Maney v. State ( 1997 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE             FILED
    JULY SESSION, 1997         October 10, 1997
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    THO MAS C . MANE Y, JR.,       )    C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9612-CR-00470
    )
    Appe llant,              )
    )
    )    BRADLEY COUNTY
    VS.                            )
    )    HON. R. STEVE BEBB
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,            )    JUDGE
    )
    Appellee.                )    (Post-Conviction)
    ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
    CRIMINAL COURT OF BRADLEY COUNTY
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                  FOR THE APPELLEE:
    THO MAS C. MA NEY, J R.,            JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    Pro Se                              Attorney General and Reporter
    Register Number 216056
    Route 1, Box 330
    Tiptonville, TN 38079-9775          MARVIN E. CLEMENTS, JR.
    Assistant Attorney General
    425 5th Avenu e North
    Nashville, TN 37243
    JERRY N. ESTES
    District Attorney General
    RANDY G. ROGERS
    Assistant District Attorney General
    204 North Jackson
    Athens, TN 37303
    OPINION FILED ________________________
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
    OPINION
    The Defe ndan t appe als the trial court’s dismiss al of his pe tition for post-
    conviction relief. The single issue presented for our review is whether the trial
    court erred in its determ ination that the petition wa s barred by the statute of
    limitations. W e conclude tha t the petition is not time-ba rred. W e therefore
    reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case fo r further
    proceedings.
    From this record, it appears that on February 12, 1993, the Defendant was
    convicted on his pleas of guilty to one count of felony possession of cocaine and
    one count of felony possession of marijuana. He received an effective sentence
    of eight years. There was no appeal from his convic tion or sen tences . The po st-
    conviction relief petition under consideration herein , appa rently th e Def enda nt’s
    first petition, was filed on M ay 9, 1996. The trial court dismissed the petition
    based on the statute of limitations. It is from the order of the trial court dismissing
    the petition that the Defendant appeals.
    At the time the Defendant’s convictions became fin al, the statute of
    limitations applicable to post-conviction proceedings was three years. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102
     (repealed 1995). It is clear that the petition in the case
    sub judice was filed after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations.
    The new Pos t-Conviction Proc edure Act is a pplica ble to this petition and
    all petitions filed after May 10, 199 5. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201
     et seq.
    -2-
    (Supp. 1996). This Act repealed the three-year statute of limitations and enacted
    in its place a one-year statute of limitations. On th e effective d ate of this A ct,
    same being May 10, 1995, the repealed three-year statute of limitations had not
    yet run on th e petitione r’s right to file a pe tition for post-c onvic tion relief. The
    1995 Act pro vides, in pertinent part, that “notwithstanding any other provision of
    this act to the contrary, any person having a ground for relief recognized under
    this act shall have at least one (1) year from th e effec tive date of this a ct to file
    a petition or a motion to reopen a petition under th is act.” 199 5 Ten n. Pub. A cts
    ch. 207, § 3.
    Because it is clear that the three-year statute of limitations had not run on
    this Defendant at the time the legislature repealed that statute and re place d it
    with a one-year statute, we believe that the provisio n quo ted ab ove pr ovided this
    Defendant one year from the effective date of the Act, or until May 10, 1996, to
    file his petition for post-conviction relief. Therefore, the petition herein was tim ely
    filed on May 9, 19 96, and sho uld have been considered by the trial court on the
    merits.1
    The judgmen t of the trial court dismissing this petition is reversed, and this
    case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
    1
    W e note that in at least one prior case in this Court, the State conceded that the statute of
    limitations did not bar consideration of a petition filed under the same factual circumstances as the
    one in the case sub judice. See Betsy Ja ne Pen dergras t v. State, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9607-CC-
    00289, Rutherford Co unty (Tenn. Crim. App., Nash ville, May 16, 1997).
    -3-
    _________________________________
    DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________________
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
    ___________________________________
    JOHN K. BYERS, SENIOR JUDGE
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03C01-9612-CR-00470

Filed Date: 10/10/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016