Jackie Robinson v. State ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
AUGUST SESSION, 1998 September 10, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
JACK IE R. RO BINS ON, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9711-CR-00525
)
Appe llant, )
) DAVIDSON COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON . CHE RYL BLAC KBU RN,
MICHAEL DUTTON, Warden, ) JUDGE
and STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee. ) (HABEAS CORPUS)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
JACK IE R. RO BINS ON, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
RMSI Unit 6 Attorney General & Reporter
7475 Cockrill Bend
Industrial Road ELIZABETH B. MARNEY
Nashville, TN 37209-1010 Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petitioner, Jackie Robinson, appeals as of right the trial court’s dismissal
of his petition for writ of hab eas co rpus. W e affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court.
Petitioner filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus on March 13, 1995. Petitioner
claims that the Tennessee Board of Parole s violated h is rights to due process and
equal protection in violation of the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States C onstitution . Specifically, Petitioner claims that the B oard refu sed to
grant him due process during his most recent parole hearing by not giving him a
continuance and by not providing him with counsel. He states that the Boa rd’s
“actions and inactions” denied him his “rights of earned good-time credits and other
credits earned by the petitioner during his twe nty-on e (21) y ears o f incarc eration in
the TDO C.” He claim s that th e Boa rd’s ac tions fo rced h im to lose his trustee status
and affected his release eligibility date.
It is a well-established principle of law that the remedy of habeas corpus is
limited in its nature and its scope. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 161-62 (Tenn.
1993); Passa rella v. State , 891 S.W.2d 619, 626 (Tenn. Crim . App. 19 94). In
Tennessee, habeas corpus relief is available only if “‘it appears upon the face of the
judgment or the record of the proce eding s upo n whic h the ju dgm ent is rendered’ that
a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or
that a defenda nt’s sentence o f imprisonm ent or other restraint ha s expired.” Archer,
851 S.W .2d at 164 (citation omitted in original). The petitioner has the burden of
establishing either a void judgment or an illegal confinement by a preponderance of
the evide nce. Pass arella, 891 S .W .2d at 6 27. Mo reove r, wher e a jud gme nt is not
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void, but is m erely voidable, such judgment may not be co llaterally a ttacke d in a su it
for habe as corp us relief. Id.
The claims presented by Petitioner are not cognizable under the habeas
corpus statute. See Tenn . Code Ann. § 2 9-21-10 1 - 130. Petitioner does not allege
in his petition that he is being illegally confined or that the judgment in his case was
void. This Court has held that if it is clear from the face of the petition that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief, then the trial court is not required to hold a hearing
or inquire into the allegations in the petition, but may dismiss the petition summ arily.
Pass arella, 891 S.W.2d at 627. We agree with the trial cou rt’s dism issal of
Petitioner’s petition.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
___________________________________
L.T. LAFFERTY, Special Judge
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