Ricky Melvin v. State ( 1998 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE              FILED
    OCTOBER 1998 SESSION
    December 10, 1998
    Cecil W. Crowson
    RICKY EARL MELVIN,                      )                   Appellate Court Clerk
    )   NO. 01C01-9707-CR-00264
    Appellant,                        )
    )   Davidson County
    v.                                      )
    )   Honorable Thomas H. Shriver,
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                     )   Judge
    )
    Appellee.                         )   (Post-Conviction)
    For The Appellant:                          For The Appellee:
    Marian C. Fordyce                           John Knox Walkup
    (at trial)                                  Attorney General and Reporter
    129 Second Ave., North
    Nashville, TN 37201-1901                    Daryl J. Brand
    Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Judson W. Phillips                          Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    (on appeal)
    315 Deaderick St., Ste. 2395                Victor S. Johnson III
    Nashville, TN 37238                         District Attorney General
    Kymberly Haas
    Assistant District Attorney General
    Washington Sq., Ste. 500
    222-2nd Ave., North
    Nashville, TN 37201-1649
    OPINION FILED:
    AFFIRMED
    Joseph M. Tipton
    Judge
    OPINION
    The petitioner, Ricky Earl Melvin, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-
    conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. Having been convicted of
    seven counts of aggravated rape and serving an effective sentence of sixty-five years in
    the Department of Correction, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance
    of counsel. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    After his first trial ended with a hung jury, the petitioner was convicted at his
    second trial on seven counts of aggravated rape. The convictions were based upon
    numerous incidents involving two females under thirteen years of age. He received an
    effective sentence of eighty-five years. Upon appeal to this court, the sentence was
    reduced to an effective term of sixty-five years. See State v. Melvin, 
    913 S.W.2d 195
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Permission to appeal was denied by the Tennessee Supreme
    Court.
    The petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective
    assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the
    petition.
    CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER
    The sole issue in this appeal is whether the petitioner was deprived of effective
    assistance of counsel at his trial. The petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective
    in the following respects:
    1.     failing to challenge the testimony of the nurse practitioner;
    2.     failing to utilize the testimony of Dr. Irene Ratner;
    3.     failing to interview other possible suspects;
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    4.     failing to have a victim examined by an expert;
    5.     failure to seek funding for an investigator; and
    6.     failing to conduct an adequate investigation of the
    facts and witnesses.
    POST-CONVICTION HEARING
    The only witness to testify at the post-conviction hearing was the petitioner’s trial
    counsel, Thomas T. Overton. A summary of pertinent portions of his testimony follows.
    At the trial a nurse practitioner testified as to a victim’s physical findings that
    were consistent with sexual abuse. Overton interviewed the witness prior to trial.
    Although he did not recall whether he filed a motion in limine to prohibit the testimony,
    there was no legal basis to do so.
    The petitioner’s family retained the services of Dr. Irene Ratner for an evaluation.
    Overton decided not to utilize Dr. Ratner at trial. Overton felt her testimony would likely
    be inadmissible. Furthermore, he feared her testimony might be damaging because
    she concluded the petitioner could not be excluded as a possible child sex abuser.
    Overton testified that he made efforts to contact other possible suspects but was
    unsuccessful. Nevertheless, he argued to the jury that other family members could
    have been responsible for the alleged crimes.
    Although Overton had the petitioner evaluated by Dr. Ratner, he did not ask for
    funding for any other experts to evaluate one of the victims. Overton believed that
    testimony on child sex abuse syndrome would have been inadmissible. Furthermore,
    the alleged abuse had taken place years earlier. The victim had intercourse since that
    time; therefore, an examination would not prove useful.
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    Overton testified that he spent over one hundred hours in preparation for the
    petitioner’s trial. He investigated the facts himself and did not seek funding for an
    investigator.
    TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS
    The trial court found that Overton rendered competent representation. It found
    that Overton was thoroughly prepared for trial and had conducted a proper
    investigation. The trial court found that the decision not to utilize Dr. Ratner was a
    proper tactical decision. It further found the failure to secure an expert to perform an
    examination on one of the victims was reasonable due to the lapse of time since the
    alleged abuse. The trial court further found the testimony of the nurse practitioner was
    properly admitted. In conclusion, the trial court found the petitioner had failed to
    establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This court reviews a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
    standards of Baxter v. Rose, 
    523 S.W.2d 930
     (Tenn. 1975), and Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
     (1984). The petitioner has
    the burden to prove that (1) the attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2) the
    deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant so as to deprive him of a
    fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Goad v. State,
    
    938 S.W.2d 363
    , 369 (Tenn. 1996); Overton v. State, 
    874 S.W.2d 6
    , 11 (Tenn. 1994);
    Butler v. State, 
    789 S.W.2d 898
    , 899 (Tenn. 1990).
    The test in Tennessee in determining whether counsel provided effective
    assistance is whether his performance was within the range of competence demanded
    of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d at 936. The petitioner must
    overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
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    acceptable professional assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.
    Ct. at 2065; Alley v. State, 
    958 S.W.2d 138
    , 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v.
    Williams, 
    929 S.W.2d 385
    , 389 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Therefore, in order to prove a
    deficiency, a petitioner must show that counsel’s acts or omissions were so serious as
    to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
    norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Henley v. State,
    960 S.W.2d at 579; Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d at 369.
    In reviewing counsel's conduct, a "fair assessment . . . requires that every effort
    be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
    circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
    counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.
    Ct. at 2065. The fact that a particular strategy or tactic failed or hurt the defense, does
    not, standing alone, establish unreasonable representation. However, deference to
    matters of strategy and tactical choices applies only if the choices are informed ones
    based upon adequate preparation. Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d at 369; Hellard v. State,
    
    629 S.W.2d 4
    , 9 (Tenn. 1982); Alley v. State, 958 S.W.2d at 149; Cooper v. State, 
    847 S.W.2d 521
    , 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
    The trial judge's findings of fact on post-conviction hearings are conclusive on
    appeal unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d at
    899; Adkins v. State, 
    911 S.W.2d 334
    , 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The trial court’s
    findings of fact are afforded the weight of a jury verdict, and this court is bound by the
    trial court’s findings unless the evidence in the record preponderates against those
    findings. Henley v. State, 
    960 S.W.2d 572
    , 578 (Tenn. 1997); Alley v. State, 
    958 S.W.2d 138
    , 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Dixon v. State, 
    934 S.W.2d 69
    , 72 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. 1996). The burden of establishing that the evidence preponderates
    otherwise is on the petitioner. Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d at 579.
    5
    ANALYSIS
    As to the testimony of the nurse practitioner, the petitioner has not shown that
    the testimony was inadmissible. This court reached the same conclusion on direct
    appeal. State v. Melvin, 913 S.W.2d at 200. Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to
    establish prejudice.
    The failure to utilize the testimony of Dr. Ratner was a tactical decision. We may
    not second-guess this decision.
    As to the alleged failure to develop other possible suspects, the petitioner has
    not shown any deficiency on the part of counsel. Furthermore, he has not established
    what else trial counsel could have done nor what he would have discovered.
    As to the failure to have one of the victims examined by an expert, the petitioner
    has failed to establish that an examination would have revealed any favorable
    evidence. See Black v. State, 
    794 S.W.2d 752
    , 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). In short,
    the petitioner has failed to establish prejudice.
    As to the alleged failure to secure the services of an investigator and properly
    investigate the facts, the petitioner again falls short. The petitioner has failed to
    establish that a further investigation would reveal favorable evidence. There is no
    showing of prejudice.
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    The trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive unless the evidence
    preponderates otherwise. The evidence does not preponderate against the findings of
    the trial court. W e, therefore, conclude petitioner has failed to establish ineffective
    assistance of counsel.
    Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    ______________________________
    Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    Paul G. Summers, Judge
    ______________________________
    Joe G. Riley, Judge
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