James Majors v. State ( 1998 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE             FILED
    NOVEMBER 1998 SESSION
    December 10, 1998
    Cecil W. Crowson
    JAMES ROBERT MAJORS, SR.,             *                Appellate Court Clerk
    C.C.A. # 01C01-9804-CR-00172
    Appellant,               *     SUMNER COUNTY
    VS.                                   *     Hon. Jane W. Wheatcraft, Judge
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                   *     (Post-Conviction)
    Appellee.                *
    For Appellant:                        For Appellee:
    David A. Simpson, Attorney            John Knox Walkup
    113 West Main Street                  Attorney General and Reporter
    Gallatin, TN 37066
    Timothy Behan
    Assistant Attorney General
    Criminal Justice Division
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Sallie Wade Brown
    Assistant District Attorney General
    113 East Main Street
    Gallatin, TN 37066
    OPINION FILED:__________________________
    AFFIRMED
    GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
    OPINION
    The petitioner, James Robert Majors, Sr., appeals the trial court's
    denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner
    claims that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the judgment of conviction
    should be set aside.
    We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    On December 16, 1996, the petitioner entered pleas of guilt to stalking,
    false imprisonment, assault, driving on a revoked license, evading arrest, and
    vandalism over $1,000.00. As a part of the plea agreement, the state did not
    prosecute indictment counts for aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping.
    While initially classified as a Class E felony, the stalking conviction was amended
    four months later to correctly identify the crime as a Class A misdemeanor. The
    effective sentence is two years, eleven months and twenty-nine days.
    In his petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner claimed, among
    other things, that his trial counsel had been ineffective for having failed to initially
    recognize that the count for stalking was a misdemeanor rather than a felony. He
    insists that "he would have pursued his defense differently if the stalking been [a]
    misdemeanor...."
    The trial court considered the several counts of the indictment, two of
    which were for Class B and Class C felonies, and then determined that, despite the
    error in the classification of the stalking charge, trial counsel had performed within
    the guidelines demanded in the profession.
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    When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of
    ineffective assistance of counsel, he must first establish that the services rendered
    or the advice given was below "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
    criminal cases." Baxter v. Rose, 
    523 S.W.2d 930
    , 936 (Tenn. 1975). Second, he
    must show that the deficiencies "actually had an adverse effect on the defense."
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 693 (1984). Should the petitioner fail to
    establish either factor, no relief is warranted. As to guilty pleas, the petitioner must
    establish a reasonable probability that, but for the errors of his counsel, he would
    not have entered the plea and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart,
    
    474 U.S. 52
    , 59 (1985).
    Under our statutory law, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his
    allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). On
    appeal, the findings of fact made by the trial court are conclusive and will not be
    disturbed unless the evidence contained in the record preponderates against them.
    Brooks v. State, 
    756 S.W.2d 288
    , 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The burden is on
    the petitioner to show that the evidence preponderated against those findings.
    Clenny v. State, 
    576 S.W.2d 12
    , 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
    In our view, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing does not
    preponderate against the trial court's conclusion that the petitioner would have
    entered the negotiated plea regardless of whether the indictment count was for
    felony stalking or misdemeanor stalking. The effective sentence is essentially the
    same. In fact, the ultimate result was marginally better than the bargain the
    petitioner and his trial counsel had made. In the context of all the various charges
    against the petitioner, it would appear that trial counsel performed effectively in
    achieving an acceptable plea agreement. The record suggests that the result would
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    have been acceptable to the petitioner whether the stalking conviction was a
    misdemeanor or a felony.
    Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
    _________________________________
    Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
    CONCUR:
    _____________________________
    John H. Peay, Judge
    _____________________________
    Jerry L. Smith, Judge
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