State v. Ricky Dale Langford ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
OCTOBER SESSION, 1999
FILED
December 15, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) M1999-01740-CCA-R3-CD
)
Appe llant, )
) CHEATHAM COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON. LEONARD W. MARTIN, JUDGE
RICKY DALE LANGFORD, )
)
Appellee. ) (THREE COUNTS RAPE OF A CHILD)
FOR THE APPELLEE: FOR THE APPELLANT:
WILL IAM B. (J AKE) L OCK ERT , III PAUL G. SUMMERS
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
STEVE STACK LUCIAN D. GEISE
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 464 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Ashland City, TN 37015 425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
DAN M. ALSOBROOKS
District Attorn ey Ge neral
JAMES W. KIRBY
Assis tant D istrict Atto rney G enera l
105 Sycamore Street
Ashland City, TN 37015-1806
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
-2-
OPINION
The Ch eatham County G rand Jury indicted Defenda nt Ricky Dale L angford
for three counts of rape of a child and one count of incest. Defe ndan t subs eque ntly
pled guilty to three counts of rape of a child and the incest charge was nolled.
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed three concurrent sentences
of twenty yea rs. The S tate contends that the trial court should have imposed
consecu tive sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
FACTS
Defendant began sexually abusing his eleven year old daughter in March of
1997. For ap proxim ately nin e mo nths, D efend ant en gage d in vag inal, anal, and oral
sex with his da ughter. D efenda nt adm itted to Barbara Wallace of the Department
of Children’s Services that he had engaged in eight acts of penile penetration and
eight acts of oral sex with his daughter, in addition to several incidents of fondling or
kissing. According to Wallace, Defendant is an untreatable pedophile with a
mode rate to high risk of re-offending. As a result o f the se xual ab use, D efend ant’s
daughter has pa rticipated in c ounse ling in orde r to learn ho w to differentiate between
love and sex a nd how to co ntrol various “sexua lly acting out behaviors ”.
-3-
ANALY SIS
The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed
concurrent sentencing. We disagree.
When the State challenges a defendant's sentence, the State has the burden
of showin g that the s entenc e is impro per. State v. Blouvet, 965 S.W.2d 489, 494
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (1997) (Sentencing
Commission Com men ts). In ad dition, o ur revie w is de novo with a presumption that
the trial court’s sentencing determinations were correct. Blouvet, 965 S.W.2d at 494;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0-35-40 2(d) (Su pp. 1999). H owev er, this p resum ption "is
conditioned upon the affirm ative show ing in the record that the trial court considered
the sentencing principles and all rele vant facts and circu mstan ces." State v. Ashby,
823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 199 1).
Consec utive sentencing is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-115 (b), which provides that “[t]he [trial] co urt may order sentences to run
cons ecutive ly if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that” one or more
of the required statu tory criteria exist. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b) (1997)
(emp hasis added). “Whether sentences are to be served concurrently or
cons ecutive ly is a matte r addres sed to the soun d discretio n of the trial co urt. State
v. Adams, 973 S.W .2d 224 , 230–3 1 (Ten n. Crim. A pp. 199 7).
During the sente ncing he aring, the tria l court state d that it recognized that
because Defendant had been convicted of two or more sexual offenses with a minor
victim, the court could impose consecutive sentencin g bas ed on Defe ndan t’s
-4-
relation ship with the victim, the time sp an of the activity, the nature o f the activity,
and the residu al dam age to the victim. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115 (b)(6)
(1997). The trial co urt then d iscusse d the na ture of the o ffenses, the injury to the
victim, the testimony that was presented during the hearing, Defendant’s age, and
the fact that Defendant would be required to serve 100% of a twenty year sentence.
The trial court then ruled that based on all of these considerations, a total sentence
of twenty years to be served at 100% was the proper and just result in this case.
W e conclude that wh ile the tria l court p robab ly would have b een ju stified in
imposing consecutive senten cing in this c ase, the tria l court did n ot abus e its
discretion in imposing concurrent sentencing. Section 40-35-115(b) provides that
the trial court may, rather than must, impo se consec utive sentencing if one or more
of the enumerated factors is present. In this case, the trial court properly considered
all of the relevant sentencing criteria and exercised its discretion to impose
concu rrent, rather than con secutive sentencing. Because our review indicates that
the trial court imposed a lawful sentence after having given due consideration and
proper weight to the factors and principles set out under the sentencing law and the
trial court's findings are adequately supported by the record, we may not modify the
sentence even if we wou ld have p referred a different res ult. State v. Fletcher, 805
S.W.2d 785, 791 (T enn. C rim. App . 1991). In s hort, the S tate has failed to mee t its
burden of sho wing th at the s enten ce is improper. Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court is AFFIRMED.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
-5-
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JR., Judge
___________________________________
JAMES CURW OOD W ITT, JR., Judge
-6-