Shelton v. State ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY SESS ION, 1998 March 24, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
CHARLES SHELTON, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9707-CR-00236
)
Appe llant, )
) GREENE COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON. JAMES E. BECKNER, JUDGE
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee. ) (POST-C ONVIC TION)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
CHAR LES S HEL TON , pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
#1170 31, N.E .C.C. Attorney General & Reporter
P.O. Box 5000
Mountain City, TN 37683-5000 ELLEN H. POLLACK
Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
C. BERKELEY BELL, JR.
District Attorn ey Ge neral
Greene County O ffice Comp lex
113-J West Church Street
Greeneville, TN 37745
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petitioner, Charles Shelton, appeals the order of the Greene Coun ty
Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-con viction relief. The trial court
found that the petition was filed outside the statute of limitations. In this appeal,
Petitioner raises numerous issues which can collectively be summarized as
challenging the trial court’s ruling that the petition for post-conviction relief is time-
barred. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of post-
conviction relief.
Petitioner pled guilty on June 19, 1987 to various sexual crimes and was
convicted of those crimes. Petitioner did not appeal any of the convic tions.
Petition er’s convictions are controlled by a three-year statute of limitations under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 4 0-30-102 (rep ealed 1995 ). He therefore
needed to file his petition by June 19, 1990 in order to toll the running of the statute.
Howeve r, Petition er did not file a petition for post-conviction relief until May 16, 1997,
thus ba rring any c laims he might ha ve had.
Furthermore, Petitioner’s petition is not revived by the new Post-Conviction
Procedu re Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et seq. The Tennessee
Supreme court recently held the following:
[The new Act] is not intended to revive claims that were barred by the
previous statute of limitations. We agree with the view that the statute
was intended to restrict the time and opportunity to seek post-conviction
relief. Clearly, this purpose is not served by a statutory construction
that allows additional time and opportunity for petitioners whose claims
are already barred by the prior statute of limitations.
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Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417, 420 (T enn. 1997 ). Therefore, “petitioners for whom
the statute of limitations expired prior to the effective date of the new Act, i.e., May
10, 1995, do not have an additional year in which to file petitions for post-conviction
relief.” Id. at 418. Ev en if arguendo the ne w Act d id gran t one a ddition al year in
which to file, P etitioner wa ited two ye ars befo re first filing his pe tition.
According ly, we co nclud e that th e trial co urt corr ectly found that the petition
was barred by the statute of limitations, and therefore, a summary dismissal of the
petition was app ropriate. Tenn . Code An n. § 40-30-20 6(b).
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, Judge
___________________________________
WILLIAM B. ACREE, JR., Special Judge
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