State v. Ronald Parker ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
AUGUST SES SION, 1998
FILED
RONALD PARKER, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9711-CC-00459
) September 14, 1998
Appe llant, )
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appe llate Court C lerk
) LAKE COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. R. LEE MOORE, JR.
FRED RANEY, WARDEN ) JUDGE
and )
STATE OF TENNESSEE )
)
Appellee. ) (Habeas Corpus)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF LAKE COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
RONALD L. PARKER JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Pro Se Attorney General and Reporter
Route 1, Box 660
Tiptonville, TN 38079 MARVIN E. CLEMENTS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
425 5th Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
C. PHILLIP BIVENS
District Attorney General
P.O. Draw er E
Dyersburg, TN 38024
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defendant, Ronald L. Parker, appeals as of right from the dismissal
of his petitio n for ha beas corpu s relief. T he De fenda nt is an inma te in the
custody of the Department of Correction. According to his petition and the
exhibits attached thereto, on May 1, 1995, he pleaded guilty to and was convicted
of three counts of burglary. For these convictions, he was sentenced to three
concurrent eight-yea r terms in th e Dep artment of Correction. His petition for
habeas corpus relief alleged that his convictions a nd sentenc es are void because
the sentences were not ordered to be served consecutively to a prior sentence
as required by law. T he trial court summarily dismissed the habeas corpus
petition, finding that the judgments of conviction were not void and that the
Defe ndan t’s sentences had not exp ired. We affirm the judgment of the trial cou rt.
Habeas corpu s relief is availa ble on ly whe n a co nvicting court is without
jurisdiction or autho rity to sente nce a d efenda nt or whe n that defendant’s term
of imprisonment or restraint has expired. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164
(Tenn. 199 3).
On appeal, the Defendant argues that at the time he was sentenced for the
three burglaries, he was on parole from a prior Tennessee sentence of twenty-
eight years. He there fore argues tha t his eight-year sen tences for burg lary
constitute illegal sentences because they were not ordered to be served
conse cutively to h is twenty -eight yea r senten ce as req uired by la w. See Tenn.
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Code Ann. § 40-28-123. The Defendant relies upon decisions of this Court and
of our su preme court wh ich hold th at beca use the law requ ires the trial co urt to
impose a consecutive sentence on any defendant convicted of a felony
committed while o n paro le from a state prison , jail, or wo rk hou se, a tria l court is
without jurisdiction or authority to enter a judgm ent against a d efendant for a
concurrent senten ce. See Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 163; Hen derso n v. Sta te ex re l.
Lance, 419 S.W .2d 176 (Tenn. 1 967); Taylor v. Morgan, 909 S.W.2d 17, 20
(Tenn. Crim . App. 1995 ).
We conclud e that the D efenda nt’s argum ents lack merit. Initially, we note
that the judgmen ts sentencing th e Defend ant to eight-year term s for burglary
provide that the burglary sentences shall be se rved co ncurren t with each other
and concurrent with a sentence from the state of Texas. The judgments make
no reference to any prior Tennessee sentences. The record on appeal contains
no evide nce c once rning a prior Te nnes see s enten ce oth er than the De fenda nt’s
unsupported allegations in his petition.
Secondly, we no te that a se ntence for a felony comm itted while th e
Defendant was on parole for another felony shall be deemed to run consecutive
to the prior sentence being served on parole whether the judgment explicitly so
provides or not. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A). Based on the allegations
contained in the Defendant’s petition and statements made in his argument, the
Board of Parole s and the Depa rtment of Correction became aware of the prior
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sentence and correctly treated the eight-year sentences as running consecutive
to the prior sentence.
Although the De fenda nt alleg es tha t his plea agreement provided that the
eight-year sente nces would run co ncurre nt with his prio r sente nce, th e judgments
do not so provide. A s we ha ve note d, the judg ments make no refere nce to any
prior unserved Tennessee sentence. Because the Defendant’s eight-year
sentences were not ordered to be served concurrently with a prior unserved
sentence, the eight-year sentences for burglary are not illegal and the judgment
of conviction is not void.
We conclude that the convicting cou rt had jurisd iction and authority to
sentence the Defendant, and it is clear that the Defendant’s term of imprisonment
under his eight-year sentences had not expired. For this reason, we conclude
that the trial jud ge did no t err in deny ing the D efenda nt habe as corp us relief.
The Defendant also alleges that his guilty pleas resulting in the burglary
convictions were not knowing and voluntary because his plea agreement
provided that his burglary sentences would run concurrent with his prior
sentences. Even if these allegations were true, they would not provide the
Defendant a basis for habeas corpus relief. These allegations could provide
grounds for post-conviction relief, assuming consideration of the allegations is not
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
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The judgment of the trial court dismissing the Defendant’s petition for
habeas corpus relief is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOHN K. BYERS, SENIOR JUDGE
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