State of Tennessee v. James Christopher Tatrow ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
APRIL, 1998 SESSION
November 2, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. 03C01-9707-CR-00299
)
Appellee )
) Cumberland County
vs. )
) Honorable John Turnbull, Judge
JAMES CHRISTOPHER TATROW, )
) (Felony Murder, Especially Aggravated
Appellant ) Kidnapping)
)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JOHN E. APPMAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP
P.O. Box 99 Attorney General & Reporter
Jamestown, TN 38556
MICHAEL J. FAHEY, II
LARRY WARNER Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 601 Criminal Justice Division
Crossville, TN 38557 425 Fifth Ave. North
Second Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM E. GIBSON
District Attorney General
DAVID A. PATTERSON
ANTHONY J. CRAIGHEAD
Assistant District Attorney Generals
145 South Jefferson Ave.
Crossville, TN 38555
OPINION FILED: ____________________
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
VACATED AND REMANDED
CURWOOD WITT
JUDGE
OPINION
A jury in Cumberland County Criminal Court convicted the defendant,
James Christopher Tatrow, of two counts of felony murder and two counts of
especially aggravated kidnapping in the deaths of Roger Zammit and John Harry.
The defendant was also convicted of two counts of premeditated and deliberate
murder of the same victims. The trial court set aside those verdicts, however, as
the thirteenth juror. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33 (f). In the sentencing phase, the jury
declined to impose the death penalty or life without parole and sentenced the
defendant to serve life sentences with the possibility of parole. At the conclusion
of a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve two
consecutive life sentences concurrently with sentences of 22 years for the
kidnapping convictions. The defendant now challenges the validity of the
convictions and the propriety of consecutive sentencing pursuant to Rule 3 of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
On appeal, the defendant raises several issues: 1
1. The evidence presented at trial was not
sufficient to support the jury verdicts.2
(Defendant’s issue #2)
2. Defendant’s statement to police was
taken under circumstances that violated
Articles 1 and 9 of the Tennessee
Constitution and the 5th and 14th
Amendments to the United States
Constitution. (Defendant’s issue #4)
3. Photographs of the dead victims were
inadmissible because their probative
value did not outweigh their inflammatory
effect. (Defendant’s issue #3)
4. The trial court erred by overruling
1
We have reorganized the issues so that related topics are
addressed together.
2
The defendant also contends that the evidence preponderates
against the jury’s verdict. This court may not reweigh the evidence or assess the
credibility of witnesses. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1990); Therefore we consider only whether the evidence is legally sufficient
to support the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 317 (1979); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tenn. 1985); Tenn.
R. App. P. 13(e).
2
appellant’s motion for mistrial after the
prosecutor made an inflammatory remark
to the jury during closing argument.
(Defendant’s issue #5)
5. Holding a second sentencing hearing
after the jury imposed a life sentence for
felony murder violates state and federal
constitutional provisions against double
jeopardy. (Defendant’s issue #8)
6. The trial court erred by refusing to admit
jurors’ affidavits into evidence at the
sentencing hearing. (Defendant’s issue
#7)
7. The trial court erred in sentencing the
appellant to consecutive life sentences
based on the finding that the defendant
had an extensive record of criminal
behavior. (Defendant’s issues # 6 and
#9)
Upon review of the record and the law, we affirm the defendant’s
convictions. The trial court, however, made equivocal findings as to whether
consecutive sentencing is required to protect the public from the defendant’s future
criminal acts. See State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938-939 (Tenn. 1995).
Therefore, we vacate the order to run the sentences consecutively and remand the
case in order for the trial court to make further findings pursuant to Wilkerson and
to determine whether the life sentences should be served concurrently or
consecutively to one another.
I. Facts
A. Facts presented during the guilt phase
At trial, both defense and prosecution witnesses testified to the bizarre
events that led up to the two brutal murders. The record indicates that Chris Tatrow
had been an outstanding rodeo cowboy, a college student, and a hardworking man
who provided for his family.3 As result of a painful back injury, however, he began
3
Tatrow excelled on his high school rodeo team and was selected
Cowboy of the Year in Tennessee for two consecutive years. He received a
rodeo scholarship to UT Martin. A leg injury ended his active participation in
rodeo; however, he continued to be involved as a stocker and a judge.
3
taking methamphetamine. At first, he used drugs infrequently, but by late 1994, he
was a heavy user of methamphetamine, cocaine, and other drugs. He and his wife
separated. After he was fired from his job, he turned to providing drugs to others
in order to support his habit. His trailer became “a party place” with people coming
and going at all hours and various people “crashing” at the trailer at different times.
Although his family continued to check on him, he became distant and refused to
discuss his activities with them. About two weeks before the killings, while Tatrow
was in Texas, someone broke into his trailer. When he returned, he found a
number of items missing including nearly one hundred prize belt buckles that he had
won in rodeo events, a Navajo blanket that belonged to a close friend who had been
killed, an antique knife collection, his great-grandfather’s coin purse, a tool box, and
several guns. He reported the burglary to the sheriff’s department and later heard
that several people including Roger Zammit, John Harry and Billy Teal were
responsible for the burglary. On the Tuesday before the murders, Tatrow and four
others went to the house of Billy Teal. According to a defense witness, Teal and his
father held the group at gun point for at least a half an hour. The Teals took their
photographs and warned Tatrow to forget about his missing property. In another
incident, several shots were fired into Tatrow’s home while he was present. One
of the shots killed his German Shepherd.
During the afternoon of Thursday, January 12, Kenny Mason took
Tatrow to Johnny Harry’s cabin in the Dry Creek area.4 Dondie Billings, who had
been staying at Harry’s, arrived along with Christy Mullican and Billings’ boy friend,
Roger Zammit. When Zammit opened the trunk of Billings’ car, Tatrow saw a tool
box that he believed had been taken from his trailer in the burglary. He became
very angry, and the two men “swapped licks.” The fight ended when Tatrow pulled
a butterfly knife. Then everyone went into the cabin where Tatrow and Harry
“cooked” either cocaine or methamphetamine in the microwave while Mason held
4
At the sentencing phase, Tatrow testified that he went to Harry’s
place because Harry offered to exchange information about his missing
belongings for cocaine.
4
a butcher knife and watched Zammit. Tatrow then announced that they were all
going to his house “to party.” Harry and his girl friend remained behind while Mason
took Zammit in his car and Tatrow drove Billings and Mullican in Billings’ car. On
the way, Tatrow picked up Mike Redmon, who is Billings’ half-brother, and Bruce
Rochefort. Amber Frederick, who was asleep in the trailer, awakened when Mason
and Zammit arrived. Phillip Lawrence, J. J. Hendrixson, Jeff Sanders, and Tony
Dan arrived later.5
Ken Mason and Dondie Billings described in great detail the events
of the next two days.6 Amber Frederick and Christy Mullican were among those the
defendant called. Although some of the details varied, their testimony is surprisingly
consistent. As they described the situation, the trailer was in a state of seige, and
Mason or someone else constantly sat looking out the front door with a shotgun in
hand. Methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine and other drugs were available and
were used copiously by everyone who was present. No one slept more than an
hour or two at a time. Apparently they were convinced that Harry or Billy Teal was
coming to attack them. Tatrow was obsessed with recovering his belongings. At
one point, he aimed an empty revolver at Zammit’s head and clicked the trigger
several times. Zammit was forced to stand with his arms in the air while Rochefort
hit him in the ribs and face. At other times, Tatrow slapped and kicked Zammit.
Apparently Zammit admitted that he knew where Tatrow’s .22 rifle was located
because he, Tatrow, and two other defendants drove to McMinnville that night and
returned with the rifle. Later Tatrow took Zammit and Redmon to Harry’s place and
retrieved some of his belongings.7
5
Phillip Lane Lawrence, James Talbert Hendrixson, Jr., Michael
Redmon, Jeffrey Sanders and Kenny Mason were indicted for two counts of
premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, and two counts of especially
aggravated kidnapping. Jimmy Anthony Dan was indicted for kidnapping only,
and Bruce Edward Rochefort was indicted for kidnapping and aggravated
assault. These men were awaiting trial when Tatrow’s case was tried.
6
The defense called the other defendants to the stand but each one
refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds.
7
Apparently, Harry was not at home when the men arrived.
5
Upon their return, Tatrow and some of the others continued to abuse
Zammit. He was kicked in the face, chunks were cut out of his hair, and he received
small incisions to his scalp, his shoulder, and his arms. An ear lobe was torn when
an earring was forcibly removed. On the other hand, Zammit was allowed to
shower, his wounds were treated, and an Ace bandage was wrapped around his
ribs. He ate, and he and Billings lay together in Tatrow’s bed during the day on
Friday.
Sometime during Friday afternoon or evening, Tatrow and three others
left and brought Johnny Harry to the trailer where they tied him ‘spreadeagle’ in a
chair in the laundry room. Tatrow repeatedly threw a knife at the portion of the
chair seat that was exposed between Harry’s legs. Later Tatrow told a woman who
stopped by the trailer for a few minutes that he had tied Harry to a telephone pole
and whipped him with a belt. She saw the welt on Harry’s back. Later, Tatrow
kicked Harry in the chest or chin, and Harry banged his nose on a vanity. Blood
spilled onto the carpet. Witnesses noted that Harry had a bad gash on his leg
which Tatrow bandaged. After taking a shower, Harry lay on a pallet in the
bedroom.
On Saturday morning, Tatrow and Mike Redmon went to a telephone
and called Dondie Billings’ parents. Sometime during the afternoon, Mr. and Mrs.
Billings arrived to take her home. Dondie Billings testified that Tatrow got down on
his knees and swore that he would take Zammit and Harry home as soon as she
and Christy Mullican left. Billings’ father saw Roger Zammit standing on the porch
and told him to stay away from his daughter.
Harry and Zammit were not taken home. Tatrow did take Zammit to
find him some pain medication. After taking two Xanaxes and drinking some beer,
Zammit passed out, and Tatrow left him slumped over on the seat of the truck that
6
was parked in the yard. At about this time, Amber Frederick returned.8 She was
very upset because some of the Dry Creek group were coming, and she refused to
stay any longer. Tatrow was furious at her and ordered the others not to let her
come back. Thirty minutes later, Tatrow’s mother stopped by the trailer to check on
her son. She spoke to him on the porch for a few minutes. At trial she testified that
he looked crazy. She knew he was strung out on drugs. When she tried to talk to
him about it, he became enraged, and she left without entering the trailer.
Mason testified that after his mother left, Tatrow “wigged out.” Tatrow
went into the trailer, grabbed Harry who was lying on the pallet, and started gouging
him in the face with a styrofoam bat. Jeff Sanders kicked Harry in the face and hit
him with his fists. Because Harry was bleeding badly, Tatrow ordered them to put
him in the bathtub. Mason and Sanders went outside and dragged Zammit out of
the truck by his hair. At Tatrow’s direction, Mason applied duct tape to Harry’s and
Zammit’s hands and mouths. He put tape across Zammit’s eyes. Zammit was
forced to kneel in the tub facing the faucets, and Harry was crowded in behind him.
Several people including Redmon, Hendrixson, and Sanders were in the bathroom.
According to Mason, he stepped out for a moment, and when he returned, Zammit
had a plastic bag over his head and a cord around his neck. Tatrow’s knee was in
Zammit’s back, and he was pulling hard on the cord. Mason said that it looked like
Tatrow was “riding a bull.” When Zammit continued to struggle fiercely, Tatrow
asked for a heavy flashlight which Mason provided. Tatrow backhanded Zammit
three times on the back of the head, and Zammit wilted. Tatrow then walked out of
the bathroom, but when someone said that Zammit wasn’t dead, Tatrow returned
and told Harry, who was still sitting in the tub, to pull on the cord. Harry pulled for
a few seconds while Tatrow laughed. Everyone went into the kitchen leaving Harry
sitting in the tub with Zammit’s lifeless body. Mason opened a window because it
8
The record indicates that people came and went numerous times.
Several trips were made to purchase food, liquor, and drugs. On Thursday
evening, Mason and several others went out to eat. Christy Mullican went home
to shower and to pick up clean clothes.
7
“smelled bad” and turned off the light.
For twenty minutes, the men sat at the kitchen table smoking
cigarettes and a “joint.” Tatrow then told Mason and two others to help him get
Harry out of the house. He told them to walk him out of the front door and into a
nearby field. Harry walked in front of them, but when they went through the gate
into the field, he broke away and ran. After about 30 yards, he stumbled and fell.
Tatrow caught up to him, dragged him to his feet, and told him to keep walking.
After Harry had taken a couple of steps, Tatrow kicked him in the leg and as he fell,
fired one shot with the .22 rifle into the side of John Harry’s head.
Over the next several hours, the men cleaned the trailer thoroughly
and attempted to dispose of the evidence. They removed the bloody portions of
carpet. Both bodies were wrapped first in woven wire fencing and then in carpeting.
Tatrow, Redmon, and Hendrixson left in the truck to dispose of the bodies. Mason
hid the revolver across the road in the brush and some dynamite in a nearby culvert,
and then he and the others took the bloody towels, rags and clothes to Goose
Creek where they burned them.
During the early morning hours of January 15, 1995, Dondie Billings
reported to the DeKalb County Sheriff’s Department that Roger Zammit and John
Harry were missing. As result of this call, Steve Johnson, the chief deputy, went to
Chris Tatrow’s mobile home at about 4:00 a.m. Tatrow answered the door. Three
men were sitting at the kitchen table drinking beer and playing cards. The home
looked neat and clean. Tatrow admitted that Zammit and Harry had been there.
He said that he’d given them “a good whipping” for stealing some of his stuff and
had dropped them off in the Dry Creek area where they were picked up by someone
in a black Camaro. The deputy noticed nothing out of the ordinary in Tatrow’s
speech or demeanor, and neither Tatrow nor the other men appeared to be
intoxicated. He observed nothing unusual or out of place at the trailer.
8
Days passed and neither Zammit nor Harry returned to their homes.
Deputy Johnson spoke with Kenny Mason who had lived at the Tatrow trailer for
several weeks, and Mason gave a statement incriminating himself, Tatrow and
several other young men. The police recovered the .357 magnum revolver hidden
across the road from Tatrow’s trailer. On January 24, 1995, TBI agents James
Moore and Mark Gwyn arrested Tatrow and took him to the DeKalb County Jail.
From there, he was transferred almost immediately to Putnam County. When a
team from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation pulled the bodies of the two
young men from Center Hill Lake on January 27, Tatrow was in a holding cell in the
Putnam County Jail. That afternoon, Moore and Gwyn served Tatrow with a warrant
to search his truck. A few moments after the agents left the cell, Tatrow pounded
on the door and asked to speak with them again. At 3:53 p.m, he admitted that late
in the evening of January 14, he strangled Roger Zammit to death and then shot
John Harry in the head with a .22 caliber rifle.
At trial, the medical examiner, Dr. Charles Harlan, testified that it
would have taken anywhere from thirty seconds to three and one-half minutes for
Roger Zammit to die of ligature strangulation. Zammit had multiple contusions on
his face, lacerations on the back of his scalp, and a grooved depression and
abrasion around his neck. He also had two shallow incisions on his upper arm and
one on the left posterior flank. The cuts occurred prior to death as did the laceration
to his bottom right ear lobe and the small gash behind his right ear. He had no
broken ribs. Dr. Harlan opined that an average sized adult is strong enough to
strangle someone by placing a knee in the victim’s back and pulling. The doctor
reported that John Harry died of a gunshot wound to the head. Harry had two
incisions on his face and another on his left upper elbow that was covered by a
Band-aid. He also had some superficial bruises. The single shot to Harry’s head
would have rendered him almost instantaneously unconscious and death would
have occurred shortly thereafter.
9
In support of his insanity defense, the defendant offered the testimony
of Dr. Donna Segar, a physician who is board certified in toxicology, and Dr.
William D. Kenner, a psychiatrist at the St. Louis Psychoanalytic Institute. Dr. Segar
testified that regular, long term use of substantial amounts of methamphetamine
and cocaine would completely change one’s personality.9 Thought processes
become delusional and paranoid. A person under the influence of “crank” or “ice”
often speaks very rapidly and literally spits out the words through clenched teeth.
Such a person demonstrates increasingly hostile and aggressive behavior and his
judgment would be substantially impaired. She testified that two grams of
methamphetamine per day is a high dosage and that a person who used that
amount would experience hallucinations. A common hallucination, according to Dr.
Segar, is the belief that insects or bugs are crawling under the skin. Dr. Segar did
not examine the defendant but testified from her knowledge and experience.
Dr. Kenner spent several hours on two different days examining the
defendant. He extensively interviewed family members and one co-defendant. Of
significance were the facts that two members of the defendant’s family suffered
from depression and committed suicide, that the defendant’s marriage had been
troubled, and that a work injury to the defendant’s back had caused considerable
pain. Despite his injury, the defendant had continued to work long hours on the job
and at home on the family farm. Within a few months, a cousin committed suicide
and his parents divorced. After his separation from his wife, his drug use grew to
unmanageable proportions, and in October of 1994, he was fired from his job. Dr.
Kenner testified that the defendant changed from a likeable, fun-loving person who
grew angry but never held a grudge into one who was increasingly cocky and
aggressive. He became jumpy and twitchy and was unable to sleep for more than
a few minutes at a time without medication. He experienced tactile hallucinations
and would sometimes dig at himself with a knife. Dr. Kenner described a person
9
Testimony at trial indicated that the defendant was using two grams
of “crank” a day in addition to a quarter gram of cocaine as well as substantial
amounts of other drugs to “mellow” the highs and to allow him to sleep.
10
seriously addicted to methamphetamine as being very paranoid and frightened but
“spoiling for a fight.” Methamphetamine produces an increase of territorial
aggression and cocaine decreases inhibitions and impairs judgment. The doctor
concluded that at the time of the murders the defendant was suffering from an
amphetamine-induced paranoid psychosis that would have a significant impact on
his ability to conform his behavior and to self-examine his thinking and actions.
In rebuttal, the state presented testimony from Dr. Wisam Owais, the
medical director and a psychiatrist at Plateau Mental Health Center, and Dr. Bob
Freeman, a psychologist and chief executive officer of the Volunteer Behavioral
Health Care System. Dr. Owais and Dr. Freeman interviewed the defendant on two
occasions. They reviewed his medical records but interviewed no one other than
the defendant. Dr. Owais concluded that there was no evidence of mental illness
and that the defendant was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts. Dr.
Freeman agreed, but on cross examination, he conceded that the defendant talked
about having some hallucinations. He also stated that taking methamphetamine,
Valium, and cocaine at the same time would have an effect on one’s judgment.
Based on these facts, the jury rejected the defendant’s insanity
defense and found him guilty of two counts of deliberate and premeditated murder,
two counts of felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping.
B. Facts in the Sentencing Phase
No issue relates specifically to the sentencing phase of this capital
case. However, in order to present a complete picture of the facts before the trial
court at the so-called “second sentencing hearing,” we briefly summarize the
testimony presented during the sentencing phase
The defendant was convicted of both premeditated and felony murder.
To avoid double jeopardy problems, the trial court decided to allow the jurors to
11
consider only the convictions for felony murder.10 The state relied upon the single
aggravating factor, that “the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in
that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce
death.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(I)(5) (Supp. 1993). The defense presented
numerous witnesses, including the defendant, family members, and friends, in
mitigation.
The prosecution called Agent James Moore as their only witness. He
used the charts prepared by the medical examiner to describe the various injuries
sustained by the victims. The trial court admitted into evidence several additional
photographs of the bodies that it had excluded from the guilt phase. Moore testified
that the defendant had freely and voluntarily confessed to committing the crimes
and that he had showed no remorse.
The defendant presented a thorough and well-documented mitigation
defense. Witnesses described the defendant as a popular leader who excelled at
rodeo and as a successful student in high school. As an adult, he was a
hardworking family man who cared for his two young sons, kept a steady job, and
loved his work on his parents’ farm. His parents and sister testified that the
defendant was particularly devastated when, as a result of their divorce, his parents
sold the farm. They also testified to the personality and behavior changes they
observed in the defendant during the months prior to the murders. James Tatrow,
the defendant’s father, candidly admitted that he had provided his son with
methamphetamine when his back hurt. Numerous pictures of the defendant’s
family and his rodeo activities were admitted into evidence. When the defendant
took the stand, he wept as he described the events that led up to the two murders.
The jury saw part of a very recent videotape showing the defendant playing with his
two young sons. During the showing, the defendant broke down on the stand and
10
The trial judge later announced that he was setting aside the
convictions for premeditated and deliberate murder as the weight of the evidence
preponderated against the verdicts.
12
begged the judge to turn off the tape.
After deliberating for approximately six hours, the jury found that the
state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders were heinous,
atrocious, or cruel in that they involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that
necessary to produce death. However, the jury also concluded that the statutory
aggravating circumstance did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt and sentenced the defendant to imprisonment for life with the
possibility of parole.
C. Facts at the sentencing hearing
On October 25, 1996, the trial court held a sentencing hearing to
determine the appropriate sentences for the two especially aggravated kidnapping
convictions and to decide whether the sentences should run concurrently or
consecutively. The probation officer who prepared the presentence report noted
that the defendant had a misdemeanor conviction for malicious mischief in which
he and a friend had dumped a load of manure in a school parking lot. His testimony
also disclosed that the defendant had begun smoking marijuana seven years prior
to the murders and his drug use had escalated to include methamphetamine,
cocaine, mushroom and a variety of tranquillizers and pain pills. TBI Agent James
Moore testified for a third time. He testified that when the defendant made his
statement there were no tears and no laughter, and that although the defendant
appeared to be anxious, he was not remorseful. Tatrow admitted he was the
leader. Not only did he accept responsibility for the deaths, but in Agent Moore’s
opinion, at times he was boasting. The state concluded with testimony from the
victims’ families which described the impact the murders had on their respective
lives. The defendant again expressed his remorse for the killings. He also testified
that he had not been involved in any drug activity in jail and that he was interested
in pursuing his education while serving his time in prison. Diane Tatrow, the
defendant’s mother, described her son’s emotional state on the night the murders
13
occurred and the change that had occurred now that he was free of drugs.
At the conclusion of the testimony, defense counsel moved that
various exhibits and letters in the court’s file be entered into evidence. The
prosecution objected to the admission of the affidavits of two jurors who stated that
a twenty-five year sentence was the appropriate punishment. To counter these
affidavits, the state offered the affidavits of two other jurors who supported
consecutive sentencing. After hearing arguments, the trial court decided to exclude
all juror affidavits “out of an abundance of caution.” The trial judge then placed on
the record his findings relevant to the aggravating factors and mitigating factors as
applied to the kidnappings and the criteria for consecutive sentencing. 11 The trial
court then sentenced the defendant to serve 22 years for each kidnapping
conviction. The court ordered that the defendant serve his two life sentences
consecutively and that the two kidnapping convictions run concurrently with each
other and the life sentences.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The defendant admits that he was involved in the kidnappings and that
he killed the victims. He contends, however, that because he was suffering from a
drug-induced psychosis, he was unable to formulate the requisite mens rea at the
time these crimes were committed. The state argues that voluntary intoxication
may not be used to negate the element of recklessness and that the evidence in the
record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly
kidnapped and then recklessly murdered the victims. After reviewing the entire
record and the applicable law, we find that the evidence presented at trial is legally
sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, an
11
We discuss the trial court’s sentencing findings in greater detail in
section V below.
14
appellate court’s standard of review is, whether after considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63,
67 (Tenn. 1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). This rule is applicable to findings of guilt
based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of direct and
circumstantial evidence. State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1990). Since a jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which
a defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, a convicted
defendant has the burden of demonstrating on appeal that the evidence is
insufficient. State v, Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). In determining
that sufficiency, this court does not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. State v.
Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Questions concerning
the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all
factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact. State v.
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The state is entitled to the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable or legitimate inferences which
may be drawn therefrom. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992).
We first consider whether the defendant’s evidence of heavy drug use
may be used to negate the requisite mental state for felony murder.
Under the version of the statue in effect at the time of these crimes,
felony murder was defined as “[a] reckless killing of another committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping or air craft piracy.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
202(a)(2) (Supp. 1994). Thus recklessness as a mens rea was required to support
a conviction for a death occurring in the course of one of the enumerated offenses. 12
12
By statute, a person acts recklessly who acts with respect to
circumstances surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct when the
person is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
15
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-503 provides that evidence
of intoxication may negate a culpable mental state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-
503(a) (1997). Subsection (b) of the statute, however, states: “If recklessness
establishes an element of an offense and the person is unaware of a risk because
of voluntary intoxication, the person’s unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution
for that offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-503(b) (emphasis added). The statute
defines intoxication as the “disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from
the introduction of any substance into the body,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-133-
503(d)(1), and voluntary intoxication as intoxication “caused by a substance that the
person knowingly introduced into the person’s body, the tendency of which to
cause intoxication was known or ought to have been known.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-13-503(d)(3).
The defendant offered the testimony of two expert and several lay
witnesses to prove that the heavy use of methamphetamine, cocaine and other
drugs had changed the defendant’s personality, distorted his sense of reality and
impaired his judgment. Although the state’s experts testified that they were unable
to find any indication of mental illness, one of the experts agreed that drug use
impairs the ability to make judgments. However, the defendant has not argued and
nothing in the record suggests that his drug use and resulting intoxication was
anything other than voluntary. Therefore, although the evidence was relevant to
negate premeditation and deliberation in the first degree murder charges as well as
the “knowing” element of especially aggravated kidnapping, the evidence cannot be
used to negate the element of recklessness required to prove felony murder. See
State v. James Lloyd Julian, II, No. 01C01-9511-CV-00371, slip op. at 37 (Tenn.
that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-11-302(c) (1991).
16
Crim. App., Knoxville, July 24, 1997)(perm. app. filed Oct. 30, 1997); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-11-503, Sentencing Comm’n Comments.13
We must now determine whether the evidence in the record is
sufficient to proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly
kidnapped and then recklessly murdered Roger Zammit and John Harry during the
perpetration of the kidnappings.
To prove especially aggravated kidnapping, the state must show that
“the accused knowingly removed or confined another unlawfully so as to
substantially interfere with the other’s liberty,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-302(a)
(1997), and that the removal or confinement was accomplished with a deadly
weapon. § 39-13-305(a)(1) (1997). A person acts knowingly with respect to the
conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of
the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
11-302(b) (1997).
With respect to Roger Zammit, the evidence shows that the defendant
believed that Zammit had stolen his property or at least knew where the property
could be found. Ken Mason testified that, at Harry’s cabin, the defendant gave him
a knife and told him to hold it and watch Zammit. Later the defendant had Mason
drive Zammit to his trailer. Although Mason indicated that the defendant never
specifically said that Zammit was a prisoner, there was ample testimony from
Mason and other witnesses that the understanding was that Zammit would not be
permitted to depart. The defendant tried to cut hunks out of Zammit’s hair, slashed
his arms, kicked him in the face, and threatened him with a .357 pistol. The
evidence is equally compelling in the case of John Harry. The defendant made two
13
This court has also recognized that evidence of a defendant’s
mental illness that does not rise to the level of an insanity defense may establish
a claim of “diminished capacity” to form a requisite criminal intent. See State v.
Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 138, 148 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
17
trips to find John Harry whom he also suspected of being involved in the burglary
of his trailer. The defendant, as well as others, were armed. Harry was whipped
with a belt before he reached the trailer. He was tied in a chair, and the defendant
taunted him by throwing a knife between his legs. Harry suffered cuts to his arms
and on one leg. Both men were beaten and kicked by others while the defendant
was present.
The record also contains considerable evidence on which the jury
could have found that the use of illegal drugs had so incapacitated the defendant
that he was incapable of acting knowingly at the time of the kidnappings. The trial
court instructed the jury on the use of evidence concerning intoxication, gave an
appropriate instruction concerning the defendant’s capacity to form a culpable
mental state, and provided the jury with the appropriate definitions. The jury, as
trier of fact, resolves all factual issues raised by the evidence as well as questions
concerning the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value of the evidence.
State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). In this instance, the jury
resolved the issue in favor of the state. The facts support a conclusion that the
defendant knowingly used a deadly weapon to confine both men so as to interfere
significantly with their liberty.
The defendant admits that he killed Roger Zammit by strangling him
with a cord and that he shot John Harry in the head with a .22 rifle. Such actions
are, at a minimum, reckless. We conclude that a rational juror could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly kidnapped Roger Zammit
and John Harry in order to obtain information about his missing property or to gain
revenge upon them for the burglary and then, during the course of the confinement,
recklessly killed both men.
The evidence in the record is sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to
support the defendant’s convictions for the especially aggravated kidnapping of
John Harry and Roger Zammit and their reckless murders. See Jackson v. Virginia,
18
443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63,
67 (Tenn. 1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).
III. Suppression of Defendant’s Statement
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress
his confession because the confession was taken in violation of both Article I,
Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. In this appeal, the defendant specifically contends that his
confession should have been suppressed because (1) he was suffering from
withdrawal symptoms that critically impaired his reasoning and judgment and
prevented a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights; and
(2) the officers obtained the confession through promises and coercion.
The record of the suppression hearing reveals that agents of the
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation arrested the defendant for aggravated
kidnapping on the morning of January 24, 1995. Agent Moore testified that they
found him sleeping at the home of a friend and took him to the DeKalb County jail.
When they advised him of his rights, he did not request an attorney; he declined,
however, to make any statements. Shortly thereafter, he was transferred to the jail
in Putnam County. On January 27, the agents visited the defendant to serve him
with a search warrant and to take his photograph for booking purposes. By this
time, the agents had taken statements from Ken Mason and several of the other
young men who were involved, and the victims’ bodies had been recovered from
Center Hill Lake. Agent Moore testified that neither he nor Agent Gwyn asked him
any questions about the crimes. They served the warrant, obtained his signature,
and after taking his photograph out in the booking area, they went to speak to some
detectives housed in another part of the same building.
The defendant’s version of the circumstances under which the written
statement was produced varies considerably from that of the agents. According to
19
the defendant, he was very ill when the agents arrived. He had last smoked “crank”
at about 5:30 a.m. on January 24 and was now experiencing serious withdrawal
symptoms. He was vomiting and suffering from diarrhea and severe cramps. He
experienced several seizures and fell off the bed. His vision was blurred, he was
sweaty, and he had difficulty walking. He believed he was going to die. He wanted
desperately to return to DeKalb County because he knew how to get drugs in that
jail. He asked the agents if they could get him sent back to DeKalb. They told him
that if he helped them, maybe they could help him.
The defendant was in the holding cell in the jail’s booking area. At the
hearing, the booking officer testified that the defendant had been placed on
“medical watch.” From her chair, she was able to observe him through an eight by
twelve window in the door of the cell. She remembered that he was extremely
agitated and nervous. He spent a lot of time pacing back and forth in the cell, but
she was unaware of any other physical symptoms. Occasionally, she would ask
him how he was doing and he always responded “okay.” He never asked for a
lawyer. Within a few minutes after the agents departed, the defendant stopped
pacing and began beating on the window and yelling. She recalled that he grabbed
his head and shouted, “I can’t take it any more. I want to confess. Get them back
down here.” Within a few minutes, the defendant was taken to the intoximeter
room where the two agents were waiting.
According to Agent Moore, before they even said a word to the
defendant, he spontaneously and immediately confessed, saying, “ I did it. I killed
them both. I’m the one that done it.” The agents stopped him and read the
standard Miranda warnings. After the defendant signed the written waiver, Moore
proceeded to take down the defendant’s version of the kidnappings and murders.
Moore said that he asked the defendant very few questions because the
defendant’s story was coherent, cogent and logical. The defendant read the written
statement, initialed a couple of corrections, and signed it. When he asked about
20
returning to DeKalb County, the agents explained to him that they could not arrange
such a transfer. During the interview, which lasted less than an hour, the defendant
showed little emotion and no remorse. In fact, Agent Moore testified, he seemed
to be boasting.
The defendant testified that he could not remember how he happened
to be interviewed. He did not know whether he asked to see the agents again or
whether he was just taken to the interview room. The defendant had no recollection
of making any statement upon entering the interview room. He did not recall signing
any waiver form or hearing the Miranda warnings. He said that he was in a
complete panic and would have confessed to anything in order to get back to his
home county. Moore told him that he already knew the whole story because the
defendant’s friends had already talked. He just needed the defendant’s
corroboration. If the defendant would confess, they would get him back to DeKalb
County. Everything, he was assured, would go much better for him if he confessed.
The agents mentioned the death penalty and the electric chair several times. Agent
Gwyn placed a telephone call ostensibly to arrange for the defendant’s transfer.
Moore determined the order in which the statement was taken. Most of the specific
details, including the exact quotes, came directly from Moore. Moore would ask the
defendant whether someone said something and then he would write it down. The
defendant said that he never reread the statement because he was crying and
could not see. Moore, he contended, guided his hand to where the initials were
required and to the place where he wrote his signature.
At the request of the defendant’s mother, attorney Martelia Crawford
visited the defendant about thirty minutes after he gave his statement.14 Ms.
Crawford testified that, when she arrived, the defendant appeared confused. He
was sitting on the cot with his knees clasped to his chest. He complained of hot
14
Ms. Crawford was later appointed to represent the defendant. She
withdrew from the case when she realized that she would have to be a witness at
a suppression hearing.
21
flashes and chills and told her that he was vomiting greenish-black liquid and was
unable to eat. He seemed very uncomfortable and distraught. His conversation
was disjointed. She had to repeat her questions several times, and it was hard to
get a complete answer from him. He showed her the copy of the search warrant,
and, when she warned him not to talk to the police, he told her that he had just
given a statement and that he would be transferred back to DeKalb County. She
told him that he probably would not be moved unless a court ordered the transfer.15
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge made thorough and
specific findings. The court found that (1) the defendant was advised of his rights
prior to making the statement and that he signed a proper waiver; (2) he never
requested the services of an attorney; (3) there was no evidence of deceit or
deception on the part of the officers; (4) nothing indicated that the officers used
threats, violence, or coercion that overbore his will; (5) the defendant had a history
of two years of serious drug abuse and was going through withdrawal at the time he
gave his statement; (6) nothing indicated that the defendant was not functioning in
a normal way during those two years despite his drug use; (6) the booking
photographs taken at the time do not show that he was so distraught he didn’t know
what he was doing; 16 (7) when the defendant spoke to Ms. Crawford he was able
to tell her about the search warrant and describe the agents; (8) the defendant was
in a state of nervousness; (9) the defendant gave a detailed account that included
statements made by various people and a coherent description of the events.
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that the defendant had knowingly
and intelligently waived his constitutional rights and had voluntarily and freely given
his incriminating statement.
15
Dr. Donna Segar, the toxicology expert, testified at the suppression
hearing as well as at trial. Since her testimony concerning the effects of
prolonged use of methamphetamine and cocaine is virtually the same in both
settings, we have not included it here.
16
According to the transcript of the suppression hearing, the booking
photographs were admitted as exhibits. They were not included, however, in the
record on appeal.
22
It is well settled that when a trial court makes finding of facts at the
conclusion of a suppression hearing, those facts are accorded the weight of a jury
verdict. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994). The facts are
binding on this court unless the evidence in the record preponderates against them.
Questions of credibility of witnesses, the weight and
value of the evidence and resolution of conflicts of
evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the
trier of fact. The party prevailing in the trial court is
entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence
adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all
reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be
drawn from the evidence. So long as the greater weight
of the evidence supports the trial court’s findings, those
findings shall be upheld.
Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996); see also State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489,
499 (Tenn. 1997); Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 544.
In this case, the evidence concerning the defendant’s physical and
mental condition was heavily controverted with each side presenting testimony that
supported its contentions. The trial court, however, resolved the conflicting
testimony in the state’s favor. After examining the record, we cannot conclude that
the evidence preponderates against those findings, and this court, therefore, is
bound by them.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” The corresponding provision of the Tennessee Constitution states “[t]hat
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. Our supreme court has previously held
that “[t]he significant difference between these two provisions is that the test of
voluntariness for confessions under Article 1, Section 9 is broader and more
protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth
Amendment.” State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn. 1992).
To admit a defendant’s written statement into evidence, the statement
23
must have been given voluntarily by a defendant knowledgeable of his constitutional
rights and accompanied by a valid and knowing waiver of those rights. See State
v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992). The prosecution may not use
statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, that stem from custodial
interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards that
effectively secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966); Crump, 834 S.W.2d at 268. Here, the
trial judge found that the agents properly advised the defendant of his rights and
that he signed a written waiver of those rights. Although the trial judge found that
the defendant was experiencing withdrawal from his prolonged use of
methamphetamine and cocaine, the court also found that the defendant was not
in such a state that he did not understand what he was doing. The record shows
that, after the defendant made his spontaneous incriminatory remarks, the agents
prevented him from making any further statements until they had advised him of his
constitutional rights and obtained a written waiver. Absent any evidence of
overreaching by the police, the waiver is valid. Bush, 942 S.W.2d at 500-501.
A confession must be free and voluntary, and it must not be
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence or other
evidence of police overreaching. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S. Ct.
183 (1897). The issue of voluntariness requires the trial judge to focus on whether
the behavior of the state’s agents was such as “to overbear” the accused’s will to
resist and thus bring about a confession that was not freely given. State v. Kelly,
603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980). In this case, the defendant contends that the
agents used deception and coercion to obtain his statement. Specifically, he
alleges that they promised to have him transferred back to his home county and
tricked him with a phony telephone call. He also alleges that they threatened him
with the death penalty and that Agent Moore virtually dictated the statement to him
using information obtained from the statements of other co-defendants. The trial
24
judge, however, believed the testimony of the state’s witnesses rather than the
defendant with respect to these factual issues. He found that no deception
occurred and that the agents made no promises or threats. This court does not
determine the credibility of the witnesses or weigh their testimony and must,
therefore, accept that judgment unless the evidence preponderates against the
holding. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23.
If the defendant is capable of making a coherent statement concerning
his participation in a crime, the statement is admissible even if he were under the
influence of drugs at the time. State v. Green, 613 S.W.2d 229, 232-33 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1980). When pressed, even the defendant’s expert witness conceded
that the statement was coherent, chronological, and rational. A trial court’s
determination at a suppression hearing is presumptively correct. State v.
Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994). Based on the record before us
and cognizant of the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that the
defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily gave his statement to the police.
The trial court did not err in admitting the defendant’s statement into evidence.
IV. Admissibility of Photographs
During the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court allowed the state to
introduce into evidence two photographs of the victims’ bodies taken after they were
retrieved from Center Hill Lake. The state requested that five pictures be admitted.
After a jury-out hearing, the trial judge ruled that the prejudicial effect of three of the
pictures substantially outweighed their probative value. Two remaining
photographs, however, the trial judge ruled were relevant and admissible.17 Neither
photograph shows the face of the victim. The carpet is gone, but both bodies are
wrapped in the woven wire fencing. In Exhibit 9, John Harry’s body lies face down
on the gravel beach. A wound to the back of his head is barely visible. Exhibit 12
17
The trial court permitted the introduction of the other three
photographs in the sentencing phase. The defendant does not contest the
admission of those photographs.
25
shows the body of Roger Zammit and includes the cinder block used to weight the
body. The cord around his neck is visible although most of his face is hidden. Duct
tape is visible in Harry’s hair and around Zammit’s hands.
In this appeal, the defendant argues that the photographs, which were
taken after the bodies had been in the lake for approximately twelve days, were
gruesome and inflammatory and offered no additional information or assistance to
the jury. The state contends that the photographs were probative of the physical
torture endured by the victims, of the process and detail of the disposal of the
bodies, and as corroboration of the defendant’s confession.
To be admissible, a photograph must be relevant to some issue at
trial, and the prejudicial effect of the photograph must not outweigh its probative
value. Bush, 942 S.W.2d at 514; State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn.
1978). The admissibility of photographs is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and the court’s determination will not be overturned on appeal except upon a
clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Bush, 942 S.W.2d at 514; State v. Bordis,
905 S.W.2d 214, 226 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
Although it is a close question in this instance, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs. The probative
value of the photographs is somewhat diminished due to the bodies’ long exposure
to lake water; however, they were relevant to supplement the testimony of the
medical examiner and to corroborate the details provided by Kenny Mason and the
defendant’s statement. See Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 542. The photographs
are not pleasant to observe, but they are not unduly gruesome nor are they
misleading. Their probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Tenn. R. Evid. 403; see State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951.
Moreover, even if it were error to admit the photographs, the error would be
harmless given the overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt.
26
V. Prosecutor’s Inflammatory Remark
The defendant next complains that because of the prosecutor’s
remarks he is entitled to a reversal of his convictions. During closing, the prosecutor
said, “Now I submit to you, with head bowed, defendant sits before you, a tear now
and then. What purpose does this serve? Pure theatrics, a show for you . . . . I
can assure you that others have cried an ocean of tears. I can assure you that he
shed no tear on the night when he brutally murdered two young men.” The
defendant contends that these remarks were intended to make the jury doubt the
remorse and sincerity of the defendant and to inflame the jury. The state argues,
first, that the issue is waived because the defendant failed to make a
contemporaneous objection, and, second, that the argument related to the veracity
of a witness and was within proper bounds.
We find that the defendant waived this issue although for other
reasons. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a detailed motion in limine for the
purpose of limiting the prosecution’s arguments. The motion was granted by the
trial court with the limitation that if the state believed that an argument within the
purview of the motion were appropriate, the prosecutor must seek the leave of court
before making that argument to the jury. At the first opportunity after the jury left the
court room, defense counsel brought the remarks to the attention of the trial judge.18
The trial judge agreed that the remarks were inappropriate and were covered by the
motion in limine. He offered to submit a supplemental instruction to the jury. He
also requested that the defense submit a written motion requesting a mistrial
although he did not intend to grant the motion. The trial judge said he had observed
the jury closely during closing arguments. He believed that the improper remarks
were poorly received and would likely prove more prejudicial to the state than to the
defendant.19 Defense counsel filed the requested motion for a mistrial but declined
18
The defendant objected to two other remarks made during closing
but has not addressed them on appeal.
19
The trial judge said that he had almost interrupted the prosecutor to
give a cautionary instruction but decided that it would only further call attention to
the improper argument.
27
the trial court’s offer to issue a supplemental instruction as the instruction would only
call attention to the improper statement.
Rule 36(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that relief need not be granted to a party who fails to take whatever action was
reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error. In this case,
defense counsel, after taking some time for deliberation, declined the trial court’s
offer to give a supplemental instruction to the jury. The defendant cannot request
relief from an appellate court when he refused for strategic reasons appropriate
relief offered by the trial court.
VI. The “Second” Sentencing Hearing
At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of this capital case, the jury
sentenced Tatrow to life imprisonment for each felony murder conviction. On
October 25, 1996, the trial court held a sentencing hearing to set punishment for the
especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and to consider consecutive
sentencing. Tatrow contends that this “second” sentencing hearing violates state
and federal constitutional provisions against double jeopardy because the trial judge
charged the jury in the first sentencing proceeding to consider the mitigating
circumstances and the aggravating circumstances which were raised by the
evidence during the entire course of the trial. At the later hearing, the state
presented no new evidence. Since all of the state’s evidence before the court in the
second hearing, the defendant contends, was previously considered by the jury, the
defendant contends that he was twice placed in jeopardy upon the same facts.
The argument is an interesting one; however, the protections against
double jeopardy are simply inapplicable in this instance. The language in the state
and federal constitutions are similar. Both provide that no person shall, for the
same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. Const. amend. V; Tenn.
Const. art. I, § 10. Our supreme court has held that double jeopardy protects a
28
defendant from (1) re-prosecution for the same crime after an acquittal; (2) re-
prosecution for the same crime after a conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for
the same offense. State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn. 1996); see also
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1969).
We are unable to see how the hearing held on October 25, 1996
violated double jeopardy principles. Double jeopardy principles do not preclude
separate sentencing hearings for convictions for different offenses. In this instance,
the trial court was required to impose sentences for especially aggravated
kidnapping and to determine whether the life sentences imposed by the jury would
be served consecutively or concurrently. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115 (1997).
The fact that the determination was made on a different day after additional
argument and upon hearing of testimony from the victims’ families does not create
a violation of double jeopardy principles.
Moreover, it has long been recognized that the use of the same
evidence to determine the range and length of a sentence and to determine whether
that sentence is to be served concurrently or consecutively does not violate double
jeopardy. State v. Davis, 757 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). There is no
prohibition, either statutory or constitutional, against using the same facts and
circumstances to enhance sentences under the applicable enhancement factors
and to require those sentences to be served consecutively. State v. Meeks, 867
S.W.2d 361, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). We are unable to conclude that double
jeopardy principles prevent the state from using evidence presented in the
sentencing phase of a capital case in a later hearing to determine whether
consecutive sentencing was appropriate.
VII. Jurors’ Affidavits
Included in the defendant’s response to the state’s Motion for
Consecutive Sentencing were the affidavits of two jurors indicating that these jurors
29
believed that the defendant was capable of rehabilitation and that he should serve
the two life sentences concurrently. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution,
while arguing that the affidavits were inadmissible, tendered affidavits from two
other jurors who believed that consecutive sentencing would be appropriate. After
hearing the arguments of both parties, the trial court decided “in an abundance of
caution” not to admit into evidence any of the affidavits.
In this appeal, the defendant contends that the affidavits should have
been admitted as jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts.20 The state argues
that the affidavits were inadmissible pursuant to Rule 606(b) of the Tennessee
Rules of Evidence. Although we find Rule 606 to have little bearing on this matter,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the
affidavits into evidence.
Neither portion of Rule 606 provides much guidance in this instance.
Subsection (a) of the rule prohibits a juror from testifying as a witness “before that
jury in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting.” Tenn. R. Evid. 606 (a).
Because there is no jury involvement in the sentencing hearing, subsection (a) does
not necessarily preclude the admission of the affidavits. Subsection (b) provides
that, when an inquiry is made into the validity of a verdict or an indictment, a juror
may not testify as “to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon any juror’s mind or emotion as
influencing that jury to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning the juror’s mental processes. . . .” Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b). The rule is
addressed to a situation in which a juror’s affidavit is submitted in connection with
a motion challenging the verdict and seeking a new trial. Tenn. R. Evid. 606,
Sentencing Comm’n Comments. The affidavits, in this instance, were offered at
20
The defendant’s brief contains no citation to authority to support
this argument. Although we have chosen to address this issue on its merits, we
remind counsel that issues unsupported by argument, citation to authority, or
appropriate references to the record may be treated as waived by this court.
Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. 10(b).
30
a sentencing hearing on the issue of consecutive sentencing, and they contain
nothing that would be of relevance to a challenge to the validity of a jury verdict. We
conclude that Rule 606 neither permits nor forbids the admission of juror affidavits
in this situation.
Trial courts have, however, broad discretion in determining the
admission of evidence. See State v. Hutchinson, 898 S.W.2d 161, 172 (Tenn.
1995); State v. Baker, 785 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). This court
will not disturb a trial judge’s discretion to admit or exclude evidence unless it is
exercised arbitrarily. Baker , 785 S.W.2d at 134.
As noted above, we find nothing in Rule 606 that forbids the admission
of the proffered affidavits. Moreover, at a sentencing hearing, traditional rules of
evidence are relaxed. Traditionally, any evidence that the judge deems trustworthy
and probative is admissible in a sentencing hearing regardless of its admissibility
under the rules of evidence. State v. Hawk, 688 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1985). Sentencing Commission Comments to Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-210 state:
The provision of subsection (b) require the court to
consider all of the proof at trial ... [and] evidence and
information offered by the parties on the mitigation and
enhancement factors . . . . This subsection permits the
court the greatest latitude in considering all available
information in imposing the appropriate sentence and
sentence alternative.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (1997), Sentencing Comm’n Comments.
The trial judge in this instance, did not give a specific evidentiary
reason for excluding the four affidavits nor did he mention relevance or probative
value. However, we do not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
Evidence must be probative and trustworthy to be admitted in a
sentencing hearing. State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 334 (Tenn. 1977); Jerry
31
Lynn Hopson v. State, No. 03C01-9308-CR-00249, slip. op at 4-5 (Tenn. Crim.
App., Knoxville, Sept. 27, 1994), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1995). The decision to
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences lies exclusively with the trial court.
Evidence presented in a sentencing hearing should provide the trial court with the
facts necessary to make a determination according to the legal requirements found
in the statutes. Even victim impact statements, which are permitted by Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-38-202, are defined as “a statement providing
information about the financial, emotional, and physical effects of the crime on the
victim and the victim’s family . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-203(2) (1997)
(emphasis added). The opinion of a juror on the subject of consecutive sentencing
is no more relevant than the opinion of anyone else. In this instance, the affidavits
expressed the opinions of individual jurors as to the propriety of consecutive
sentencing. Not surprisingly, the two obtained by the state were completely
opposite to those offered by the defense. The four mutually contradictory affidavits
would have been of no assistance to the finder of fact. They could not have made
the existence of any fact that was of consequence to the trial court’s determination
more probable or less probable. Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Simply put, the affidavits were
irrelevant. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding them at the
sentencing hearing.
VIII. Consecutive Sentencing
In his final issue, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in
ordering him to serve his two life sentences consecutively. The defendant, who was
28 when he was sentenced, will not be eligible for parole until he is over 75 years
old.21 In essence, the defendant argues that consecutive sentencing undermines
the jury’s decision to sentence him to life sentences with the possibility of parole.
He also argues that, because the trial court found that he had previously been a
dependable, honest, well-behaved citizen who maintained full employment and who
21
The trial court ordered that the two 22-year sentences for
especially aggravated kidnapping run concurrently to each other and to the life
sentences.
32
had, except for a single misdemeanor conviction, a clean criminal record, it was
error to impose consecutive sentences. The state, however, points to the
defendant’s history of extensive use of illegal drugs, the need for deterrence, and
the torture and brutality of the crimes as ample justification for consecutive
sentencing. We conclude that because the trial court affirmatively found that
consecutive sentencing was not required to protect society, State v. Wilkerson, 905
S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), as interpreted by the bulk of opinions from this court,
precludes the use of consecutive sentences.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that
six enhancement factors applied to the especially aggravated kidnapping
convictions: (1) the defendant has a previous history of criminal behavior; (2) the
defendant was a leader in the commission of the offense: (5) the defendant treated
or allowed the victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty; (6) the injuries inflicted
were particularly great; (10) the defendant had no hesitation about committing the
crime when the risk to human life was high; and (16) the crimes were convicted
under circumstances in which the potential for bodily injury to a victim was great.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (1), (2), (5), (6), (10), (16). As mitigating factors,
the trial court found that the defendant had acted under some provocation and that
there were some grounds that tended to excuse or justify his acts. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-113 (2), (3) (1997). However, the trial court found that the provocation
was comparatively weak and the grounds were insubstantial and so accorded these
factors little weight. As the defendant has not challenged the applicability of any
of these factors, and he does not complain about the kidnapping sentences
imposed by the trial court, we need not review either the factors or those sentences
in any detail.
In conjunction with the enhancement and mitigating factors, the trial
court also made the following factual findings:
1. The defendant had been a good family
man prior to being overtaken by drugs.
33
2. The defendant was a good steady worker
who had maintained regular employment
until four months prior to the commission
of the offenses.
3. The defendant had been a better than
average citizen.
4. The defendant showed genuine remorse
for his crimes.
5. The defendant has the ability to
rehabilitate himself.
The trial court also concluded that the defendant’s behavior leading
up to and during the commission of the crimes indicated little or no regard for
human life, that the defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when
the risk to human life is high, that the circumstances were aggravated, and that the
length of the aggregate sentences were reasonably related to the severity of the
offenses. Offsetting these findings, however, the court found that the defendant
was capable of rehabilitation and that, if he remained drug free, society would not
need further protection from criminal behavior on the part of the defendant.
With respect to the consecutive sentencing criteria, the trial court
found that the defendant, despite his four-month immersion in buying and selling
drugs, was not a professional criminal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(1).
The trial court also concluded that the defendant was not a dangerous offender.
However, relying upon the defendant’s extensive and admitted record of drug use,
the trial judge believed that the facts of the case required consecutive life
sentences. He concluded:
As I found above, the Defendant’s record of
criminal activity is extensive. In addition, he committed
two aggravated first degree murders which were
heinous, atrocious and cruel. Were I to sentence
concurrently, it would be the equivalent of sending a
message to the Defendant and to DeKalb County that
you get one murder free.
When an accused challenges the length, range, or manner of service
of a sentence, it is the duty of this court to conduct a de novo review with a
34
presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-401(d)(1990). This presumption is "conditioned upon the affirmative
showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and
all relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn.
1991). In conducting our review, we must consider all the evidence, the
presentence report, the sentencing principles, the enhancing and mitigating factors,
counsels’ arguments, the appellant’s statements, the nature and character of the
offense, and the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-
103(5), -210(b) (1990); State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169. The defendant has the
burden of demonstrating that the sentence is improper. Id. In the event the record
fails to demonstrate the appropriate consideration by the trial court, appellate review
of the sentence is purely de novo. Id. If our review reflects that the trial court
properly considered all relevant factors and the record adequately supports its
findings of fact, this court must affirm the sentence even if we would have preferred
a different result. State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
In this instance, the trial court appropriately referred to the sentencing
principles and painstakingly made the appropriate factual findings. Therefore, we
defer to the trial court’s factual findings and presume these findings to be correct.
However, given the trial court’s factual findings, we find that the trial court erred in
applying the law to those findings and in imposing consecutive sentences in this
instance.
Consecutive sentencing may be imposed in the discretion of the trial
court upon a determination that one or more of the criteria listed in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35-115(b) exist.22 Consecutive sentences, however, should
22
Those criteria are: (1) The defendant is a professional criminal
who has knowingly devoted himself to criminal acts as a major source of
livelihood; (2) The defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is
extensive; (3) The defendant is a dangerous mentally abnormal person so
declared by a competent psychiatrist who concludes as a result of an
investigation prior to sentencing that the defendant’s criminal conduct has been
characterized by a pattern of repetitive or compulsive behavior with heedless
35
not be routinely imposed even for the offender whose record of criminal activity is
extensive. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115, Sentencing Comm’n Comments; State
v. Taylor, 739 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); State v. David L. Mayes,
No. 03C01-9610-CR- 00365 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 9, 1997); State v.
Roscoe C. Smith, No. 01C01-9502-CR-00031, slip op. at 10 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Nashville, Oct. 12, 1995). Moreover, the consecutive sentencing factors “cannot be
read in isolation from other provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989.”
Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d at 937.
In State v. Wilkerson, our supreme court promulgated two additional
requirements for consecutive sentencing: (1) the court must find that consecutive
sentences are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses committed and (2)
are necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct. 905 S.W.2d at
937-38. We recognize that in Wilkerson, the supreme court was considering the
“dangerous offender” criterion, and that it is not cogently clear that Wilkerson
applies to those cases involving one of the other six criteria. See State v. David
Keith Lane, No. 03C01-9607-CC-00259, slip op. at 11-13 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Knoxville, June 18, 1997), perm. app. granted (Tenn. 1998).
The principles of sentencing, however, include the notion that any
punishment imposed should be necessary in order to protect the public from a
defendant with a lengthy history of criminal conduct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
102(1); State v. David L. Mayes, No. 03C01-9610-CR-00365, slip op. at 8 (Tenn.
indifference to consequences; (4) The defendant is a dangerous
offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no
hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high; (5)
The defendant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory offenses involving sexual
abuse of a minor with consideration of the aggravating circumstances arising
from the relationship between the defendant and victim or victims, the time span
of defendant’s undetected sexual activity, the nature and scope of the sexual
acts and the extent of the residual, physical and mental damage to the victim or
victims; (6) The defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while on
probation; or (7)The defendant is sentenced for criminal contempt. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-115(b) (1997).
36
Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 9, 1997) As noted in Lane, one of the principles of the
Act is to assure that defendants be punished “by the imposition of a sentence justly
deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
102(1)(1997), and that “the sentence imposed should be no greater than that
deserved for the offense committed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(2) (1997);
State v. David Keith Lane, slip op. at 13. Moreover, the ultimate purpose of
consecutive sentencing is to protect the public. State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d at
935; Gray v. State, 538 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Roscoe C. Smith,
No. 01C01-9502-CR-00031, slip op. at 10 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 12,
1995).
Since Wilkerson, the weight of precedent in this court favors the use
of the two additional requirements in all consecutive sentencing cases.23 We
23
See e.g., Walter Powers v. State, 942 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1996) (extensive record of criminal behavior); State v. Jernigan, 929
S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (sexual abuse of a minor); State v. Kenneth
W. Jackson, No. 02C01-9704-CR-00159 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, May 5,
1998) (extensive record of criminal behavior); State v. Samuel Myron Carter, Jr.,
No. 01C01-9705-CR-00173 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Apr. 7, 1998) (record
of extensive criminal behavior); State v. Larry Blair, (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville,
Apr. 7, 1998) (record of extensive criminal behavior); State v. Zachary L.
Barnes, No. 01C01-9704-CC-00138 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Mar. 5, 1998)
(extensive record of criminal behavior and offense committed while on
probation); State v. Anthony Jason Merlo, No. 01C01-9611-CC-00471 (Tenn.
Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 23, 1998) (extensive record of criminal behavior and
offense committed while on probation); State v. Noah Gene Noble, No. 02C01-
9701-CC-00060 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Jan. 30, 1998) (extensive record of
criminal behavior); State v. Percy Brown, No. 01C01-9701-CR-00015 (Tenn.
Crim. App., Nashville, Nov. 5, 1997) (sexual abuse of a minor); State v. Carl E.
Campen, No. 01C01-9512-CC-00433 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 24,
1997) (extensive record of criminal behavior); State v. David M. Cantrell, No.
01C01-9604-CC-00136 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 24, 1997) (extensive
record of criminal behavior); State v. Phyliss Ann McBride, No. 01C01-9606-CC-
00269 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 24., 1997) (extensive record of criminal
behavior and offense committed while on probation); State v. Stanley Lawson,
No. 01C01-9607-CR-00320 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 24, 1997) (sexual
abuse of a minor); State v. Bobby Teaster, No. 03C01-9611-CC-00405 (Tenn.
Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 26, 1997) (extensive record of criminal behavior);
State v. Charles W. Sanderson, No. 01C01-9608-00384 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Nashville, Sept. 9, 1997) (extensive record of criminal behavior); State v. David
L. Mayes, No. 03C01-9610-CR-00365 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 9,
1997) (extensive record of criminal behavior); State v. Charles Henry George,
No. 01C01-9512-CC-00407 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Mar. 13, 1997)
(extensive record of criminal behavior); State v. Gary W. Witherspoon, No.
01C01-9511-CC-00381 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 17, 1996) (extensive
record of criminal behavior); State v. Roscoe C. Smith, No. 01C01-9502-CR-
37
recognize that our supreme court has granted permission to appeal in Lane, and
ultimately this issue will be resolved by that court. However, in the meantime we are
bound by this court’s precedents. Therefore, consecutive life sentences may be
imposed in this case only if the extended sentences reasonably relate to the
severity of the offenses and an extended sentence in this case is required to protect
the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant.
The trial court made extensive findings of fact. First the court
concluded that four months of immersion in drug-related activity did not qualify the
defendant as a professional criminal and that the defendant was not a dangerous
offender. 24 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(1),(4) (1997). Based on the
defendant’s daily use of illegal drugs for more than a year, the court found that the
defendant had a extensive record of criminal behavior. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
35-115(b)(2) (1997). It found that the circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crimes were aggravated and that the murders were especially brutal and cruel
and that two consecutive life sentences were reasonably related to the severity of
00031 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 12 , 1995) (professional criminal and
extensive record of criminal behavior); State v. Jeffery Dion Webb, No. 01C01-
9409-CC-00327 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 4, 1995) (professional
criminal). Other consecutive sentencing cases do not refer to the “additional”
Wilkerson requirements, e.g., State v. David L. McClure, No. 01C01-9505-CR-
00145 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Apr. 30, 1997) (sexual abuse of a minor) or
have held that Wilkerson held that consecutive sentencing as a dangerous
offender requires the application of the two requirements. State v. James Ray
Bartlett, No. 01C01-9509-CC-00302, slip op. at 16 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville,
Apr. 7, 1998).
24
The record isn’t entirely clear as to the court’s reasons for declining
to find the defendant a dangerous offender. The court found that the defendant
had shown little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a
crime when the risk to human life was high. However, these findings appear to
pertain more to the kidnapping convictions than to the convictions for felony
murder. Obviously these two factors would exist in any felony murder case.
On the other hand, had the trial court found the defendant a dangerous
offender, we observe that the record may well have supported the finding. The
two homicides occurred not as two parts of one incident, but as two discrete acts
that were separated by a time for reflection and conference with the defendant’s
friends. Different means of killing helpless victims were employed.
However, finding the defendant a dangerous offender only brings the case
squarely within the rule of Wilkerson, and consecutive sentencing would not be
authorized where the court finds that the longer incarceration is not necessary to
protect the public.
38
the offenses. The record overwhelmingly supports these findings.
However, the trial judge found that the defendant, prior to becoming
addicted to drugs, had been a “better than average” citizen. He described the
defendant as a “good family man” and “a hard, steady worker” until he was
overtaken by drugs. The trial judge found that the defendant’s remorse for his
crimes was genuine, and that the defendant was capable of rehabilitation. The
defendant has remained close to his parents and sister throughout, and their
support for him has been unwavering. At the sentencing hearing, close friends also
testified to their affection for the defendant and expressed a belief in his ability to
redeem his life. An affidavit from the sheriff of Putnam Co. indicated that the
defendant had been cooperative and had posed no problems during his nearly two
years of incarceration in the county jail. The defendant, who said he had been
completely drug-free since his arrest despite the availability of drugs in jail, testified
to his intent to continue his college education while he was serving his time. The
trial judge was able to observe the defendant and the other witnesses, and he
clearly accredited the defendant’s testimony. Of critical significance to this court’s
review, the trial court found that the defendant was capable of rehabilitation and
that, as long as the defendant was drug free, extended sentences were not required
to protect the public.
The trial court, therefore, did not clearly determine whether extended
sentences were required to protect the public from further criminal acts by this
defendant. The trial court’s finding is conditional and hedges the outcome on the
defendant’s future, unforeseeable success in avoiding drugs. This conditional
finding averts the mandate of Wilkerson.
We note that previously this court, “under our power of de novo
review,” has itself made fact findings in support of the application of the Wilkerson
requirements, see State v. Ricky Dean Cole, No. 03C01-9604-CC-00171, slip op.
39
at 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, July 29, 1997), but such a de novo finding was
made in the absence of findings on the issue by the trial court. In the present case,
the trial court made many material findings based upon extensive live testimony,
including the testimony of the defendant. Although the proportionality of the length
of the sentence to the severity of the offense is obviously appropriate for de novo
appellate review, the second Wilkerson requirement, which involves the question
of the defendant’s amenability to rehabilitation, is more fact-driven. We are
generally in no position to second-guess a trial judge who heard testimony from
witnesses, which in this case included the defendant. In such a situation, we must
defer to the trial court to clarify the conditional finding it made relative to the need
for a lengthy sentences to protect the public.
Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
sentencing and remand the case in order for the trial court to make appropriate
findings under Wilkerson and to determine whether the defendant’s two life
sentences shall be served concurrently with or consecutively to each other.
Conclusion
Our review of the record and the law has disclosed no error requiring
reversal of the defendant’s convictions, and we affirm his convictions. The
imposition of consecutive sentences, however, is vacated. We remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to this opinion.
__________________________
CURWOOD W ITT, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
______________________________
40
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
41