State v. Tyrone Meade ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JUNE SESSION, 1998 FILED
September 11, 1998
TYRONE G. MEADE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9708-CR-00316
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appe llant, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JAMES C. BEASLEY, JR.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post Conviction)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
RANDALL B. TOLLEY JOHN KNOX WALKUP
242 Poplar Avenue Attorney General and Reporter
Memphis, TN 38103
DOUGLAS D. HIMES
Assistant Attorney General
425 5th Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
WILLIAM GIBBONS
District Attorney General
JOHN CAMPB ELL
Assistant District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301
201 Poplar Street
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defendant ap peals the trial court’s de nial of his pe tition for post-
conviction relief. He was convicted by a jury verdict of two counts of second
degree murder. He sought post-conviction relief asserting that he received
ineffective assistan ce of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied relief and we affirm.
The Defendant was co nvicted of tw o coun ts of second degree murder for
shooting and killing Charles Matthews and Lavester Jefferson in Memphis,
Tennessee. He originally received an effective sentence of forty years. He
appealed his convictions and his sentence and this court affirmed his convictions
but rem anded for resen tencing. State v. Meade, 942 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1996). The record indicates that upon resentencing he received two
concu rrent twen ty-year sen tences .
With the assis tance of c ounse l, the Defe ndant filed a petition for post-
conviction relief on March 18, 1997. The petition alleged that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to zea lously re prese nt the D efend ant, failin g to file pretrial
motions, failing to objec t to testim ony, failin g to investigate, failing to cross-
examine witnesses, failing to properly advise the Defendant concerning his right
to testify, failing to request a mental evaluation, failing to raise the issue of
dimin ished capa city and failing to adeq uately p repar e for trial.
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First, we will briefly discuss the underlying facts. The Defendant gave the
police a statement, which was introduced at his trial, in which he admitted that he
had shot and killed bo th victims. He said tha t the victims were “crazy” and “high”
on both a lcoho l and d rugs. T he m en we re insu lting bo th him and h is girlfriend
and he felt threatened by the way they were talking. He told them to leave but
they would not, so he shot the first victim. He subsequently got into an argument
with the second victim and shot him also. The autop sy report indicated that both
victims died of multiple gunshot wounds with at least one wound to the back of
each victim’s head at close range. Both victims tested positive for cocaine and
alcoh ol. 1 At the post-convictio n hea ring, the Defe ndan t testified and a gain
admitted that he had k illed bo th victim s. He s aid that he killed one of the victims
in self defense because he was “threatened or provoked” and that the victim had
a gun. H e said that the other v ictim a lso thre atene d him , but he didn’t know if
that victim had a gun or not. He further stated that he had “over-reacted” when
he shot the s econd victim and that his ove rreaction may have been due to the
fact that he had consumed alcohol that evening.
In this appeal, the Defendant argues that his trial cou nsel was ineffec tive
because (1) he filed no pre trial mo tions to test the streng th of the State’s case,
(2) he failed to file a motion to suppress the statements Defendant had give n to
police, (3) he filed no motions for discove ry, (4) he filed n o motio n in limine to
inquire as to whether a prior manslaughter conviction could be used against the
Defendant if he testified, (5) he performed an inadequate investigation of the
facts, (6) he fa iled to in vestiga te or rais e the is sue o f dimin ished capacity or
1
For a detailed summary of the facts developed at trial, see State v. Meade, 942 S.W.2d
561, 563-564 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
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request a pretrial mental eva luation, (7) he ma de unpro fessional e rrors in
judgment, (8) he gave improp er advice conce rning the decision not to offer any
defense proof, including proof of self defense, (9) he misrepresented to the
Defendant that he would prevail at trial, and (10) he exhibited an overall lack of
effort an d zea l.
Trial couns el testified at g reat leng th concerning the various allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. He testified that he filed no pretrial motions
because he though t none were necessary in view of his theory of self defense.
He said he saw no grounds on which to file a m otion to supp ress th e Def enda nt’s
statem ent. He stated that he filed no discovery motions because the district
attorne y’s office gave him free and o pen a cces s to the ir entire file . Trial co unse l’s
testimony was un clear con cerning his failure to file a motion to test the
admissibility of the De fenda nt’s prior manslaughter conviction as contemplated
by Rule 609(a)(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. It is clear, however, that
at trial the judge ruled that the Defe ndan t’s testim ony co uld not be impeached by
reference to this prior conviction and that the Defendant nevertheless decided not
to testify.
Trial counsel testified that he adeq uately investig ated th is case and th at his
investigator contacted eleven of the eighteen witnesses whose names were given
him by the Defendant. He obtained statements from these witnesses and
statem ents from other witnesses who testified for the State. Trial counsel further
testified that he saw no indications that the Defendant suffered from any mental
defects or that “diminished capacity” was a legitimate issue in this case. Counsel
testified that in his view, the only defense to the second degree murder charges
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was self defense or provocation, and he believed he raised these issues fully by
cross examination of witnesses and through the statements which the Defendant
had made to the police. Trial counsel further testified that he advised the
Defendant fully concerning the decision whether to testify at trial. He stated that
the Defenda nt decided he did not desire to testify. Trial counsel generally denied
the remaining factual allegations presented in the post-conviction petition as
alleged by the Defendant during his testimony at the post-conviction proceeding.
Other than the De fendant and his trial counsel, the primary additional
witness at the post-conviction hearing was a clinical psychologist who testified
gene rally that the Defendant’s history of alcohol abu se could po ssibly have
affected his mental capacity and decision-making process at the time of the
killings.
Subsequent to the e videntia ry hea ring, the post-c onvictio n court filed a
written order denying post-conviction relief. The court found that many of
coun sel’s decisions and the actions complained of by the Defendant fell clear ly
in the category of trial strategy and trial tactics, and the court found no
shortcomings in counsel’s actions. Concerning the lack of pretrial motions and
discovery, the post-conviction court accredited counsel’s decision not to pursue
said motions in view of the open acce ss cou nsel w as give n to the State’s file and
his judgmen t that further motions were unnecessary. The court further found that
trial counsel had thoroughly investigated the case prior to proceeding to trial. The
post-conviction court concluded that defense c ounsel had provided effective
representation to the Defendant and had represented the Defendant to the best
of his ability. The court further concluded that defense counsel had the
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experience and ab ility to evaluate and properly prepare a criminal case for trial
and h ad do ne so in the case at bar. The court accordingly determined that the
Defendant had not established his c laim of ineffective assistance of counsel and
therefore was no t entitled to po st-convictio n relief.
In determining whether counsel provided effective assistance at trial, the
court must decide whether counsel’s performance was within the range of
competence dema nded o f attorneys in crimina l cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523
S.W.2d 930, 93 6 (Ten n. 1975). To succeed on a claim that his counsel was
ineffective at trial, a petitioner bears the burden of showing that his counsel made
errors so serious that he was not functioning as counsel as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment and that the deficient representation prejudiced the petitioner
resulting in a failure to produ ce a reliab le result. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (19 84); Cooper v. State, 849 S.W .2d 744 , 747 (T enn. 19 93); Butler
v. State, 789 S.W .2d 898 , 899 (T enn. 19 90). To satisfy the second prong, the
petitioner must sh ow a rea sonab le proba bility that, but for counsel’s
unrea sona ble error, the fact finder would have had reasonable doubt regarding
petition er’s guilt. Strickland, 466 U .S. at 69 5. This reasonable probability must
be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outc ome.” Harris v. S tate, 875
S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 199 4).
When reviewing trial counsel’s ac tions, th is cour t shou ld not u se the bene fit
of hindsight to secon d-gues s trial strategy and criticize couns el’s tactics. Hellard
v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). Counsel’s alleged errors should be
judged at the time they were made in light of all facts and circumstances.
Strickland, 466 U.S . at 690; see Cooper, 849 S.W.2d at 746.
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In post-conviction relief proceedings, the petitioner has the burden of
proving the allegations of fact in his or her petition by clear and convincing
evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). The factual findings of the trial court
are conclusive on appeal unless the appellate court finds that the evidence
preponderates against the judgm ent. Butler, 789 S.W.2d at 899. In the case at
bar, the trial court found that defense counsel had adequately investigated the
case against the Defendant and had d iligently p repar ed for tr ial and zealo usly
represented this Defendant. The post-conviction court further determined that
other actions of trial counsel properly fell within the category of trial strategy and
tactics. The Judge further concluded that the De fenda nt had not es tablish ed his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We believe the record supports the
findings and conclusions of the post-conviction ju dge. F rom o ur revie w of this
record, even if we determined that trial counsel was ineffective in some way, we
do not believe that the Defendant has established prejudice. He has not
demonstrated a reasona ble probability, sufficient to unde rmine our co nfiden ce in
the outcome, that but for counse l’s error, the jury w ould h ave ha d a rea sona ble
doubt re garding the Defe ndant’s g uilt.
According ly, the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief
is affirmed.
___________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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CONCUR:
___________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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