State v. Billy Kilburn ( 1997 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    FILED
    JULY 1997 SESSION
    July 29, 1997
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    BILLY KILBURN,                          )              Appellate C ourt Clerk
    )    C.C.A. No. 02C01-9608-CC-00251
    Appellant,                        )
    )    OBION COUNTY
    VS.                                     )
    )    HON. C. CREED McGINLEY,
    )    JUDGE
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                     )
    )    (Post-Conviction)
    Appellee.                         )
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                           FOR THE APPELLEE:
    THOMAS T. WOODALL                            JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    (appeal only)                                Attorney General & Reporter
    203 Murrell St.
    P.O. Box 1075                                DEBORAH A. TULLIS
    Dickson, Tennessee 37056-1075                Assistant Attorney General
    450 James Robertson Parkway
    JOSEPH P. ATNIP                              Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
    (at hearing & of counsel on appeal)
    District Public Defender                     THOMAS A. THOMAS
    111 Main Street                              District Attorney General
    P.O. Box 734
    Dresden, Tennessee 38225                     JAMES T. CANNON
    Assistant District Attorney General
    JAMES D. KENDALL                             P.O. Box 218
    (at hearing)                                 Union City, Tennessee 38261-0218
    Assistant District Public Defender
    407 Perkins St.
    Union City, Tennessee 38261
    OPINION FILED: __________________
    AFFIRMED
    JOE G. RILEY,
    JUDGE
    OPINION
    The appellant, Billy Kilburn, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. On
    August 8, 1990, the appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree. The
    conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. On March 20, 1996, the appellant filed his
    second pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging 1) the “reasonable doubt”
    jury instruction given at his trial was unconstitutional, and 2) he received ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel. After appointing counsel, but without holding an
    evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. The judgment of the trial
    court is AFFIRMED.
    CASE HISTORY
    The appellant filed his first petition for post-conviction relief on March 26,
    1992, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court found the appellant
    received effective assistance of counsel at his trial. This Court upheld the trial
    court’s denial of the appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief. Billy Ernest Kilburn
    v. State, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9403-CC-00033, Obion County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed
    August 3, 1994, at Jackson) perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1994).
    Appellant subsequently filed a second pro se petition for post-conviction relief,
    the subject of the instant appeal. After appointing counsel, the trial court dismissed
    the petition finding that 1) the petition was not timely filed, 2) the issue of ineffective
    assistance of counsel had been either “waived or previously determined,” and 3) the
    jury instructions given at appellant’s trial were constitutionally valid.
    I. Statute of Limitations
    The appellant argues that he is entitled to a post-conviction hearing because
    the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act extends the filing period to May 10, 1996.
    Under the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act, the statute of limitations for post-
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    conviction relief is reduced to one (1) year. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202
     (Supp.
    1996). The Act also provides for a one (1) year grace period from May 10, 1995, to
    file a petition or reopen a petition for post-conviction relief. However, the grace
    period does not apply in this instance because post-conviction relief was already
    barred by the statute of limitations when the new legislation was enacted. When this
    Court affirmed petitioner’s original conviction on August 28, 1991, petitioner’s
    conviction became final. Therefore, his claim was in existence prior to enactment of
    the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act and expired August 28, 1994. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102
     (repealed by 1995 Tenn. Pub. Act 207, § 1).
    The new Post-Conviction Procedure Act was not meant to revive previously
    barred claims. See Jimmy Earl Lofton v. State, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9603-CR-00073,
    Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed March 7, 1997, at Jackson); Eric C. Pendleton
    v. State, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9604-CR-00158, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. App.
    filed February 12, 1997, at Nashville); Johnny L. Butler v. State, C.C.A. No. 02C01-
    9509-CR-00289, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed December 2, 1996, at
    Jackson). The majority of this Court is no longer following Arnold Carter v. State,
    C.C.A. No. 03C01-9509-CC-00270, Monroe County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed July 11,
    1996, at Knoxville). Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
    II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    The appellant raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in his first
    post-conviction petition and was given a full evidentiary hearing. He specifically
    alleged that trial counsel 1) did not properly advise him whether to testify in his own
    behalf, 2) unfairly prejudiced his case through remarks made during opening
    statement, 3) was ineffective in examining witnesses, 4) prejudiced and alienated the
    jury by his actions during the course of the trial, and 5) was ineffective in not
    perfecting an appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. The trial court denied relief,
    and this Court affirmed.
    3
    Petitioner subsequently filed the instant petition alleging ineffective assistance
    of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing
    finding the issues had been either “waived or previously determined.” The record
    does not preponderate against this finding. Moreover, a ground for relief is
    previously determined if a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits
    after a full and fair hearing. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. §40-30-206
    (h)(Supp. 1996); House v.
    State, 
    911 S.W.2d 705
    , 711 (Tenn. 1995). Accordingly, this issue was previously
    determined and is without merit.
    III. Jury Charge
    The appellant argues the jury instruction defining “reasonable doubt” violates
    due process by lowering the burden on the state to prove guilt.
    Our courts have repeatedly held that using the phrase “moral certainty” in
    conjunction with an instruction that “reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by
    an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation,
    to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt” is a valid instruction on
    reasonable doubt. Nichols v. State, 
    877 S.W.2d 722
    , 734 (Tenn. 1994); State v.
    Sexton, 
    917 S.W.2d 263
    , 266 (Tenn. Crim App. 1995); Pettyjohn v. State, 
    885 S.W.2d 364
    , 366 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Hallock, 
    875 S.W.2d 285
    , 294
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). The record reflects the jury charge was given with the
    above instruction pertaining to reasonable doubt.
    Furthermore, this issue has been waived. A ground for relief is waived if the
    petitioner personally or through an attorney fails to raise it for determination in any
    proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction in which the ground could have
    been presented. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. §40-30-206
     (g)(Supp. 1996). The petitioner has
    waived this issue by failing to include it in his first post-conviction petition.
    Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
    4
    The judgment is AFFIRMED.
    ___________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
    ______________________________
    DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9608-CC-00251

Filed Date: 7/29/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014