State v. James Carr ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JAMES CARR, )
FILED
) April 23, 1998
Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9802-CC-00037
) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
vs. ) LAKE COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. 98-7739
)
Respondent. )
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the
judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. In January 1984, the petitioner was indicted on one count of aggravated rape.
The petitioner was subsequently convicted of this charge and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. The petitioner has since filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the sufficiency of the indictment and the jury instruction on reasonable
doubt. The trial court denied relief.
On appeal, the petitioner argues that the indictment is invalid because it
failed to assert an essential element of the offense, i.e., the mental state, and that his
conviction, therefore, cannot stand. The petitioner also contends that the trial judge
provided the jury a defective instruction on reasonable doubt.
At the time of the offense in this case, aggravated rape was defined as
the unlawful sexual penetration of another accompanied by several enumerated
circumstances, including that force or coercion was used to accomplish the act and the
defendant was armed with a weapon. T.C.A. § 39-2-603 (1982). The indictment at
issue before us charged that the petitioner “did unlawfully, feloniously and forceably
[sic] sexually penetrate [the victim], at the time of the said sexual penetration he, the
said JAMES CARR was armed with a weapon, to-wit, a knife.”
This language was sufficient under the law as it existed at the time. The
statutory requirements for an indictment were found in § 40-13-202, which provided
simply that:
The indictment must state the facts constituting the offense in
ordinary and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such a
manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is
intended, and with that degree of certainty which will enable the court, on
conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment.
Furthermore, in Campbell v. State, 491 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tenn. 1973) (emphasis
supplied), while addressing the sufficiency of an indictment charging the offense of
murder, our Supreme Court stated the following:
While it seems clear that the indictment in Witt was insufficient in
that it failed to charge an element, that the murder was committed
unlawfully, in either the language of the statute or common law or words
of equivalent import, the decision is confusing because of the language,
‘fatally defective in omitting the charge that the offense was committed
feloniously, or with malice aforethought; and containing no words of
equivalent import.’ It is clear, however, that had the indictment used the
words ‘feloniously’ or ‘unlawfully’, it would have been sufficient.
We agree with this proposition. By containing the words found in the language of the
statute, the indictment at issue here sufficiently apprised the petitioner of the offense
charged under the law at the time, and is therefore valid. See Orren v. State, No.
03C01-9704-CR-00141 (Tenn. Crim. App., Feb. 13, 1998).
The petitioner also challenges the adequacy of the reasonable doubt jury
instruction. The petitioner, however, has failed to include a copy of the indictment in the
record. T.R.A.P. 24. Accordingly, the petitioner has waived the issue and this Court,
therefore, is precluded from conducting an adequate review on appeal. See State v.
Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1993). Regardless, this is not a proper ground for
habeas corpus relief. See Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) (habeas
corpus relief available only when convicting court was without jurisdiction to sentence
defendant or defendant's sentence has expired).
2
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, is hereby ORDERED that the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
Enter, this the ___ day of April, 1998.
___________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
___________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
___________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
3