737 S.W.2d 304
    , 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
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    In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this court should not
    reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the
    weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the
    evidence are resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835
    (Tenn. 1978). Nor may this court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the
    trier of fact from the evidence. Liakas v. State, 
    199 Tenn. 298
    , 305, 
    286 S.W.2d 856
    , 859 (1956); Farmer v. State, 
    574 S.W.2d 49
    , 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). On
    the contrary, this court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate
    view of the evidence contained in the record as well as all reasonable and legitimate
    inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835.
    The defendant contends there was no evidence that he entered the
    church for an unlawful purpose. Burglary occurs when “[a] person . . . without the
    effective consent of the property owner . . . [e]nters a building other than a
    habitation . . . not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault.”
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(1) (1997). The defendant testified that he entered
    the church because he was investigating a noise. The defendant entered the
    church without permission. Padgett testified that he saw the defendant running out
    of an office when he opened the door, and that items were stacked beside the
    window with the missing pane. No one else was found inside the church. The jury
    chose to disregard the defendant’s testimony regarding why he was inside the
    church. Instead, from these circumstances, the jury found the defendant was inside
    the church to commit a theft. A jury may infer criminal intent from the circumstances
    of the case. See State v. Holland, 
    860 S.W.2d 53
    , 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
    The jury was presented with sufficient evidence from which they could infer the
    defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Shirley Double, No.
    5
    01C01-9704-CR-00156, slip op. at 9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 19, 1998)
    (defendant found guilty of aggravated burglary when she admitted being at the
    victim’s home, but denied entering it and participating in the burglary). We find
    sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for burglary.
    The defendant was convicted of attempted theft also. Theft occurs
    when “[a] person . . . with intent to deprive the owner of property, . . . knowingly
    obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s effective consent.”
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103 (1997). Under these circumstances, attempt occurs
    when “[a] person . . . acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
    offense . . . [a]cts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that
    would constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as
    the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step
    toward the commission of the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101(a)(3) (1997).
    The evidence showed that a radio and tape recorders were stacked
    beside the window. Padgett’s typewriter had been moved from his office and
    thrown on the floor downstairs. Nothing was actually removed or found missing
    from the church. However, items had been moved and seemed to be in a position
    where someone was planning to remove them from the church. A substantial step
    toward the commission of theft occurred in this case. The jury could infer that the
    defendant moved these items and intended to deprive the owner of them. See
    State v. Daniel S. Barnes, No. 01C01-9702-CR-00070, slip op. at 5 (Tenn. Crim.
    App., Nashville, Jan. 27, 1998) (evidence sufficient where several items had been
    moved from their normal locations). We find sufficient evidence existed for the jury
    to find the defendant guilty of attempted theft.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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    ________________________________
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    _______________________________
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE
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