State v. Quinton Cage ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
MAY SESSION, 1997 January 26, 1999
Cecil W. Crowson
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate Court Clerk
C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9605-CC-00179
)
Appellee, )
)
) MONTGOM ERY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JAMES E. WALTON
QUINTON CAGE, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (Direct Appeal - Aggravated Rape-
) Especially Aggravated Kidnapping)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JOHN E. HERBISON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
2016 E ighth Ave nue So uth Attorney General and Reporter
Nashville, TN 37204
(On A ppea l) EUGENE J. HONEA
Assistant Attorney General
COLLIER GOODLETT, JR. 450 James Robertson Parkway
Assistant Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243-0493
109 S. Second Street
Clarksville, TN 37040 JOHN CARNEY
(At Tr ial) District Attorney General
ARTHUR BEIBER
Assistant District Attorney
204 Franklin Street
Clarksville, TN 37040
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
On Decem ber 2, 19 94, a Montgomery County jury convicted Appellant
Quinton Cage of aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment with a
deadly weapo n. After a se ntencing hearing on Jan uary 13, 1 995, Appellant
received sentences of twenty-five years for aggravated rape, twenty years for
espe cially aggravated kidnapping, eight years for aggravated robbery, three
years for attempted aggravated robbery, and two years for reckless
endan germe nt. The sentences for espe cially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
rape, aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment were ordered to run
cons ecutive ly and the sentence for attempted aggravated robbery was ordered
to run co ncurre ntly with th e othe r sente nces . Appe llant ch allenges both his
convictions and his sentences, raising the following issues:
1) whether the charges against Appellant should have been dismissed or
remanded to the juvenile court for failure to give timely written notice of the
transfer hearing;
2) whether the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court was established at the
acceptance hearing;
3) whether the indictment was sufficient to charge Appe llant with attempted
aggravated robbery;
4) whether the evidence was sufficient to convic t Appe llant of e spec ially
aggravated kidnapping a nd aggrava ted robbery;
5) whether the trial court properly denied Appellant’s pre-trial motion for
expert assistance;
6) whether the trial court properly quashed a defense subpoena for
materia ls in the po ssessio n of the S tate’s expe rt;
7) whether the trial court properly admitted DNA evidence;
8) whether Appellant’s sentences are excessive; and
9) whether the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences.
After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
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I. FACTS
Rajohnah Stepha nie Stua rd testified tha t on April 1, 1994, she went to a
retail store in Clarksville, Tennessee to do some shopping. When Stuard left the
store and walked over to her 1993 Ford Explorer, Appellant approached her and
ordered her to get into the vehicle. When Stuard asked whether he was serious,
Appellant looked down at the gu n in his hand and then looked back at Stuard and
repeated his demand.
Stuard testified that after she and Appellant got into her vehicle, Appellant
told her to drive to her ba nk and told her to p ull up to the last stall. When Stuard
pulled up to the s tall, Appella nt told her to write a check for $500. When Stuard
began looking in her purse for her checkb ook, Ap pellant sta ted, “Don ’t fuck with
me” and Stuard replied, “I’m not fucking with you.” Stuard then found her
checkbook and wrote ou t the check. Stua rd wrote the wo rd “Help” at the bottom
of the che ck so tha t some one in the bank w ould ass ist her.
Stuard testified that after she put the check in the “tube” and sent it to the
bank, Appellant told her to drive away because she “probably wrote something
on the check.” Stuard then drove away and followed Appellant’s instructions until
she came to a barb eque p it in back of a white build ing. Stua rd testified that
during this drive, she asked Appellant whether he was going to rape or kill her.
Appellant told her to “shut up” and stated that he was n ot going to kill her, but he
was go ing to sho ot her in the leg.
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Stuard testified that after she drove behind the white building, Appellant
ordered Stuard to get in the back seat of the vehicle and then he ordered her to
undress. Stuar d beg ged A ppella nt not to rape h er, but A ppella nt repe ated h is
demand that she undress. After Stuard took her clothes off, Appellant penetrated
her vagina w ith his penis and the n ejacula ted. After Ap pellant ha d finished with
her, Stuard grabbed her shirt and got in the front seat of the car. When Appellant
asked where she was going, Stuard said that she did not know and she got out
of the ca r. App ellant th en told her to g ive him her mon ey and her p urse. Stuard
then gave App ellant approximately $350 and the keys to her car. Stuard then
grabbed the rest of her clothes and hid behind the barbeque pit until Appellant
drove away in her vehicle. After Appellant left, Stuard ran to a house down the
road where she was able to call “911.” An ambulance responded to the call and
took Stu ard to the hospital.
Stuard testified that Appellant he ld a gun in his ha nd through out the entire
episode and that as he was raping her, she “could hear the metal hitting the side
of [her] car.” Stuard described the gun as a black automatic that had some
scrapes on it. Stuard testified that she believed that the pistol was real and that
“[I]f he had not had the gun, he would ha ve had a fight on his h ands. I figure
myse lf to be a pretty good scrapper, but not when something like that is looking
at you.”
Dwayne Turley testified that at a pprox imate ly 4:45 p.m. on April 1, 1994,
Appellant came to Turley’s residenc e in a white Ford E xplorer. T urley
subs eque ntly got into the vehicle and he and Appellant eventually ended up on
Interstate 24 in Kentucky. Turley also testified that he owned the gun that
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Appellant had in his po sses sion o n Apr il 1, 1994. Turley testified that the gun
was a pellet pistol that he had thrown away when he and Appellant had been
unable to fix it.
Sergeant Robert Ott of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department
testified that at approximately 4:30 p.m. on April 1, 1994, he received a dispatch
to be on the lookout for a white 1993 Ford Explorer. At approximately 5:00 p.m.,
Ott saw Stuard’s vehicle o n Interstate 24 hea ded we st toward s St. Lou is. Ott
then asked for back-up, turned on his vehicle’s emergency equipment, and began
pursu it of Stuard’s vehicle. During the subsequent chase, Appellant drove
Stuar d’s vehicle at a high speed that reached one hundred and ten miles per
hour at one point. Ott testified that traffic on the Interstate was fairly heavy and
that Appellant passed b etween othe r vehicles several time s. Appellant eve ntually
ran into a gua rdrail and “flipp ed” Stua rd’s vehicle , damaging it beyond rep air.
When Appellant was taken into custody, he told Ott that he had been kidnapped
by Turle y.
Teresa Worley testified that during he r shift as a nurs e at Cla rksville
Memorial Hospital on April 1, 1994, she assisted Doctor Stephen Kent i n
performing a “rape kit” on Stua rd. Doctor Kent testifie d that d uring th e pelvic
examination that he performed on Stuard, he found “a cloudy discharge in the
vaginal vault tha t was c onsis tent with semen.” Doctor Kent also went to the
Montgom ery County jail and p erformed a “rape suspect examination” on
Appe llant.
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Joe Minor of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation testified that he
conducted DNA tests o n the ra pe kit ta ken fro m Stu ard an d the ra pe su spec t kit
taken from Appellant. Minor stated that the DNA profile obtained from the spe rm
found in Stuard’s vaginal vault matched the DN A pro file from Appellant’s blood
sample. Minor also testified that the possibility of selecting an unrelated person
at random with a DN A pro file that m atche d App ellant’s would be one in 4,400,000
in the Caucasian population and one in 16,800,000 in the African-American
popula tion.
Appellant testified that on April 1, 1994, his sixteenth birthday, he met
Stuard in the parking lot and she invited him into her vehicle. Appellant testified
that Stuard voluntarily accompanied him to their “little secret place in the country”
and had consensual sex with him. Appellant also testified that he and Stuard had
seen e ach oth er appro ximately te n times b efore this o ccasion .
Appellant testified that he stole Stuard’s vehicle “in revenge” because she
had slapped him, but he denied taking her money. Appellant admitted that he
reckle ssly endangered the general public during the high speed chase on
Interstate 2 4.
II. NOTICE OF THE TRANSFER HEARING
Appellant conte nds th at the tria l court s hould have e ither dis miss ed this
case or rem ande d it to the juvenile court because he was not given timely written
notice of his transfer hearing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-
1-134, which states, in relevant part
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After a petition has been filed alleging delinquency based on
conduct which is designated a crime or public offense under
the laws, including local ordinan ces, of this s tate, the co urt,
before hearing the petition on the merits, may transfer the
child to the she riff of the county to be held according to law
and to be dealt with as an adult in the criminal court of
competent jurisdiction. The disposition of the child shall be as
if the child we re an ad ult if:
....
Reasonable notice in writing of the time, place and
purpose of the h earing is given to the child and the
child’s parents, guardian or other custodian at least
three (3) d ays prior to the hea ring . . . .
Tenn. C ode Ann . § 37-1-134(a )(3) (1994).
The reco rd indicates that on April 5, 1994, the trial court informed
Appe llant’s counsel in open court that there were two available dates for the
transfer hearing, one on April 8, 1994, and one on April 11, 1994. Appellant’s
counsel then s poke to App ellant a nd Ap pellan t’s mother, who agreed that April
8 would be the be st date to have the transfer hearing. Written notice was given
on Apr il 6, 1994, a nd the tra nsfer he aring wa s held on April 8, 199 4.
It is evident that any error in failing to provide written notice three days
before the transfer hearing wa s cau sed b y App ellant h imse lf when he an d his
counsel chose to have the hearing on April 8 rather than on April 11. Thus,
Appellant has clea rly waived th is issue. See Ten n. R. A pp. P. 3 6(a) (“N othing in
this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be grante d to a p arty res pons ible
for an error or who failed to take whate ver action was rea sonab ly available to
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prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”). 1 Thus, this issue is without
merit.
III. DETERMINATION OF VENUE
Appellant contends that his convictions should be reversed because the
State failed to establish venue at the acceptance hearing. Appellant concedes
that there is no Tennessee authority that expressly requires venue to be proven
at an acceptance hearing. Appellant suggests, however, that this requirement
can be inferred from reading Tennessee Code Annotated sections 37-1-134(a)
and 37-1-159(d )(2) together. W e disagree. At the time of Appellant’s transfer
and acceptance hearings, section 37-1-134(a) provided that a juvenile court
could transfer a ju venile to a c riminal co urt of “comp etent jurisd iction” if it
determined that the requirements of subsections (a)(1)–(4) and (b)(1)–(5) had
been satisfied. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134 (1994). In addition, section 37-1-
159 provided that, as part of the acceptance hearing, the criminal court must
consider “[t]hose issues considered by the juvenile c ourt purs uant to
[subsections] 37-1-134(a) and (b).” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(d )(2) (1994). 2
W e agree that section 37-1-1 34 req uires th e juven ile court to determine whether
venue would be proper in the criminal court, i.e., whether the criminal court is a
court of “competent jurisdiction.” Howeve r, we do not agree that subsection 37-1-
1
Appellant concedes that he is either responsible for this error or that he failed to take whatever
action wa s nece ssary to pr event or n ullify the harm ful effect o f the error . Howev er, Appe llant sugge sts
that he is entitled to relief if subsection 37-1-134(a)(3) is mandatory or jurisdictional in nature. Appellant
cites no authority for his proposition, and we are unaware of any. Further, the fact that the Tennessee
Supre me C ourt has held that the entire trans fer hear ing is waiva ble, State v. Ha le, 833 S.W.2d 65, 67
(Tenn. 1992), indicates that there is no reason why the written notice of the hearing cannot also be
waived.
2
We note that these requirements are substantially the same as those contained in the current
versions of these statutes. See Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 37-1-134, -159 (Supp. 199 8).
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159(d)(2) requires the State to re-establish venue during the acceptance hearing.
That subsection merely requires the criminal court to cons ider the spec ific
requirem ents of subsections 37-1-134(a)(1)–(4) and (b)(1)–(5), which do not
include the question of venue . The record indicates that the trial court made the
required determinations.
Even if the State had been required to establish venue at the acceptance
hearing, any failure to do so was harmless error b ecaus e the Mo ntgom ery Cou nty
Circu it Court was clearly th e prop er ven ue for A ppella nt’s trial. The Tennessee
Constitution provides that a defendant has the right to be tried by an impa rtial jury
of the county in w hich the c rime wa s com mitted. T enn. C onst. art I, § 9 . See
also Tenn. R. Crim. P . 18. This Court has construed this constitutional guarantee
as precluding a c ourt from indicting o r prosecuting a defendan t for crimes
committed outside of the co unty where the court is located. See State v. Hill, 847
S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Although venue is not an element of
the crime, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
offense was c omm itted in th e cou nty alleg ed in the indictm ent. Harvey v. State,
213 Tenn . 608, 612 , 376 S.W .2d 497 , 498 (19 64); State v. Baker, 639 S.W.2d
670, 672 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). In this case, the State clearly established that
each of the offenses with which Appe llant wa s cha rged w ere co mm itted in
Montgom ery County. First, Stuard testified at the tra nsfer h earing that all of the
events in question occurred in Montgomery County. Second, a nd more
importantly, Stuard a lso testified a t trial that all of these eve nts oc curred in
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Montgom ery County. 3 Indeed, Appellant does not contend that venue was
improp er. This iss ue is witho ut merit.
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT
Appellant conten ds that his conviction for attempted aggra vated robbe ry
should be revers ed bec ause th e indictm ent was insufficient to charge him with
that offense. Under Tennessee law, aggra vated robbe ry is “[a]ccom plished w ith
a dead ly weap on or b y displa y of any article used or fashioned to lead the victim
to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
402(a)(1) (1997). Coun t two of th e indic tmen t in this case alleged that Appellant
had “act[ed] with intent to c omple te a cour se of actio n to cause the Aggravated
Robbe ry of Stephanie Stuard . . . by use of a weapon fashioned to lead the sa id
Steph anie Stuard to believe it to be a deadly weapon . . . .” Appe llant es sentia lly
claims that because the ind ictme nt did not inc lude th e word “reaso nably,” it only
alleged that he had committed attempted robbery and thus, his conviction for
attempted aggravated robbery should be reversed.4 We disagree.
The Tennessee Supreme Cour t has s tated th at “an in dictm ent is va lid if it
provides sufficient information (1) to enable the accused to know the accusation
3
It cou ld be a rgue d tha t Stua rd als o tes tified d uring the a cce ptan ce he aring that a ll of the even ts in
question occurred in Montgom ery County. The record reveals that when the prose cutor asked Stuard
whe ther th e eve nts o ccu rred in Mo ntgo me ry Cou nty, Stu ard re plied “ Uh- huh .” Adm ittedly, h owe ver, th is
response is somewhat ambiguous when viewed in the context of prior and subsequent questions and
answers.
4
The State contends that Appellant waived this issue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Tennessee
Rule s of C rim inal P roce dure by failin g to ra ise it eit her b efor e trial o r in his mo tion fo r a ne w trial. R ule
12(b)(2), however, provides that either jurisdictional defects or the failure to properly charge an offense
“shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings.” Tenn. R. Crim. P.
12(b)(2). Thus, the waiver rule does not apply when the indictment fails to assert an essential element of
the offen se. State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W .2d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App . 1992).
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to which answ er is required, (2) to furnish the court adequ ate basis for the en try
of a proper judgment, and (3) to protect the accused from dou ble jeopa rdy.”
State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn . 1997) (c itations om itted). Further, “an
indictment need not conform to traditionally strict pleading requirements.” Id.
“Thus, we now approach ‘attack s upo n indic tmen ts, esp ecially o f this kind, from
the broad and enlightened standpoint of common sense and right reason rather
than from the narro w standpo int of petty preciosity, pettifogging, tech nicality or
hair splitting fault finding.’” Id. (quoting Unite d State s v. Pur vis, 580 F.2d 853,
857 (5th Cir.1978)). A “commo n sense” reading of count two of the indictment
clearly indicates that it was sufficient to comply with the constitutional notice
requirem ents recited in Hill. Count two clearly informed Appellant that he was
being charged with the offense of attem pted a ggrav ated ro bbery and it
substan tially set forth each of the elements of that offense. To hold that count
two of the indictment in the case is invalid merely beca use it omits the w ord
“reasonab ly” would re quire us to engag e in the “pe tty preciosity, pettifogging,
technica lity or hair s plitting fa ult finding” that the supreme court jettisoned in Hill.
Thus , this issue h as no m erit.
V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant contends that the evidence was in sufficie nt to su pport h is
convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Under
Tennessee law, both of these offenses require use of a deadly weapon or
“display of any article used o r fashione d to lead the victim to reasona bly believe
it to be a dead ly weapon .” See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-305(a)(1), -402(a)(1)
(1997). Appella nt claims that the evid ence w as insufficie nt to convict him of
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these offenses because no reasonab le jury co uld ha ve foun d that A ppella nt’s
display of an ino perab le pellet gun would lead Stuard to “reasonably believe” that
the gun was a deadly weapon. We disagree.
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
is obliged to review that challenge according to certain well-settled principles . A
verdict of guilty by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony
of the State’s witnesses and re solves all conf licts in the testim ony in favor of the
State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253 , 259 (T enn. 19 94); State v. Harris , 839
S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Although an accused is originally cloaked with a
presumption of innocence, a jury verdict removes this presumption and replaces
it with one of gu ilt. State v. Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence,
on appeal, the burden of proof rests with Appellant to demonstrate the
insufficiency of the con victing evide nce. Id. On ap peal, “the [S ]tate is entitled to
the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and
legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Id. (citing State v. Cabbage,
571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (T enn. 1 978)) . Wh ere the sufficie ncy of th e evide nce is
contested on appea l, the relevant question for the reviewing cou rt is whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the
offense beyond a rea sonab le doub t. Harris , 839 S.W .2d at 75; Jackson v.
Virgin ia, 443 U .S. 307, 3 19, 99 S . Ct. 2781 , 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (19 79). In
conducting our evaluation of the convicting evidence, this Court is precluded from
reweighing or recons idering the evidenc e. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383
(Tenn. Crim. A pp. 199 6); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1990). Moreover, this Court may not substitute its own inferences “for those
drawn by the trier of fact from circum stantial evidence.” Id. at 779 . Finally, R ule
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13(e) of the Te nnes see R ules o f Appe llate Pro cedu re prov ides, “fin dings of guilt
in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings by th e trier of fact beyond a
reasonab le doubt.” See also Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 780.
Appellant contends that because the gun has no trigger and no mechanism
by which the pre ssure to prop el a BB or pelle t is gen erated , no ratio nal jury c ould
have concluded that Stuard reaso nably b elieved that it was a real gun. That may
have been true if Appellant had handed the gun to Stuard and given her a few
minutes to exam ine it before he committed these offenses, but that was not the
case. Stuard te stified that wh en App ellant app roache d her in the parking lo t, “he
looked down a t his gun a nd looke d back up at m e and h e said ge t in your car.
So I got in my car. I am not bullet proof.” When they got in Stuard’s vehicle,
Appellant sat behin d her. Wh ile Stuard was driving her vehicle, Appellant told her
that he was going to shoot her in the leg. Stuard testified that Appellant held the
gun in his right hand throughout the entire episode, even when he was rapin g
her. A rational jury could infer from this evidence that Stuard never had enough
of a chance to observe the gun to de termine that it wa s inop erable beca use it
was missing som e parts. Further, a ration al jury could have inferred that S tuard
would have had to look inside the gun to see that the mechanism that propels the
pellets was missing and that it was likely that Appellant had h is finger positioned
where the trigger would have been, thus preventing Stuard from seeing whether
or not there was a trigg er. It is clear that a rational jury could conclude that
Stuar d reas onab ly believe d that th e gun was re al. 5 This issu e has n o merit.
5
Appellant suggests that this court should hold, under the “physical facts rule,” that Stuard’s belief
that the gun was real could not possibly have been reason able. Under this rule, courts can declare
testimony incredible as a matter of law and decline to consider it where the testimony of a witness “cannot
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VI. DENIAL OF EXPERT ASSISTANCE
Appellant conten ds that the trial court erred when it denied his pre-trial
motion for state funds “to obtain a DNA expert to cross-examine or assist in
cross-exam ination of the State’s D NA expe rt.”
At the time of Appellant’s motion in November 1994, Te nnes see la w did
not provide for such expert assis tance in non-c apital cases, and the trial court
prope rly denied the mo tion. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-207(b) (1997)
(allowing for authorization of fund s for exp ert serv ices on ly in capital ca ses); see
also State v. Williams, 657 S.W .2d 405 , 411 (T enn. 19 83); State v. Harris , 866
S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). On appeal, however, Appellant relies
upon State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. 1995), a Tennessee Supreme
Court case which post-dates the trial court’s ruling. In Barne tt, the supreme court
held that, where an ind igent d efend ant’s need for a state-p aid psychiatric expe rt
touches upon a due process concern, a trial court may order such services even
in non-capital cases, provided the defendant can demonstrate a “particularized
need.” Id. at 431. While Barne tt dealt with a psychiatric expe rt, this Court has
previo usly extended the reas oning o f Barne tt to other forms of expert assistance.
See State v. James W. Jacobs, No. 01C01-9601-CC-00048, 1997 WL 576493,
at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept 18, 1997) (citations omitted). Because
Barne tt constitute s a new constitution al rule, it mu st be app lied retroac tively to
possibly be true, is inherently unbelievable, or is opposed to natural laws.” State v. Hornsby, 858 S.W.2d
892, 894 (Tenn. 1993) (citations omitted). “Courts have made it clear that in order for testimony to be
considered incredible as a matter of law, it must be unbelievable on its face, i.e., testimony as to facts or
events that the witness physically could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred
under the laws of nature.” Id. (citations om itted). This ru le has ab solutely no a pplication to th is case.
Stuard’s belief is obviously not a physical fact. Further, as previously explained, Stuard’s belief that the
gun was real was not impossible, inherently unreliable, or contrary to natural laws.
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Appe llant’s case w hich wa s in the ap pellate pip eline at the time of the Barnett
decision . See Id.
In this case, the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for e xpert
assistance was proper because Appella nt failed to de mons trate a “particularized
need” for suc h services. Und er Barne tt,
To establish particularize d need , the defen dant m ust show that a[n] . . .
expert is neces sary to pro tect his right to a fair trial. Unsupported
assertions that a[n] . . . expert is necessa ry to counter the S tate’s proof are
not sufficient. The defendant must demonstrate by referenc e to the fac ts
and circumstances of his particu lar case th at appo intmen t of a[n] . . .
expert is ne cessar y to insure a fair trial.
909 S.W .2d at 431 . Appellant’s motion for expert services and his memorandum
in support thereof consist almost entirely of lega l argumen ts as to why a court is
authorized to prov ide a d efend ant with exper t service s. Inde ed, Ap pellan t’s
motion and memorandum do not explain why “the facts and circum stanc es of h is
particular case” demonstrate that appointment of an exp ert is necessary to ins ure
a fair trial. In fact, the only reference Appellant made to the specific facts and
circum stance s of his cas e is conta ined in the following s tateme nt:
As part of its proof in this case the State will offer the testimony of
one Joe Minor of the TBI Crime Lab who performed the analysis of the
vaginal swabs taken from the victim. It is believed that Mr. M inor will testify
that those swabs were found to contain sperm cells and that the DNA
remov ed from those sp erm ce lls match ed with D NA from the Defe ndant.
This testimony will be so damning that unless the Defendant has an
expert who can either cross-examine the State’s expert or who can assist
in cross-e xamina tion of the e xpert, the D efenda nt will not be a ble to
present a “mean ingful defense” a nd as such will be denied effective
assist ance of cou nsel.
W e do not be lieve that this s tateme nt adeq uately de mons trates particularized
need as required by Barne tt. As the supreme court stated in Barne tt, when a
motion for expert assistance is “accompanied by little more than undeveloped
assertions that the services were needed to attem pt to coun ter the Sta te’s proof,”
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the trial court is within its discretion in denying the requ est. 909 S.W.2d at 430
(quoting State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 261 (Tenn. 1994)). Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for expert services.6
This issu e has n o merit.
VII. QUASHING OF DEFENSE SUBPOENA
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it quashed his subpoena
duces tecum for materials in the possession of the State’s DNA expert.
Specifically, Appellant claims that he was entitled to materials relating to the
factual basis upon which the expert based his conclusions. We disagree.
On November 7, 1994, Appellant filed a motion for further d iscovery
pursuant to Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, asking the
trial court to require the State to provide him with information related to the DNA
testing by the State’s expert. On November 16, 1994, Appellant filed a motion
to compel pursuant to Rule 16, as king the tria l court to req uire the S tate to
provide him with the materials used by the S tate’s DN A exp ert in rea ching his
conclusions. After a hearing on the discovery motions, the trial court denied the
motions. The trial court ruled that the materials requested by Appellant were not
disco verab le under Rule 16 because the materials used by the expert in arriving
6
Even if the trial court had erred, any such error would have been harmless in light of the fact that
Appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with Stuard. Appellant’s claim that this sex act was
conse nsual co uld not ha ve been aided by a D NA ex pert in any co nceivab le way. See Tenn. R. App. P.
36(b).
-16-
at his conclusion were “work product.”Appellant does not challenge the trial
court’s ruling that these materials were not discoverable under Rule 16.7
On November 21, 1994, Appellant filed a subpoena duces tecum, directing
the State’s DNA expert to appear on November 30, 1994, with the mate rials
Appellant had soug ht to obtain throug h discovery. On November 22, 1994, the
State filed a m otion to quas h the s ubpo ena. T he trial court granted the motion
to quash the subpoena on Nove mbe r 30, 19 94. Th e trial co urt foun d that in
issuing the subpoena pursuant to Rule 17(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal
Procedure,8 Appellant was simply attempting to obtain the same documents and
other work product that were protected from discovery by Rule 16(a)(2). The trial
court stated that alth ough Rule 16 and Rule 17 are separate rules, they must be
read together in context. In short, the trial court found that Appellant could not
circumvent the discovery protections of Rule 16 simply by issuing a subpoena for
the sam e mate rials unde r Rule 17 .
W e agree with the trial court that Ru le 17(c )cann ot be u sed to obtain
mate rials which are no t discoverable un der Rule 16 (a)(2). Certainly, the limits of
Rule 16(a)(2) would be meaningless if a defendant could simply subpoena the
protected materials under Rule 17(c). Indeed, under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, “[a] defend ant ma y not obta in throug h Rule 1 7(c) doc umen ts
7
We note that, subject to exceptions not applicable here, Rule 16 “does not authorize the
discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal State documents made by the district
attorney general or other State agents or law enforcement officers in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of the case.” Tenn . R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2).
8
Rule 17 (c) states that “[a] sub poena may als o com man d a pers on to wh om it is dire cted to
produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein. The court, upon motion
made promptly and in any event by the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may
quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” Tenn. R. Crim. P.
17(c).
-17-
which are protected from disclosure pursuant to Rule 16(a)(2 ).” United States v.
Orena, 883 F. Supp. 849, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). Our Rules 16(a)(2) and 17(c) are
subs tantially identical to th eir federa l counterp arts. Thus, we see no reason why
the result under our state rules should be any different. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it granted the motion to quash the subpoena.9 This
issue is w ithout me rit.
VIII. ADMISSION OF DNA EVIDENCE
Appellant conte nds th at the tria l court c omm itted rev ersible error w hen it
allowed the State to introduce evidence of the DNA tes t results. Specifically,
Appellant claims that this evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403 of the
Tennessee Rules of Evid ence beca use its proba tive valu e was subs tantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.10
A trial court’s decision to adm it evidence is largely discretion ary and that
decision will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Gray, 960 S.W .2d 59 8, 606 (Ten n. Crim . App. 1 997). In this
case, we see no reason to disturb the trial court’s ruling. The DNA evidence in
this case w as clearly p robative. Indeed , it is hard to imagine an ything with more
probative value in a rape case than evidence tha t the accused had sexual
9
Even if the trial court had erred in granting the motion to quash, any such error would have been
harmless in light of the fact that Appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with Stuard. Discrediting the
State’s D NA ex pert wou ld not have strength ened A ppellant’s c laim tha t the sex w as con sensu al. See
Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).
10
Rule 403 s tates that “[ a]ltho ugh relev ant, e viden ce m ay be e xclu ded if its pro bative value is
sub stan tially out weig hed by the dang er of unfa ir prej udic e, co nfus ion of the is sue s, or m islead ing th e jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pre sentation of cumulative evidence.”
Tenn. R. Evid. 403.
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intercourse with the victim. At the time Stuard identified Appellant as her
assailan t, Appellant had not yet admitted to having had sex with her. Thus, the
DNA evidence was clearly probative of whether Stuard was telling the truth. This
probative value was not substantially outweighed by any of the considerations of
Rule 403. Th e trial court d id not abuse its discre tion wh en it ad mitted this
evidenc e. This iss ue is witho ut merit.
IX. LENGTH OF SENTENCES
Appellant contends that his sentences for especially aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated rape, and reckless endangerment are excessive.
Specifically, Appellant claims that the trial court misapplied various mitigating and
enhancement factors in determining the lengths of these three sentences.
“When reviewing senten cing issu es . . . including the granting or denial of
probation and the length of sentence, the appellate court shall conduct a de novo
review on the record of such issues. Such review shall be conducted with a
presumption that the determinations made by the co urt from which the ap peal is
taken are correct.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (1997). “However, the
presum ption of correc tness which acco mpa nies th e trial co urt’s ac tion is
conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial cou rt
considered the sentencing principles and all rele vant facts a nd circum stance s.”
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In conducting our review, we
must consider all the evidence, the presentence report, the sentencing principles,
the enhan cing and mitigating factors, arg umen ts of coun sel, the appellant’s
statements, the nature and character of the offense, and the appellant’s potential
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for rehabilitation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103(5), -210(b) (1997 & Supp.
1998); Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169. “The defendant has the burden of
demonstrating that the se ntence is improp er.” Id. Because the record in this
case indicates that the trial court failed to properly consider the sentencing
principles and all relevant facts and circumstances, our review is de novo without
a presumption of correctness.
A. Sentence for Especially Aggravated Kidnapping
In senten cing Ap pellant to twenty years for the especially aggravated
kidnapping conviction, the trial court found that no mitigating factors were
applicable. The trial co urt also fou nd that A ppellant’s sentence should be
enhanced because he had treated the victim with exceptional cruelty and
because the injuries that he inflicted were particularly great. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 4 0-35-11 4(5), (6) (19 91997 ).
W e agree that none of the enumerated mitigating factors of Tennessee
Code Annota ted sectio n 40-35 -113 we re applica ble. Howeve r, the trial court
shou ld have considered the mitigating factor contained in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-13-305, which states that in determining the sentence for
espe cially aggrava ted kidna pping, “[i]f the offender volunta rily relea ses th e victim
alive . . . such action[] shall be considered by the court as a mitigating factor at
the time of se ntencing .” Tenn . Code Ann. § 39-13-305(b)(2) (1997). Although
we hold that this factor should have been considered, we believe that this factor
is entitled to little weight, especially in light of the fact that Appellant did not in fact
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possess a deadly weapon with which he could have killed Stu ard witho ut a
difficult struggle.
W e conclude that the trial court improperly app lied enhance ment factor (5),
that the victim was treated with exceptio nal cruelty . The tr ial cou rt appa rently
based its decision to apply this factor on the fact that Appellant told Stuard that
he was g oing to shoo t her in th e leg. W hile this action was u ndou btably c ruel, it
does not rise to the level of being “exceptionally cruel”, as that term has been
interpreted by our State Supreme Court. That Court has stated that before this
factor may be applied, the facts in the case must “support a finding of
‘exceptional cruelty’ that ‘demonstrates a culpability distinct from a nd ap precia bly
greater than that in cident to’” the crime. State v. Poo le, 945 S.W.2d 93, 98
(Tenn. 1997) (c itation om itted). See also State v. Emb ry, 915 S.W.2d 451, 456
(Tenn. Crim. App . 1995) (holding that application of enhancement factor (5)
“requires a finding of cruelty over an d above tha t inherently attendant to the
crime”). In this case, Appellant’s threat to shoot Stuard in the leg came
imm ediate ly after he told her that he was not going to kill her. A threat of the
victim being shot is inherent in the offense of an especially aggravated
kidnapping that is committed by the use of a firearm. Thus, application of
enhancement factor (5) was not appropriate.
W e also conclude that the trial court improperly applied enhancement
factor (6), that the injuries inflicted upo n the victim were pa rticularly grea t. In
applying this fac tor, the tr ial court relied on a finding that Stuard had suffered
“personal injuries by way of em otional distre ss [and] th e now in clusion in h er life
of fear.” There is no question that emotional and psychological injuries can be
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the basis fo r apply ing this enhan ceme nt factor. See State v. S mith, 891 S.W.2d
922, 930 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “However, before this factor may be applied,
the State has the burden of establishing that the emotional injuries and
psychological scarrin g are ‘p articula rly great.’” State v. Hoyt, 928 S.W.2d 935,
948 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citation omitted). “In order to prove that the injuries
are particularly great and/or will endure ‘for the rest of [the victim’s] life,’ the State
must offer expert testimon y to that effect.” Id. (citation om itted). W e do not doubt
that Ms. S tuard w as trau matiz ed by th e esp ecially aggravated kidnapping.
However, because the State failed to introduce any expert testimony that her
emotional injuries we re particula rly great co mpare d to those suffered by every
victim of an especially aggravated kidnapping, application of enhancement factor
(6) was not appropriate.
In our de n ovo review , we conclude that the trial court erroneously failed
to apply enhancement factor (1), that Appellant had a previous history of criminal
convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the
approp riate range. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-11 4(1) (1997). T he record
indicates that App ellant had juvenile ad judication s for theft of p roperty ($1 ,000 to
$10,000), burgla ry of an autom obile, and sexual battery. Juvenile convictions
may be used to enhance the sentence of an adult offen der. State v. Adams, 864
S.W.2d 31, 34 (Tenn. 1993). Thus, enhancement factor (1) is clearly applicable.
Further, given the serious nature of these prior offenses, we believe that this
factor is en titled to significa nt weigh t.
Even though we hold that the trial court erred in applying some
enhancement factors, a find ing that en hance ment factors we re erro neou sly
-22-
applied does n ot equa te to a reduc tion in the se ntence . State v. Keel, 882
S.W.2d 410, 423 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). We hold that enhancement factor (1)
clearly applies to this sentence and that this factor is e ntitled to sign ificant weig ht.
W e further hold th at the m itigating factor a pplica ble to this sentence is entitled to
only minimal weight. Thus, we hold that a sen tence of twen ty years for esp ecially
aggravated kidnapping is appropriate in this case.
B. Sentence for Aggravated Rape
In sentencing Appellant to twen ty-five years for aggravated rape, the trial
court found that no mitigating factors were applicable. The trial court also found
that Appellant’s sentence should be enhanced because the injuries that he
inflicted on the victim were particularly great. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
114(6) (1991997). We agree that none of the enumerated mitigating factors of
Tennessee Code Anno tated s ection 40-35 -113 a re app licable to the sentence for
this offense. However, we hold that the trial court improperly applied one
enhancement factor and should have applied two other enhan ceme nt factors to
the sentence for this offense.
W e conclude that the trial court improperly app lied enhance ment factor (6),
that the injuries inflicted upon the victim were particularly great, for the same
reason that we conclude that this factor should not have been applied to the
sentence for especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court based its decision
to apply this fa ctor on the fact that Stuard’s normal life activities had been
disrupted by the fe ar that r esulte d from her be ing raped. However, the reco rd
does not indicate that any expert evidence was introduced on the extent of
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Stuar d’s psychological injuries. While we do not mean to minimize the trauma
and fear that Stuard undoubtedly experienced a s a res ult of this repreh ensib le
act, the State has sim ply failed to meet its burden, under the law, of showing that
this factor w as app licable. See Hoyt, 928 S.W.2d at 948.
In our de n ovo review , we con clude th at the trial court erroneously failed
to apply enhancement factor (1) to the sentence for this offense for the same
reason that it should ha ve app lied this factor to the se ntenc e for es pecia lly
aggravated kidnapping. This factor is entitled to especially great weigh t for this
sentence in light of the fact that one of Appellant’s prior adjudications was for
sexual battery.
In our de novo review, we also conclude that the trial court improperly
failed to apply enhancement factor (7), tha t this offense involved a victim and was
committed to gratify Appellant’s des ire for pleasure or e xcitement. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-114(7) (1997). The Tennessee Supreme Court has noted
that because pleasure or excitement is not an essential element of the offense
of rape, it may be con sidered as an ap propriate enhan ceme nt. Adams, 864
S.W.2d at 35 (citation omitted). T he record ind icates that App ellant raped Stu ard
for pleasure. Appellant testified that he ejaculated during sex with Stuard, that
he felt “pure[] lust” for her, and that he “got that good feeling” when he had sex
with her. Thus, the trial court should have applied facto r (7) to e nhan ce this
sentence.
-24-
Because two enhance ment factors and no mitigating factors apply to the
sentence for aggra vated rap e, we hold that a sentence of twenty-five years for
this offense is appropriate in this case.
C. Sentence for Reckless Endangerment
In sentencing Appellant to two years for reckless endangerment, the trial
court found that no m itigating factors were applicab le. The trial court also found
that this sentence should be enhanced because the offense involved more than
one victim and because Appellant had no hesitation in committing an offense
when the risk to hu man life w as grea t. See Tenn . Code A nn. § 40-35-1 14(3),
(10) (1997). We agree that none of the enumerated mitigating factors of
Tennessee Code A nnotated se ction 40-35-11 3 are applicable to the sentence for
this offense. However, we hold that the trial court improperly applied one
enhancement factor and should have applied one other enhancement factor to
the sentence for this offense.
The trial court correctly applied enhancement factor (3) to the sentence for
reckless endan germe nt because Appellant’s conduct placed more than one
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. See Tenn . Code Ann. § 40-35-
114(3) (1997). Appellant argues that the application of this factor to this sentence
was impro per be caus e the e xistenc e of m ultiple victims was pleaded in the
indictment and therefore, was an element of the offense. However, the
indictment in this case alleged that Appellant “did recklessly engage in conduct
with a deadly weapon . . . [which] placed another person or persons in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury.” Under the expre ss terms of the
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indictme nt, the State only had to prove that one person was endangered. Thus,
enda ngerin g mu ltiple persons was not an element of the offens e as ch arged in
the indictm ent. Ap pellan t’s conduct in driving a vehicle at one hundred and ten
miles per hour in hea vy traffic on Interstate 24 c learly endange red his passe nger,
other motorists, and the pursuing police officers. Thus, application of this factor
was appropriate.
The trial court clearly erred by applying enhancement factor (10) to the
reckless endangerment sentence because a high risk to human life is inherent
in the offens e. State v. Robert Chapman, No. 02C01-9510-CR-00304, 1997 WL
11280, at *3 (Tenn . Crim. A pp., Jackson, Jan. 15, 1997). However, for the same
reason that enhancement factor (1) applied to the other sentences, factor (1)
shou ld have been applied to this sentence as well. We hold that because two
enhancement and no mitigating factors apply to the sentence for reckless
endangerment, a sentence of two years is entirely appropriate.
X. IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the sentences
for espe cially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and
reckless endangerment to run consecutively. Co nsec utive se ntenc ing is
governed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115. The trial court has
the dis cretion to orde r cons ecutive sente ncing if it finds that one or more of the
required statutory crite ria exist. State v. Black, 924 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995). Further, the court is required to determine whether the
consecu tive sentences (1) are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses
-26-
committed; (2) serve to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the
offender; and (3) are congruent with general principles of senten cing. State v.
Wilkerson, 905 S.W .2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 199 5).
In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court found that Appellant was
a dangerous offender who se behavior ind icates little or no regard for hum an life
and who has no hesitation in committing a crime in which the risk to human life
is high. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(4) (1997). We agree. Indeed,
Appellant attempted to escape in Stuard’s stolen vehicle by driving at speeds up
to one hundred and ten miles per hour and by driving in between moving
vehicles. Appella nt’s cond uct dem onstrate d indifferen ce to a hig h proba bility of
calamitous cons eque nces to him self and mo torists who m he w as certain to
encounter. See Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d at 937–38. The trial court properly
determine d that Appe llant is a dangerou s offender. 11
Because the trial court sentenced Appellant before Wilkerson was decided,
the court made no express finding that the Wilkerson test was satisfied.
Howeve r, we conclude that it is. First, consecutive sentences are clearly related
to the se verity of A ppella nt’s offenses. Indeed, App ellant was con victed of five
serious felony offenses and he put numerous lives at risk during this criminal
episode. If anything, Appellant is fortunate that he received consecutive
sentences for only four of the five convictions. Second, consecutive sentences
are required in this case in order to protect the public from further criminal
11
However, we do not agree with the trial court that the possible transmission of the HIV virus
during the rape established that Appellant was a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no
rega rd fo r hum an life and w ho ha s no h esita tion in com mittin g a cr ime in whic h the risk to hum an life is
high. While this may have been true if Appellant actually had the HIV virus and knew that he had the
virus, there is no evidence in the record that Appellant had any sexually transmitted disease.
-27-
conduct by Appellant. The record indicates that Appellant’s criminal conduct has
become more and more violent with each new offense . Appe llant ap paren tly
began with the ft, mov ed on to vehic le burglary, then to sexu al battery, and fin ally
to the violent offenses at issue here. Further, the trial court found that Appellant
had shown no rem orse for h is actions a nd had denied all respon sibility for the
aggravated rape of Stuard. The public certainly needs protection from
Appe llant’s increa singly vio lent be havior . Finally, c onse cutive s enten cing in this
case is congru ent with general principles of sentencing. This issue has no me rit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
____________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
___________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
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