Appeal, The Relying In Part Upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508 ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
RONALD DENNIS CRAFTON, )
)
Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9703-CC-00103
)
vs. ) LAKE COUNTY
)
BILLY COMPTON, WARDEN, ) No. 97-7591
)
Respondent. )
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the
judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The
case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the
petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on March 13, 1997,
and the petitioner's brief was filed on March 19, 1997. The record indicates the
petitioner was originally indicted on one count rape in July 1991.1 In the present
appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-
CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against
him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.
Having reviewed the state’s motion in light of the petitioner’s response
and the entire record on appeal, we conclude that the motion is well-taken and should
be granted. The trial judge dismissed the petition stating that “[a]llegations concerning
the sufficiency of an indictment are not proper subject for habeas corpus relief.” It is
well established that challenges to the sufficiency of an indictment cannot be tested in a
habeas corpus proceeding. See Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1971); Brown v. State, 445 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969). A panel of
this Court recently held the same in a capital case. Barber v. State, No. 01C01-9408-
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The petitioner contends that he was originally indicted on two counts of rape, and that he was
subsequently convicted on both counts. The record, however, does not contain the second count of the
indictm ent nor the judgm ent she et.
CR-00281 (Tenn. Crim. App., Feb. 23, 1995).
Nonetheless, we have considered the substance of the petitioner’s claim
and determine it to be without merit. Rape is defined as the “unlawful sexual
penetration of a victim by the defendant” accompanied by certain enumerated
aggravating circumstances, including that the “force or coercion is used to accomplish
the act.” T.C.A. § 39-13-503 (1991). The indictment at issue before us charged that
the petitioner did “unlawfully have sexual penetration by force or coercion of [the victim],
in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-503(a)(1).” We find that the indictment at issue here
sufficiently apprised the petitioner of the offense charged, and is therefore valid.
A valid indictment in this state must contain the elements constituting the
offense and must sufficiently apprise the accused of the offense he is called upon to
defend. State v. Tate, 912 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). When the
legislature neglects, however, to include the requisite mental state in the definition of an
offense, permitting the application of any one of the three mental states set forth in
T.C.A. § 39-11-301(c), an allegation of criminal conduct will provide the accused
constitutionally adequate notice of the facts constituting the offense. State v. Dison,
No. 03C01-9602-CC-00051 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jan. 31, 1997). The accused’s culpable
mental state, therefore, is not an essential element of the offense. Id. Consequently,
the failure to allege a culpable mental state in this case did not invalidate the
indictment.
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED, pursuant to Rule
20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the judgment of the trial court
dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall
be assessed against the petitioner.
Enter, this the ___ day of May, 1997.
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__________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
__________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE
__________________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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