Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-Cc-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JAMES A. BROWN, )
)
Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9702-CC-00056
)
vs.
FRED J. RANEY, WARDEN,
) LAKE COUNTY
)
) No. 96-7573
FILED
) June 3, 1997
Respondent. )
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the
judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The
case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the
petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on February 11,
1997, and the petitioner's brief was filed on March 18, 1997. The petitioner was
originally indicted on one count of rape of a child in May 1994, and was subsequently
convicted of the same on June 2, 1995. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in
part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment
failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.
Having reviewed the state’s motion in light of the petitioner’s brief and the
entire record on appeal, we conclude that the motion is well-taken and should be
granted. The trial judge dismissed the petition, stating that “[a]llegations concerning the
sufficiency of the indictment are not subject to habeas corpus relief.” The petitioner
subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the order of dismissal, which the trial court
denied. It is well established that challenges to the sufficiency of an indictment cannot
be tested in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 186, 187
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Brown v. State, 445 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1969). A panel of this Court recently held the same in a capital case. Barber v. State,
No. 01C01-9408-CR-00281 (Tenn. Crim. App., Feb. 23, 1995).
Nonetheless, we have considered the substance of the petitioner’s claim
and determine it to be without merit. Rape of a child is defined as “the unlawful sexual
penetration of a victim by the defendant . . . if such victim is less than thirteen (13)
years of age.” T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (1996 supp.). The indictment at issue before us
charged that the petitioner “did unlawfully sexually penetrate [the victim], a child less
than thirteen (13) years of age, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-522.” We find that the
indictment at issue here sufficiently apprised the petitioner of the offense charged, and
is therefore valid.
A valid indictment in this state must contain the elements constituting the
offense and must sufficiently apprise the accused of the offense he is called upon to
defend. State v. Tate, 912 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). When the
legislature neglects, however, to include the requisite mental state in the definition of an
offense, permitting the application of any one of the three mental states set forth in
T.C.A. § 39-11-301(c), an allegation of criminal conduct will provide the accused
constitutionally adequate notice of the facts constituting the offense. State v. Dison,
No. 03C01-9602-CC-00051 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jan. 31, 1997). The accused’s culpable
mental state, therefore, is not an essential element of the offense. Id. Consequently,
the failure to allege a culpable mental state in this case did not invalidate the
indictment.
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED, pursuant to Rule
20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the judgment of the trial court
dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall
be assessed against the petitioner.
Enter, this the ___ day of May, 1997.
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__________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
__________________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
__________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
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