State of Tennessee v. Tony Randall Arnold ( 1998 )


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  •           IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON                           FILED
    SEPTEMBER 1998 SESSION
    December 2, 1998
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                      )       C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9803-CC-00066
    )
    Appellee,                          )      BENTON COUNTY NO. 97-CR707
    )
    VS.                                       )      HON. JUILIAN P. GUINN,
    )      JUDGE
    TONY RANDALL ARNOLD,                      )
    )      AFFIRMED - RULE 20
    Appellant.                         )
    ORDER
    The defendant, Tony Randall Arnold, appeals as of right his conviction by
    a Benton County jury of simple assault, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a)(3). The trial court sentenced the defendant to six (6)
    months in jail to be served at 75%. The sole issue for appeal is whether the trial
    court properly sentenced the defendant.
    The defendant was originally indicted for rape of a child, but was
    convicted of simple assault. The transcript of the trial is not in the record. From
    the technical record it appears the victim was the step-sister of the defendant’s
    wife and was less than thirteen (13) years of age.
    In determining whether the trial court has properly sentenced an
    individual, this court engages in a de novo review of the record with a
    presumption that the trial court’s determinations were correct. Tenn. Code Ann.
    § 40-35-401(d). This presumption is “conditioned upon an affirmative showing in
    the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all
    relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 169 (Tenn.
    1991). The burden is upon the appealing party to show that the sentence is
    improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) Sentencing Commission Comments.
    The state asserted the following enhancement factors at the sentencing
    hearing: the victim was particularly vulnerable due to her age; the offense was
    committed to satisfy the defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement; and the
    defendant took advantage of a position of private trust. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
    40-35-114(4), (7), (15). The defendant submitted for the trial court’s
    consideration that he had no prior arrests, a full-time job, and a family to support.
    In sentencing the defendant to incarceration, the trial court expressly
    rejected alternative sentencing based upon the seriousness of the offense and
    the vulnerability of the victim. As stated, the trial court imposed a six (6) month
    sentence of incarceration.
    The facts and circumstances of the offense are crucial to the propriety of
    this sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b)(1). However, this Court
    has not been furnished a copy of the trial transcript. For all practical purposes,
    we are precluded from considering the merits of the sentencing issue. See State
    v. Ballard, 
    855 S.W.2d 557
    , 560-61 (Tenn. 1993); Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b).
    Nevertheless, based upon what few facts do appear in the record, we find no
    impropriety in the sentence imposed by the trial court.
    Based upon the record before this Court, the defendant has failed to meet
    his burden of establishing that the sentence was improper. Tenn. Code Ann. §
    40-35-401(d) Sentencing Commission Comments.
    Because we find no error in the trial court’s sentencing of the defendant,
    pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, we affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    In the event the appellant indicates an intention to file an application for
    permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, he may be admitted to
    bail in the additional amount of $1,000 for a total bond amount of $26,000 with
    sufficient sureties to be approved by the clerk of the trial court pending filing and
    disposition of said application. In default of such bond, he shall be remanded to
    the custody of the Sheriff of Benton County. Costs are taxed to the state as the
    appellant is indigent.
    All of which is so ORDERED.
    2
    _________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    _________________________
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
    _________________________
    DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9803-CC-00066

Judges: Judge Joe G. Riley

Filed Date: 12/2/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014