State v. Ricky Dale Langford ( 1999 )


Menu:
  •           IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    OCTOBER SESSION, 1999
    FILED
    December 15, 1999
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                   )   M1999-01740-CCA-R3-CD
    )
    Appe llant,               )
    )   CHEATHAM COUNTY
    V.                                    )
    )
    )   HON. LEONARD W. MARTIN, JUDGE
    RICKY DALE LANGFORD,                  )
    )
    Appellee.                 )   (THREE COUNTS RAPE OF A CHILD)
    FOR THE APPELLEE:                          FOR THE APPELLANT:
    WILL IAM B. (J AKE) L OCK ERT , III        PAUL G. SUMMERS
    District Public Defender                   Attorney General & Reporter
    STEVE STACK                                LUCIAN D. GEISE
    Assistant Public Defender                  Assistant Attorney General
    P.O. Box 464                               2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
    Ashland City, TN 37015                     425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243
    DAN M. ALSOBROOKS
    District Attorn ey Ge neral
    JAMES W. KIRBY
    Assis tant D istrict Atto rney G enera l
    105 Sycamore Street
    Ashland City, TN 37015-1806
    OPINION FILED ________________________
    AFFIRMED
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
    -2-
    OPINION
    The Ch eatham County G rand Jury indicted Defenda nt Ricky Dale L angford
    for three counts of rape of a child and one count of incest. Defe ndan t subs eque ntly
    pled guilty to three counts of rape of a child and the incest charge was nolled.
    Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed three concurrent sentences
    of twenty yea rs. The S tate contends that the trial court should have imposed
    consecu tive sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    FACTS
    Defendant began sexually abusing his eleven year old daughter in March of
    1997. For ap proxim ately nin e mo nths, D efend ant en gage d in vag inal, anal, and oral
    sex with his da ughter. D efenda nt adm itted to Barbara Wallace of the Department
    of Children’s Services that he had engaged in eight acts of penile penetration and
    eight acts of oral sex with his daughter, in addition to several incidents of fondling or
    kissing.       According to Wallace, Defendant is an untreatable pedophile with a
    mode rate to high risk of re-offending. As a result o f the se xual ab use, D efend ant’s
    daughter has pa rticipated in c ounse ling in orde r to learn ho w to differentiate between
    love and sex a nd how to co ntrol various “sexua lly acting out behaviors ”.
    -3-
    ANALY SIS
    The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed
    concurrent sentencing. We disagree.
    When the State challenges a defendant's sentence, the State has the burden
    of showin g that the s entenc e is impro per. State v. Blouvet, 
    965 S.W.2d 489
    , 494
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (1997) (Sentencing
    Commission Com men ts). In ad dition, o ur revie w is de novo with a presumption that
    the trial court’s sentencing determinations were correct. Blouvet, 965 S.W.2d at 494;
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0-35-40 2(d) (Su pp. 1999). H owev er, this p resum ption "is
    conditioned upon the affirm ative show ing in the record that the trial court considered
    the sentencing principles and all rele vant facts and circu mstan ces." State v. Ashby,
    823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 199 1).
    Consec utive sentencing is governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section
    40-35-115 (b), which provides that “[t]he [trial] co urt may order sentences to run
    cons ecutive ly if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that” one or more
    of the required statu tory criteria exist. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b) (1997)
    (emp hasis added).       “Whether sentences are to be served concurrently or
    cons ecutive ly is a matte r addres sed to the soun d discretio n of the trial co urt. State
    v. Adams, 973 S.W .2d 224 , 230–3 1 (Ten n. Crim. A pp. 199 7).
    During the sente ncing he aring, the tria l court state d that it recognized that
    because Defendant had been convicted of two or more sexual offenses with a minor
    victim, the court could impose consecutive sentencin g bas ed on Defe ndan t’s
    -4-
    relation ship with the victim, the time sp an of the activity, the nature o f the activity,
    and the residu al dam age to the victim. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115 (b)(6)
    (1997). The trial co urt then d iscusse d the na ture of the o ffenses, the injury to the
    victim, the testimony that was presented during the hearing, Defendant’s age, and
    the fact that Defendant would be required to serve 100% of a twenty year sentence.
    The trial court then ruled that based on all of these considerations, a total sentence
    of twenty years to be served at 100% was the proper and just result in this case.
    W e conclude that wh ile the tria l court p robab ly would have b een ju stified in
    imposing consecutive senten cing in this c ase, the tria l court did n ot abus e its
    discretion in imposing concurrent sentencing. Section 40-35-115(b) provides that
    the trial court may, rather than must, impo se consec utive sentencing if one or more
    of the enumerated factors is present. In this case, the trial court properly considered
    all of the relevant sentencing criteria and exercised its discretion to impose
    concu rrent, rather than con secutive sentencing. Because our review indicates that
    the trial court imposed a lawful sentence after having given due consideration and
    proper weight to the factors and principles set out under the sentencing law and the
    trial court's findings are adequately supported by the record, we may not modify the
    sentence even if we wou ld have p referred a different res ult. State v. Fletcher, 
    805 S.W.2d 785
    , 791 (T enn. C rim. App . 1991). In s hort, the S tate has failed to mee t its
    burden of sho wing th at the s enten ce is improper. Accordingly, the judgment of the
    trial court is AFFIRMED.
    ____________________________________
    THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
    -5-
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JR., Judge
    ___________________________________
    JAMES CURW OOD W ITT, JR., Judge
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M1999-01740-CCA-R3-CD

Filed Date: 12/15/1999

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021