State v. Pam Davis ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
FEBRUARY SESS ION, 1998 April 30, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TE NNE SSE E, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9704-CC-00139
)
Appellee, )
) McNAIRY COUNTY
V. )
)
) HON. JON KERRY BLACKWOOD,
PAM DAVIS, ) JUDGE
)
Appe llant. ) (WORTHLESS CHECKS)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GARY F. ANTRICAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
RICKEY W. GRIGGS GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER
Assistant Pu blic Defende r Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
JEANNIE KAESS 425 Fifth Avenue North
Assistant Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243
P.O. Box 700
Somerville, TN 38068 ELIZABETH T. RICE
District Attorn ey Ge neral
ED NEAL McDANIEL
Assistant District Attorney General
300 Industrial Drive
Selmer, TN 38375
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defe ndan t, Pam Davis , appeals as of right from the judgment of the
McNairy County Circuit Court. Defendant was convicted of issuing worthless checks
following a jury trial and was sentenced to eleven (11) month s, twenty-nine (29) d ays
in the McN airy Cou nty Jail with the sentence to be suspended upon payment of the
check amo unt with in thirty (3 0) day s. On a ppea l, Defe ndan t raises the follo wing
issues:
1) Whether there is sufficien t eviden ce to s uppo rt the D efend ant’s
conviction ;
2) Whether the trial judge abused its discretion by denying Defe ndan t’s
motion for a judgm ent of acq uittal base d upon a defective indictme nt.
We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the
standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rat ional trie r of fact c ould have fou nd the e ssential e lemen ts of the
crime beyond a reason able do ubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 30 7, 319 (1979 ).
On appea l, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and
all inference s therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 197 8).
Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with
a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of illustrating why the
evidence is insufficient to suppo rt the verdict re turned b y the trier of fac t. State v.
Tug gle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Te nn. 198 2); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476
(Tenn. 19 73).
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Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to
be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evide nce, are
resolved by the trier of fact, no t this court. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 198 7). Nor ma y this court
reweig h or reevalu ate the ev idence . Cabbage, 571 S.W .2d at 835. A jury verdic t
approved by the trial judge accredits the State’s witnesses and resolve s all conflicts
in favor of the State. Grace, 493 S.W .2d at 476 .
“A person commits an offense who, with fraudulent intent or knowingly: stops
payment on a check or similar sight order for the payment of money for the purpose
of paying any fine, fee, tax, license or obligation to any governmental entity or for the
purpose of obtaining money, services, labor, c redit or a ny article of value; provided,
that such money, credit, goods or services were as represented at the time of the
issuance of the check or similar sight order.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-14-1 21(a)(2).
The Defenda nt contends that the above statute do es not ap ply to checks written for
the service s of rental a ccom moda tions.
A statute is construed to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose
of legislation, considering the statute as a whole and giving words their common and
ordinary meaning withou t forced or sub tle con structio n that w ould lim it or extend the
meaning of the lang uage. Carso n Cree k Vaca tion Res orts, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). This court should assume that the
legislature used e ach wo rd in the sta tute purposely and that the use of those words
conveyed some intent and had so me m eaning and pu rpose. As the language in the
statute is plain, clear a nd un amb iguou s, there is no room for interpretation and we
apply the words o f the statute as written. Id.-3-
Under the broad definition of “services,” accommodations in hotels,
restaura nts or else where are inc luded within the statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-
106(a)(35). While the definition does not spec ifically refer to “ren t,” this check was
written for the services of monthly accommodations. The indictment spe cifically
charged that the Defendant stopped payment of a check for the purpose of
“obtaining services.” B y use of the term “or e lsewhe re,” the act is written to
encompass services which are no t spec ifically enumerated within the statute. In the
light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have fo und that there
was sufficient evidence to find the Defendant guilty under the provisions of
Tennessee Code Annota ted sectio n 39-14 -121(a)( 2). The Defen dant ha s failed to
meet h er burde n of proo f, and this iss ue is witho ut merit.
The Defendant argues that the indictment is invalid as it failed to specify the
requisite menta l elemen t of “fraudulent intent.” The indictment charged the
Defendant as follows:
Pam Davis . . . did unlaw fully and know ingly stop payment of a check
for the purp ose of ob taining se rvices . . . in violation of T.C.A . 39-14-
121.
In order to be convicted under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14 -121(a)(2),
a defendant must act “knowingly” or “with fraudulent intent.” As the indictment
charged the Defe ndant w ith acting “kn owingly,” this is sufficient to meet the
requirement that the indictment state the facts constituting the offen se in ordinary
and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such a manner as to enab le
a person of common understanding to know what is intended. Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-13-202. The indictment correctly informed the Defendant of the charges, enabled
the trial court to enter judgment and sentence and protected the Defendant against
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doub le jeopard y. State v. T rusty, 919 S.W .2d 305, 309 (Tenn. 199 6). This issue is
without m erit.
We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOSEPH B. JONES, Presiding Judge
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
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