Willie Claybrook v. State of Tennessee ( 2008 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
NOVEMBER 1996 SESSION
WILLIE CLAYBROOK, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9511-CC-00346
Appellant, *
VS.
*
*
*
GIBSON COUNTY
FILED
Hon. Dick Jerman, Jr., Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, *
Appellee. * (Post-Conviction Relief)
*
*
March 26, 2008
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Appellate Court Clerk
Tom W. Crider Charles W. Burson
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
Periann S. Houghton M. Allison Thompson
Assistant Public Defender Counsel for the State
107 South Court Square 450 James Robertson Parkway
Trenton, TN 38282 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Robert Radford
District Attorney General Pro Tem
P.O. Box 686
Huntingdon, TN 38344
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, Judge
OPINION
The petitioner, Willie Claybrook, appeals the trial court's denial of post-
conviction relief. In this appeal of right, two issues are presented for our review: (1)
whether the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (2) whether
the trial court's order denying relief met the minimum statutory requirements.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. This court
affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. State v. Willie Claybrook, No. 3 (Tenn.
Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 5, 1991). Thereafter, on June 7, 1993, the petitioner
filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court appointed counsel for
the petitioner and conducted an evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the
proceedings, the trial court ruled that the petitioner received the effective assistance
of counsel.
I
The petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective by failing to allow
him to testify at his trial and by failing to call James King as a defense witness.
There is well-established case law governing this issue. In order to be
granted relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must
establish that the advice given or the services rendered were not within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and that, but for his counsel's
deficient performance, the result of his trial would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936
(Tenn. 1975).
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The burden, of course, is on the post-conviction petitioner to show that
the evidence preponderates against the findings made at the conclusion of the
hearing by the trial judge. Clenny v. State, 576 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1978). Otherwise, findings of fact made by the trial court are binding on this court.
Graves v. State, 512 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court established the
following standards:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or ... sentence resulted from a breakdown in
the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
The petitioner admitted during his testimony at the evidentiary hearing
that he met with his counsel "frequently." He acknowledged that each of his two
attorneys discussed the nature of the charges he faced and his right to remain
silent. The petitioner charged, however, that his counsel ignored his requests to
testify on his own behalf. One of his attorneys testified at the evidentiary hearing;
he recalled that he had explained to the petitioner that it would be in his best interest
not to testify for three reasons: the petitioner had already given authorities his
version of the events and that statement was entered into evidence; the petitioner,
who had testified in two pretrial suppression hearings, did not make an effective
witness; and the petitioner had a prior homicide conviction that, if the petitioner
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testified, might be admitted into evidence. He claimed that at the conclusion of the
state's case-in-chief, the petitioner agreed with his counsel's recommendations.
Obviously, the trial court accredited the testimony of the trial counsel
over that of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner has not shown that the evidence
preponderates against the trial court's finding that trial counsel's performance was at
or above the level guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Thus, we find no merit to
his claim that his trial attorneys were ineffective by denying him his right to testify.
The petitioner also claims that counsel was deficient by not calling
James King to testify for the defense. Upon questioning, however, the petitioner
could not specify what information King had to offer. Again, the petitioner has failed
to meet his burden of proof. Certainly, no prejudice has been shown by his
counsel's failure to call this witness.
Next, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred by not including
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in the order denying post-conviction
relief:
Upon the final disposition of every petition, the court shall
enter a final order ... and shall state the findings of fact
and conclusions of law with regard to each such ground.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-118(b). While brief, the trial court's order does not require
a reversal or remand of this case for further findings. See State v. Swanson, 680
S.W.2d 487,489 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). During the evidentiary hearing, counsel
for the petitioner acknowledged that there are only two grounds for post-conviction
relief. The transcript of the hearing establishes that the trial court clearly recalled
the trial and the performance of the petitioner's counsel. In the order denying relief,
the trial court affirmatively found that the petitioner "received effective counseling
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throughout his trial and proceedings relating thereto." We are satisfied that the
contents of the order were adequate.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Gary R. Wade, Judge
CONCUR:
David G. Hayes, Judge
William M. Barker, Judge
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