State of Tennessee v. Anthony Lee Smith ( 2002 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs July 24, 2002
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTHONY LEE SMITH
    Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County
    No. 232692    Rebecca J. Stern, Judge
    No. E2001-02333-CCA-R3-CD
    August 9, 2002
    A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant of burglary and theft under $500. He received
    consecutive sentences of 10 years as a Range III offender and 11 months and 29 days, respectively.
    The defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial
    court erred in allowing the state to present a property receipt into evidence in lieu of coins found in
    the defendant’s possession; (3) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument; and
    (4) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    JOE G. RILEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and JERRY L. SMITH,
    JJ., joined.
    John G. McDougal (at trial) and Melanie R. Snipes (on appeal), Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the
    appellant, Anthony Lee Smith.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Kathy D. Aslinger, Assistant Attorney General;
    William H. Cox, III, District Attorney General; and Dean C. Ferraro, Assistant District Attorney
    General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    At 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 2000, Officer Damany Norwood of the Chattanooga Police
    Department went to Anderson’s Fashion Fabrics to investigate a reported burglary. Officer
    Norwood observed a person inside the store “scattering around” as if trying to find a place to hide
    or exit the building. The glass front door was broken, and a brick was in front of the doorway.
    Norwood testified he saw the defendant exit through the front door. Norwood stated he chased the
    defendant and was able to keep sight of him until he arrested him. Norwood testified he found
    $15.90 in quarters, dimes, and nickels on the defendant. Norwood returned the defendant to the
    store.
    The store’s owner, Alton Anderson, came to the store after he was notified of the burglary.
    Both Norwood and Anderson testified the cash register drawer was open, and coins were scattered
    on the floor and counter. Anderson stated change appeared to be missing from the cash register.
    According to both men, the defendant apologized to Anderson for breaking into the store.
    I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    The defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Where
    sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime or crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App.
    P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789, 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
    (1979);
    State v. Abrams, 
    935 S.W.2d 399
    , 401 (Tenn. 1996). The weight and credibility of the witnesses'
    testimony are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the triers of fact. State v. Sheffield, 
    676 S.W.2d 542
    , 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Brewer, 
    932 S.W.2d 1
    , 19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
    The defendant was convicted of burglary and theft of property. A person is guilty of burglary
    if he enters a building without the owner’s effective consent with the intent to commit a theft. Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(1). A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the
    owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the
    owner's effective consent. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103.
    Officer Norwood testified he saw a hole in the store’s glass door, a brick resting near the
    doorway, and a person inside the store “scattering around” in an apparent effort to hide or flee.
    According to Officer Norwood’s testimony, the defendant fled out the front door of the store, and
    Officer Norwood kept the defendant in his sight until he was captured. Both the store’s owner and
    the officer testified the store’s cash register was open and coins were scattered. The owner testified
    it appeared coins were missing from the register. A large number of coins were found in the
    defendant’s possession. Further, the defendant apologized for entering the store. In short, the
    defendant was caught “red-handed.” We conclude this proof was more than sufficient to support the
    defendant’s convictions for the burglary and theft. This issue is without merit.
    II. ADMISSION OF PROPERTY RECEIPT INSTEAD OF COINS
    At trial, the state did not present the actual coins Officer Norwood found on the defendant
    at the time of his arrest; instead, a property receipt and an inventory were presented as exhibits to
    Officer Norwood’s testimony that he found $15.90 in coins on the defendant. Officer Norwood
    testified he turned the coins over to the police department’s property division, who put them in a
    safe. Norwood stated the police department would write a check to the owner of the coins rather
    than return them. The defendant argues the trial court erred in not requiring the state to produce the
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    coins. He also argues the property receipt was inadmissible hearsay, and the proper chain of custody
    was not established.
    First, our review of the record shows the defendant expressly waived his hearsay objection
    in the trial court. By doing so, he cannot now change his position on appeal.
    The defendant argued at trial, and also argues on appeal, that the coins were destroyed,
    thereby denying the defendant the right to a fair trial due to the destruction of the physical evidence.
    However, before the state has a duty to preserve evidence, the evidence must have exculpatory value.
    See State v. Ferguson, 
    2 S.W.3d 912
    , 917 (Tenn. 1999). The defendant has made no showing that
    the coins in the instant case had exculpatory value.
    The defendant further contends on appeal the state did not establish a proper chain of custody
    for the property receipt. There was no objection on this basis at trial; the issue is waived. See State
    v. Dooley, 
    29 S.W.3d 542
    , 549 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Even if the trial court erred by admitting
    the receipt, such an error clearly did not affect the result of the trial to the defendant’s prejudice. See
    Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).
    III. PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT
    The defendant maintains the prosecutor made improper remarks during his closing argument.
    The prosecutor told the jury, “When you go back to the jury room, all of you check your pockets and
    see how much change you have in your pocket. I’ll bet you no one probably has more than two
    dollars in change in their pocket.” The record shows there was no objection to this statement.
    Therefore, this issue has been waived. State v. Farmer, 
    927 S.W.2d 582
    , 591 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1996).
    Further, the test for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct is whether improper conduct affected
    the verdict to the defendant’s prejudice. State v. Zirkle, 
    910 S.W.2d 874
    , 888 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1995). The courts should consider the following factors in determining whether the verdict was
    affected: (1) the alleged improper conduct in light of the facts and circumstances of the case; (2)
    curative measures taken by the court and the prosecutor; (3) the prosecutor’s intent in making an
    improper statement; (4) the cumulative effect of improper conduct and other errors in the record; and
    (5) the relative strength or weakness of the case. 
    Id. Even if the
    prosecutor’s remarks in this case
    were improper, the strength of the evidence against the defendant and lack of other errors makes it
    unlikely that the remarks affected the verdict. This issue is without merit.
    IV. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING
    The defendant complains the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. First, we
    note the record does not contain the transcript of the sentencing hearing. It is the duty of the accused
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    to provide a record which conveys a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with
    regard to an issue which forms the basis of the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b); see State v. Taylor,
    
    992 S.W.2d 941
    , 944 (Tenn. 1999). For this reason, the issue has been waived.
    Regardless of this waiver, we find ample evidence in the presentence report to reveal the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing. Generally, it is within the
    discretion of the trial court to impose consecutive sentences if it finds by a preponderance of the
    evidence that “[t]he defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. . . .”
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2). The presentence report, which is contained in the record,
    shows the defendant had at least seven prior felony convictions and numerous prior misdemeanor
    convictions. We conclude this evidence was sufficient to justify consecutive sentencing due to the
    defendant’s extensive criminal history.
    Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm.
    ___________________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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