Collier v. Harris ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
MAY SESSION, 1997
FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A.# W1999-02144-CCA-RM-CD
December 29, 1999
)
Appellee, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate Court Clerk
SHELBY COUNTY
)
V. ) HON. FRED AXLEY, JUDGE
)
COLLIER V. HARRIS, )
) (FIRST DEGREE MURDER IN
Appe llant. ) THE PE RPET RATIO N OF T HEFT )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
A. C. WHARTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
W. MARK WARD DEB ORA H A. TU LLIS
Assistant Pu blic Defende r Assistant Attorney General
147 Jefferson, Suite 900 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Memphis, TN 38103 425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
JOHN W. PIEROTTI
District Attorney General
EDGAR PETERSON
Assistant District Attorney General
LOR RAIN E CR AIG
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue, Ste. 301
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defen dant, Collier V. Harris, was co nvicted in the She lby Cou nty
Criminal Court of first degree murder committed during the perp etration of th eft,
in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202(a)(2). He received
a sentence of life imprisonment. He raised ten (10) issues on appeal. In an
opinion filed on December 3, 1997, this court affirmed the conviction. Defendant
subs eque ntly filed an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee
Supreme Court pursua nt to Rule 11 of the T ennes see Ru les of Ap pellate
Procedure.
On September 13, 1999, the Supreme Court of Tennessee filed an
order reman ding the c ase to this court. The order states in its entirety as follows:
Upon consideration of the application for permission to appeal and
the entire record before us, the Court is of the opinion that the
application should be, and is, hereby, granted for the sole purpose
of rema nding the ca se to th e Cou rt of Crim inal Appeals for
reconsideration in light of the Court’s opinion in State v. Buggs, 995
S.W.2d 1 02 (Tenn. 1 999).
PER CURIAM
Based upon o ur review of Buggs, the sole issue raised by the
Defendant on ap peal w hich w ould b e relev ant to th e sup reme court’s opinio n in
Buggs, is the Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a conv iction for “felon y murd er” com mitted du ring the pe rpetration of theft.
Our opinion previously filed in this case provides a detailed
statement of the facts proven at trial. Of course, the State is entitled to the
strongest legitimate view of the evidenc e and a ll inference s therefro m. State v.
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). In this light, the proof at trial
showed that Defendant entered the victim’s home after 1:00 a.m. and before 5:00
a.m. on November 29, 1992. The Defe ndant and victim knew each other. The
Defendant strangled the victim, struck her with a blunt object which smashed or
actua lly burst h er liver at four (4) different sites causing it to “bleed out,” and
stabbed her at least twelve (12) times, including two (2) wounds through the
victim ’s heart. When he left her home, he took her new bank ATM card to a First
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Tennessee Bank in Millington, where the victim resided, and withdrew $30.00
from her acco unt at approximately 5:10 a.m. on November 29, 1992. The
Defe ndan t’s activities at the ATM machine were recorded on video tape. When
Walter Blaydes, another acquaintance of the victim, left her home at
appro xima tely 1:00 a.m. on Novem ber 29, she w as fine, and the A TM card
remained on a table in her h ome w here Blayd es had ob served it earlier in the
evenin g.
In State v. Buggs, supra, our supreme court held:
The law does not require that the felony necessarily precede the
murder in order to support a felony-murder conviction. The killing
may precede, coincide with, or follow the felony and still be
considered as occurring “in the perpetration of” the felony offense,
so long as there is a connection in time, place, and continuity of
action.
Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 106.
How ever, the court furthe r held that:
Thus, in a felony-murder case, intent to commit the underlying
felony must exist prior to or concurrent with the commission of the
act caus ing the de ath of the v ictim.
Proof that such intent to commit the underlying felony existed
before, or concurrent with, the act of killing is a question of fact to be
decided by the jury after consideration of all the facts and
circum stance s. [citations o mitted].
Id. at 107
The supreme court further overruled Mullen dore v. S tate, 183 Tenn.
53, 191 S.W .2d 149 (1945), to the “exten t that Mullendore stands for the
proposition that intent to commit a felony may be presumed from the act of
comm itting that felony.” Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 108.
More significantly, however, the supreme court further noted that
Mullendore “still stands for the proposition that the jury may reasonably infer from
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a defendant’s actions immediately after a killing that the defendant had the intent
to comm it the felony prior to, or concu rrent with, the killing.” Id. at 108.
As the supreme court did in State v. Buggs, supra, we conclude
herein that the re wa s am ple proof fr om w hich th e jury c ould rationally infer that
the victim’s m urder w as com mitted in th e perpe tration of the ft, and specifically
that the Defendant had the intent to commit the theft prior to, or concurrent with,
the killing. Th e jury c ould e asily rationally infer that when the Defendant left the
victim ’s residence, he took the ATM card with him . The ho ur that it wa s used to
obtain the $30.00 also shows that by Defendant’s actions “immediately after the
killing,” he had the intent to commit the felony prior to or concurrent with, the
killing. See Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 108.
We hereby affirm the conviction of Defendant for first degree murder
committed in the perpetration of theft on the issue of sufficiency of the evidence
in light of State v. Buggs, 995 S.W .2d 102 (Te nn. 1999) an d in addition reaffirm
and ratify all other portions of our o pinion filed in this cause on December 3,
1997.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. WO ODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
GARY R. WADE , Judge
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
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