State v. Tracy Poarch ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
JULY 1998 SESSION
September 15, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9709-CC-00406
Appellee, )
) Bedford County
V. )
) Honorable Charles Lee, Judge
TRACY LEE POARCH, )
) (Driving Under the Influence and
Appellant. ) Driving as a Habitual Offender)
)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Andrew Jackson Dearing, III John Knox Walkup
Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter
117 South Main Street, Suite 101
Shelbyville, TN 37160 Janis L. Turner
Counsel for the State
425 Fifth Avenue North
Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
W. Michael McCown
District Attorney General
Robert Crigler
Assistant District Attorney General
One Public Square, Suite 100
Shelbyville, TN 37160
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMMERS,
Judge
OPINION
In December 1996, Tracy Lee Poarch was indicted for operating a motor
vehicle after having been declared a habitual offender in violation of Tennessee
Code Annotated § 55-10-616 (1993); driving under the influence of an intoxicant
(DUI), third offense in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-401
(Supp. 1996); and criminal impersonation in violation of Tennessee Code
Annotated § 39-16-301 (1990). The appellant entered a plea of guilty to the
criminal impersonation charge, and after a jury trial, he was convicted on the two
remaining charges. The appellant was ordered to serve a sentence of two years
in the Tennessee Department of Correction for violation of the habitual offender
status, nine months in the county jail for the driving under the influence of an
intoxicant conviction, and six months in the county jail for the criminal
impersonation conviction, to run concurrently.
The appellant’s issues are whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his
conviction for driving under the influence and driving after having been declared
a habitual offender. The arguments are related and were combined into one.
We affirm.
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on March 15, 1996, Officer Homer Davis of the
Bedford County Sheriff’s Department received a radio call about a one-vehicle
accident on Highway 130 in the Pleasant Grove community. He and Detective
Robert Filer drove to the scene to investigate. Once on the scene, Officer Davis
saw a car off the road and partially in a ditch. The rear wheels were spinning,
and the car was “in drive.” Also, the headlights were on, and the windshield
wipers were running.
Detective Filer knocked on the driver’s side window and attempted to
awaken the person slumped over the steering wheel. At trial, Filer identified
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that person as the appellant. Filer opened the driver’s side door, put the vehicle
in park, turned the ignition off, and removed the appellant from the vehicle.
Officer Davis and Detective Filer testified that the appellant appeared to
be very intoxicated. He could barely stand and could not perform any of the field
sobriety tests. Detective Filer then arrested the appellant and observed that
appellant for twenty minutes before administering the breathalyzer.
Approximately twenty-eight minutes later, he administered the breathalyzer, and
the results indicated that the appellant had a blood alcohol content of .21.
After he was arrested, the appellant stated to Detective Filer that he was
“driving around after work having a few.” When asked for his driver’s license, the
appellant responded that he did not have it with him. He identified himself as
“Thomas Ray Poarch” who was born in 1972, but Detective Filer later
determined that “Thomas Ray Poarch” was in fact the appellant’s brother.
Officer Davis testified that only the appellant was in the vehicle. Officer
Davis stated that he had not seen anyone walking toward the convenience
market from the Pleasant Grove area where the vehicle was found as he and
Detective Filer were traveling to the accident scene. Also, Officer Davis testified
that he was at the scene approximately sixty minutes and did not see anyone
arrive at the scene looking for the appellant.
Todd Poarch, the appellant’s brother, testified that he was driving the
vehicle that night, not the appellant. He stated that he was driving to his sister’s
residence when he ran the vehicle off the road. He also stated that he had
attempted to get the appellant to help him, but the appellant, who had been
passed out, refused. Todd Poarch testified that he walked several miles to a
convenience market to call his mother. He then waited there for her so she
could take him and his brother home. However, according to Todd Poarch, the
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appellant and the car were gone when he and his mother arrived at the accident
scene at daybreak.
The appellant’s mother, Bessie Poarch, testified that she received a call
from her son Todd in the early morning hours on March 15, 1996. She testified
that she drove from her home in Cornersville to the Pantry convenience market
in Shelbyville to pick up Todd. They then drove to the accident scene and
arrived there around daybreak. However, the appellant and the car were no
longer there.
The appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support the
jury verdict. In his brief, the appellant insists that ‘[t]he evidence against the
[appellant] failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [appellant] was
operating the motor vehicle.” However, he provides no specific proof in support
of his argument.
The state asserts that the evidence is sufficient to support the appellant’s
conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. It contends that it
“proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was driving or had
physical control of the vehicle on a public road and that the [appellant] was under
the influence of an intoxicant.” In support of its argument, the state notes that
upon the arrival of Officer Davis and Detective Filer, the car was still in drive and
was still running. Furthermore, the tires were spinning, the headlights were on,
and the windshield wipers were running. In addition, the appellant was found by
the officers in the driver’s seat and slumped over the steering wheel.
The state further argues that both officers determined that the appellant
was very intoxicated. He was unable to perform any field sobriety tests, but the
breathalyzer that was administered thirty minutes later indicated the appellant’s
blood alcohol content was .21. The appellant admitted that he had been “driving
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around after work having a few.” Also, no other individuals were seen in the
vicinity of the appellant’s vehicle.
Great weight is accorded jury verdicts in criminal trials. Jury verdicts
accredit the state’s witnesses and resolve all evidentiary conflicts in the state’s
favor. State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Banes, 874
S.W.2d 73, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). On appeal, the state is entitled to both
the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which
may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1978).
Moreover, guilty verdicts remove the presumption of innocence, enjoyed by
defendants at trial, and replace it with a presumption of guilt. State v. Grace,
493 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1973). Appellants, therefore, carry the burden of
overcoming a presumption of guilt when appealing jury convictions. Id.
When appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979);
Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1985). The
weight and credibility of witness testimony are matters entrusted exclusively to
the jury as the triers of fact. State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. 1984);
Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-401 (Supp. 1996) states that it is
unlawful for any person to drive or to be in control of any automobile or other
motor vehicle on any public roads and highways while under the influence of an
intoxicant. From our review of the record, the appellant, who had a blood alcohol
level of .21, was found by two officers in the driver’s seat and slumped over the
steering wheel of a car that was still in drive. The tires were spinning, the
headlights were on, and the windshield wipers were running. The appellant
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admitted that he had been “driving around after work having a few,” and no other
individuals were seen in the vicinity of the accident scene or on the road toward
the convenience market. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a trier of fact
could have found the appellant guilty of driving under the influence of an
intoxicant beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is sufficient.
No dispute exists that the appellant had been declared a habitual motor
vehicle offender. Since we have found the evidence sufficient as to DUI, we find
the evidence equally sufficient as to the other charge.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
_______________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
CONCUR:
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_____________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
_____________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
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