State v. Clarence Washington ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JANUARY 1998 SESSION
FILED
January 30, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
CLARENCE WASHINGTON, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
) NO. 02C01-9703-CC-00097
Appellant, )
) LAUDERDALE COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JOSEPH H. WALKER,
JIMMY HARRISON, WARDEN, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Writ of Habeas Corpus)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
CLARENCE WASHINGTON, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Number 97682 Attorney General and Reporter
Cold Creek Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 1000 KENNETH W. RUCKER
Henning, TN 38041-1000 Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
ELIZABETH T. RICE
District Attorney General
302 Market Street
Somerville, TN 38068
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, Clarence Washington, appeals as of right from an order
entered in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
I.
The appellant was convicted in February 1983 of two (2) counts of
robbery with a deadly weapon, which were Class X felonies at that time. Jury
sentencing was still in effect, and he was sentenced by the jury to two (2) ten-
year sentences. The appellant was then found to be an habitual criminal, and
his sentences were enhanced to two (2) concurrent life sentences. The
appellant asserts that having his sentences enhanced as an habitual offender
after being convicted for Class X felonies violates double jeopardy principles. He
claims the enhanced sentences are void; therefore, he should be released based
on the original sentences.
II.
It is a settled principle that an appellant is only entitled to habeas corpus
relief if “it appears on the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings
upon which the judgment is rendered, that a convicting court was without
jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence
of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d
157, 164 (Tenn. 1993).
The appellant does not allege, nor does it appear that his judgment is void
on its face. Nor does it appear that his sentences have expired. Therefore, he is
not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
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III.
Habitual criminal statutes do not prescribe an additional sentence for one
already convicted, or punish offenders for crimes where sentences have been
served. A finding of guilt and the jury’s setting of sentence for the triggering
offense prior to the jury’s habitual criminal designation does not violate double
jeopardy principles. State v. Archie, 639 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1982). Rather, the statutes recognized prior criminal convictions and used them
as a means to enhance the present sentence for the triggering offense. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-801 et. seq. (1982).
“Since habitual criminality is a status or a vehicle for the enhancement of
punishment, incidental to and dependent on the most recent conviction, as
opposed to an independent crime, jeopardy does not attach.” Pearson v. State,
521 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tenn. 1975). Thus, the procedure for the habitual
criminal designation and setting of punishment does not violate double jeopardy.
IV.
The appellant contends he is entitled to relief under double jeopardy
principles that prohibit multiple punishments for a single offense. He claims that
by being convicted of a Class X felony, he originally received an enhanced
punishment for his crimes. He argues the habitual criminal enhancement he
received was a second, distinct punishment for the same crimes.
The appellant mischaracterizes the sentence enhancement he received
by virtue of his habitual criminal designation. He received one punishment for
each of the crimes as discussed above, albeit a much more severe punishment
based upon his designation as an habitual criminal.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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__________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
______________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
______________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
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