State v. Brian Hunter ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MAY SESSION, 1998
FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) August 14, 1998
) No. 02C01-9708-CR-00309
Appellee ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) SHELBY COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk
vs. )
) Hon. W. Fred Axley, Judge
BRIAN J. HUNTER, )
) (Interlocutory Appeal)
Appellant )
DISSENTING OPINION
Because I find that an instruction on the lesser grade offense of voluntary
manslaughter was not warranted by the proof presented at trial, I am unable to join
with the majority’s conclusion. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for
dismissal of the indictment.
Although the majority concludes, absent any lesser offense analysis, that the
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, I find such
a review crucial in order to resolve the ultimate issue presently before this court. A
trial court has the duty, in criminal cases, to fully instruct the jury on the general
principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. This obligation
includes giving instructions on lesser offenses included in the indictment, without
any request on the part of the defendant. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-
110(a)(1990). Nonetheless, it remains a principle well-established in the law of this
state that, where there is no proof in the record to support an instruction on a lesser
offense, no jury instruction on the same need be submitted. Elder, No. 03C01-
9702-CR-00053 (citing Trusty, 919 S.W.2d at 311). See also Keeble v. United
States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S. Ct. 1993, 1995 (1973) (holding that there is no
constitutional right to a jury instruction on a lesser offense in every case). Thus, a
proper review of the issue before this court involves (1) a determination of the lesser
offenses of the offense charged in the indictment and (2) whether an instruction on
any of the lesser offenses is warranted by the evidence. State v. Elder, No. 03C01-
9702-CR-00053 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Apr. 23, 1998). See also State v.
Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tenn. 1996).
It is without dispute that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser offense of second
degree murder as it is a lesser grade or class of that offense. See Elder, No.
03C01-9702-CR-00053 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-201 et seq. (1991)). Thus,
the remaining question is whether such an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is
warranted by the proof presented in the case sub judice.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a defendant
to an “instruction on a lesser . . . offense if the evidence would permit a jury to
rationally find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.” Keeble
v. United States, 412 U.S. at 208, 93 S.Ct. at 1995 (internal footnote omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Trusty, 919 S.W.2d at 311. The court “must determine
whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant’s
theory of the case, would justify a jury verdict in accord with the defendant’s theory,
and would permit a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the lesser
offense and not guilty of the greater offense.” Elder, No. 03C01-9702-CR-
00053(citations omitted). 1 Absent this standard, the trial judge who charges a lesser
offense based upon less than sufficient evidence would be faced with the absurd
necessity, predicated upon its own invited error, of entering a judgment of acquittal
following the jury’s guilty verdict on the lesser offense. Elder, No. 03C01-9702-CR-
00053 (citations omitted). Moreover, to employ a lesser standard in determining
which lesser offenses need be instructed invites the jury to return a compromise or
otherwise unwarranted verdict. Elder, No. 03C01-9702-CR-00053 (citations
1
But see State v. Howard, 926 S.W .2d 5 79, 5 86-5 87 (T enn . Crim . App . 199 6 (“re latively
scant te stimon y”); State v. Ruane, 912 S.W .2d 766, 7 82 (Te nn. Crim . App. 199 5) (“slight”
evidence).
2
omitted). Indeed, this is exactly what occurred in the present case.2
After review, I am unable to conclude that the evidence, in this case, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant, is sufficient for a rational trier of
fact to find the elements of voluntary manslaughter. The proof established that both
the victim and the appellant were professionals. The appellant was employed as an
investment banker and the victim was a medical lab technician. The victim had
serious health problems and had been diagnosed with Hepatitis C and mixed
connective tissue disease. The proof also revealed that the appellant and the
victim, neighbors in an apartment complex, routinely socialized and it was not
unusual for them to visit back and forth, sometimes at unusual hours. The record is
absent any indicia of hostility or ill will between the two neighbors prior to the
incidents occurring immediately preceding the shooting.
On the fateful evening of the shooting, the appellant and the victim met on
four occasions. On all four occasions, it was the victim who initiated the encounters.
The testimony established that both had been drinking alcohol.3 The first meeting
occurred as the appellant was returning to his apartment from work when he met the
victim on the steps of their apartment building. Their exchange was fairly brief and
without any notable unpleasantries. The victim told the appellant that he had been
advised by his doctor that his medical condition had worsened and that he only had
two and one-half to five years to live. The appellant, in passing, told the victim that
he had seen a mutual friend, a local pharmacist, who said “hello.” The victim, in
response to this statement, questioned the appellant as to whether their mutual
friend had said anything else about him. The appellant assured him that their friend
had not said anything further and the conversation ended. The remaining
encounters involved an extension of the first conversation. In sum, during ensuing
2
I acknowledge the trial court’s dilemma in resolving this issue. Indeed, the trial court
observed that the proper charge would be “either murder second or nothing.” However, under
the dictate s of a de cision by a p revious p anel of this c ourt, Sum mer all v. State, 926 S.W.2d 278,
279 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1995), the court noted that it had no choice but to instruct on voluntary
man slaughte r.
3
The a utopsy rep ort revea led that the v ictim’s bloo d alcoho l level was .42 per cen t with
cocaine and m eperidine also being presen t.
3
meetings between the two, the victim expressed, with growing hostility, that he did
not think the appellant had shown appropriate compassion for his worsened medical
condition and that he believed the pharmacist had said more than the appellant was
relating.
The record reflects that, although the victim’s frustration intensified with each
meeting, the appellant remained calm and, in fact, attempted to calm the victim.
The last encounter occurred when the victim returned to the appellant’s apartment
at approximately 10:30 p.m. Prior to entering, the victim remarked, “I’d like to come
in and apologize for the way I acted earlier.” As the appellant opened the door, the
victim pushed his way into the apartment and grabbed the appellant. The appellant
retreated to the bedroom where the victim continued, in a “hostile and irate state,” to
make threats against the appellant’s life. Shortly, thereafter, the victim “crammed” a
pistol into the appellant’s ear and exclaimed, “You’ve got thirty seconds left to live.”
The appellant was ultimately able to retrieve the pistol and, during a final scuffle,
shot the victim.
Before a defendant can be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, there must
be evidence that he acted in a state of passion sufficient to obscure his reasoning
and that the passion was produced by reasonable and adequate provocation. State
v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 553 (Tenn. 1992); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
211. In other words, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is proper only if the
proof establishes both provocation and passion. Although the proof clearly
establishes that the victim was “hostile and irate,” there is simply no evidence that
the appellant acted in sudden passion as to obscure his judgment or that the
appellant acted in an irrational manner and without cool purpose. See Sentencing
Commission Comments, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211. Indeed, the proof shows
that the appellant shot the victim with “cool purpose,” believing that the use of
deadly force was necessary under the circumstances to prevent his own death, i.e.,
self-defense. In the absence of proof of passion, I find the trial court’s instruction for
voluntary manslaughter improper.
4
Additionally, it could be argued that the instruction on voluntary manslaughter
in the present case abridged the appellant’s constitutional right to present his
defense. The appellant chose to proceed on an “all or nothing” approach, i.e., either
he was guilty of second degree murder or the homicide was justified under a theory
of self-defense. Voluntary manslaughter does not fall squarely under either
category. Rather, it lies someplace between the justifiable killing and the unlawful
taking of a human life, in other words, a so-called imperfect self-defense.
Again, voluntary manslaughter differs from homicide which is
excusable because committed in self-defense; in the latter case, there
is an apparent necessity to kill the agressor for self-preservation, and
in the former, no necessity at all. Usually, voluntary manslaughter is a
consequence of quarrels and combats. It is committed suddenly,
without reflection, and repels the supposition that it is the result of
premediation or a prearranged plan to kill.
40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 57. Obviously, in a homicide case defended upon a
theory of self-defense where there is no proof of either passion or provocation, an
instruction on manslaughter effectively compromises the defendant’s theory of the
case. Cf. People v. Strohl, 456 N.E.2d 276, 280 (Ill. App. 1983).
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
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