Ashlee Sellars v. State ( 2000 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
February 24, 2000
JANUARY 2000 SESSION
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
ASHLEE M. SELLARS, )
)
Appellant, ) No. E1999-00356-CCA-R3-PC
)
) Knox County
v. )
) Honorable Richard Baumgartner, Judge
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-conviction)
)
Appellee. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
J. Liddell Kirk Paul G. Summers
706 Walnut Street, Suite 902 Attorney General of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN 37902 and
R. Stephen Jobe
Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
Randall E. Nichols
District Attorney General
and
William H. Crabtree
Assistant District Attorney General
Post Office Box 1468
Knoxville, TN 37901-1468
OPINION FILED:____________________
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The petitioner, Ashlee M. Sellars, appeals as of right from the Knox
County Criminal Court’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. On January
30, 1998, the petitioner pled guilty to facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony, and
especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced her to
concurrent twenty-five year terms. The trial court dismissed the post-conviction petition
for failing to state a claim for relief. The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in
dismissing her petition without an evidentiary hearing because it stated a colorable
claim. She claims that her guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary because they
resulted from emotional coercion from her mother the night before she entered her
plea. The state contends that the petitioner failed to allege a violation of her
constitutional rights. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and remand
the case for an evidentiary hearing.
The petitioner filed a pro se petition. The trial court appointed counsel,
and the attorney amended the petition. The amended petition alleges that the
petitioner, who was nineteen at the time of her plea, did not knowingly and voluntarily
plead guilty. It claims that the petitioner had insisted upon proceeding to trial until the
day before her guilty plea. Her attorney explained the plea offer that day and strongly
advised her to accept it. When she refused, her attorney asked her mother to help
convince her to plead guilty. That night, her mother, crying hysterically, begged her to
accept the state’s offer. As a result of this pressure, the petitioner agreed to plead
guilty. The petition also alleges that at the time she pled guilty, the petitioner:
was afraid and confused about what was going on around her,
and not in a clear frame of mind. She did not fully understand
and appreciate the consequences of her waiver of her
constitutional rights against self-incrimination and her due
process rights to a fair jury trial.
The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the facts, taken as true, failed to show
that the petitioner was entitled to relief.
The trial court is required to dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief
after its preliminary consideration if the facts alleged, taken as true, “fail to show that
the petitioner is entitled to relief.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(f). Post-conviction
relief is only available when the petitioner’s conviction or sentence is void or voidable
due to the abridgement of a constitutional right. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-203. A guilty
plea must be voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered before a conviction
thereon can comply with due process. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.
2
Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969). A guilty plea is not voluntary “if it is the product of ‘[i]gnorance,
incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats . . . .’”
Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at
242-43, 89 S. Ct. at 1712).
We cannot say that a guilty plea resulting from coercion by a family
member could never be involuntary, especially when combined with allegations of
mental confusion. The state argues that although an involuntary guilty plea resulting
from coercion violates due process, due process protects individuals from overbearing
action by the state, not third parties. However, our analysis of whether a guilty plea is
involuntary does not turn upon the source of the coercion. The standard for assessing
the validity of a guilty plea is “‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Blankenship,
858 S.W.2d at 904 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160,
164 (1970)). Thus, our focus is upon the accused. The petitioner’s allegation that her
guilty plea was involuntary because she was coerced by her mother and confused
states a colorable claim for post-conviction relief. We also note that although not
argued at the motion hearing or in the briefs, the petitioner alleges that she
was not competent to appreciate the consequences of her waiver of her right against
self-incrimination and to a jury trial. This allegation presents a colorable claim as well.
Thus, the petitioner is entitled to the opportunity to prove her allegations in an
evidentiary hearing.
Based upon the foregoing and the record as a whole, we reverse the trial
court’s dismissal of the petition and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.
________________________________
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
_______________________________
James Curwood W itt, Jr., Judge
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_______________________________
Norma McGee Ogle, Judge
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