State v. Christopher Eacholes ( 1999 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON            FILED
    JANUARY 1999 SESSION        January 29, 1999
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,            )
    )    NO. 02C01-9803-CR-00065
    Appellee,                )
    )    SHELBY COUNTY
    VS.                            )
    )    HON. BERNIE WEINMAN,
    CHRISTOPHER J. EACHOLES,       )    JUDGE
    )
    Appellant.               )    (Second Degree Murder)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                  FOR THE APPELLEE:
    ROBERT C. BROOKS                    PAUL G. SUMMERS
    707 Adams Avenue                    Attorney General and Reporter
    P.O. Box 771558
    Memphis, TN 38105                   CLINTON J. MORGAN
    Assistant Attorney General
    Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
    District Attorney General
    C. ALANDA HORNE
    KEVIN R. RARDIN
    Asst. District Attorneys General
    201 Poplar Ave, Suite 301
    Memphis, TN 38103-1947
    OPINION FILED:
    AFFIRMED
    JOE G. RILEY,
    JUDGE
    OPINION
    The defendant, Christopher J. Eacholes, appeals as of right his conviction
    for second degree murder by a Shelby County jury. He received a sentence of
    twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. On appeal he contests the
    sufficiency of the evidence and whether the trial court erred in failing to apply
    certain mitigating factors in sentencing. Finding no error below, the judgment of
    the trial court is AFFIRMED.
    FACTS
    The defendant resided in Memphis with Sharon Nunnally and her sister,
    Melissa Stewart. Shortly after the defendant moved in with the sisters, he and
    Stewart began a romantic relationship. That relationship ended sometime
    around the first part of September 1996. Stewart and the victim, Montsho
    Jimerson, also had a previous relationship. Stewart resumed her relationship
    with the victim in early October 1996.
    Stewart and the victim were watching television in Nunnally's residence on
    the evening of October 17, 1996. The defendant returned to the residence and
    entered through a side door. Stewart proceeded to the bedroom to speak with
    the defendant. The defendant then walked into the living room, drew a small
    pistol, and shot the victim four (4) times from the side as he watched television.
    The victim subsequently died from these wounds.
    Stewart testified that the defendant had previously argued with the victim
    about the victim’s presence in the residence. Apparently, the defendant was
    unhappy that Stewart continued to have contact with her ex-boyfriend. At one
    point the defendant told the victim if he continued to visit the residence, his
    mother would "be wearing a black dress."
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    The defendant testified that he, in fact, did not approve of the victim's
    presence at the residence. Defendant testified that the victim previously
    threatened him and appeared to be reaching for a gun when he shot him. No
    weapon was found on the victim.
    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    The defendant contends the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to
    support his conviction for second degree murder.
    In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court does not reweigh
    or reevaluate the evidence. State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn.
    1978). A jury verdict approved by the trial judge accredits the state's witnesses
    and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. State v. Bigbee, 
    885 S.W.2d 797
    ,
    803 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Harris, 
    839 S.W.2d 54
    , 75 (Tenn. 1992). On appeal,
    the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
    legitimate or reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. 
    Id. This Court will
    not disturb a verdict of guilt due to the sufficiency of the evidence
    unless the defendant demonstrates that the facts contained in the record and the
    inferences which may be drawn therefrom are insufficient, as a matter of law, for
    a rational trier of fact to find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
    State v. Brewer, 
    932 S.W.2d 1
    , 19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Accordingly, it is
    the appellate court's duty to affirm the conviction if the evidence, viewed under
    these standards, was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the
    essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P.
    13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 317, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789, 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
    (1979); State v. Cazes, 
    875 S.W.2d 253
    , 259 (Tenn. 1994).
    The state’s proof revealed that defendant knowingly shot and killed the
    victim. Although the defendant contended the shooting was in self-defense, the
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    jury rejected this and found him guilty of a “knowing killing of another.” Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). Self-defense is a jury question. State v. Ivy, 
    868 S.W.2d 724
    , 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). The jury was within its prerogative in
    rejecting self-defense.
    This issue is without merit.
    SENTENCING
    The defendant’s second issue addresses the trial court’s failure to apply
    any mitigating factors. This Court’s review of the sentence imposed by the trial
    court is de novo with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
    401(d). This presumption is conditioned upon an affirmative showing in the
    record that the trial judge considered the sentencing principles and all relevant
    facts and circumstances. State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 169 (Tenn. 1991). If
    the trial court fails to comply with the statutory directives, there is no presumption
    of correctness and our review is de novo. State v. Poole, 
    945 S.W.2d 93
    , 96
    (Tenn. 1997).
    The defendant received a twenty-one (21) year sentence. The
    presumptive sentence for the Class A felony of second degree murder is the
    midpoint within the range; namely, twenty (20) years. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
    40-35-210(c). The trial court considered statutory enhancing factors and found
    that the offense was committed with a firearm. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
    114(9). Based upon this factor, the trial court enhanced defendant’s sentence
    one (1) year. The trial court noted the mitigating factors submitted by defendant:
    (1) defendant acted under strong provocation, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(2);
    and (2) defendant was a first-time offender, had a high school education, had a
    good work record, came from a good family, and was deeply remorseful, Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13). The trial court rejected these factors. The
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    sentence of twenty-one (21) years, one year above the presumptive sentence,
    was well within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, the sentence was proper.
    This issue is without merit.
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
    _________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
    ______________________________
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
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