State of Tennessee v. Otis Lee Price ( 2002 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs October 29, 2002
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. OTIS LEE PRICE
    Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cocke County
    No. 8413    Ben W. Hooper, II, Judge
    No. E2002-00510-CCA-R3-CD
    December 23, 2002
    A Cocke County jury convicted the Defendant of attempted burglary, and the trial court sentenced
    the Defendant to three years incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that insufficient
    evidence was presented at trial to convict him of attempted burglary. Finding no error, we affirm
    the judgment of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, P.J., and
    JOE G. RILEY, J., joined.
    Amber D. Haas, Assistant Public Defender, Newport, Tennessee, for the appellant, Otis Lee Price.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Helena Walton Yarbrough, Assistant Attorney
    General; Al C. Schmutzer, Jr., District Attorney General; and Ronald C. Newcomb, Assistant
    District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    At trial, Everett Davis testified that he resides in Newport, Tennessee, where he owns a
    garage that is located near his home. He testified that around 10:30 p.m. on April 5, 2000, he was
    at home when he saw “a car going up and down the road and turning around.” Davis reported that
    he watched the car, and then he “laid down” for awhile. He recalled that around 11:00 p.m. the car
    returned and “parked right above the garage.” Davis testified that “somebody” then went inside the
    garage, but by the time Davis was able to get there, the person he had seen had already gone.
    Davis testified that around 12:00 a.m., he again saw someone in the garage. He reported that
    he went to the garage, where he found the Defendant and another man. Davis testified that he
    “[s]tuck a gun between [the Defendant’s] eyes” to stop him from leaving, but he did not shoot at the
    Defendant. Davis testified that after he caught the Defendant, he called the police. Davis recalled
    that when the police arrived, the Defendant was walking down the road.
    Davis testified that his garage had a “double sliding door” with a chain and a lock. He
    maintained that he owned the garage and that he did not give the Defendant permission to go inside
    the garage. Davis stated that he did not know of anything in the garage that belonged to the
    Defendant. He stated that the Defendant had broken a chain and bent the lock on a box containing
    tools. Davis estimated that the cost of repairing the damage caused by the Defendant was about
    twenty-five dollars.
    Davis stated that the Defendant was his former brother-in-law and that he had known him
    for about ten years. Davis testified that the garage was formerly owned by his father, Swann Davis.
    According to Davis, his father stored a tractor and tools in the garage. Davis testified that the
    Defendant had been in the garage before. He stated, “[the Defendant] used to help my daddy on the
    farm some.”
    On cross-examination, Davis testified that there were no lights in the garage. He reported
    that the Defendant was formerly married to his sister, but they had been divorced for about two years.
    Davis testified that he and the Defendant remained “friendly” and acknowledged that the Defendant
    had been to his house since the divorce. Davis testified that he initially stopped the Defendant by
    brandishing a “.22 pistol,” but the Defendant walked away when Davis went to call the police.
    Although Davis stated that there was another man with the Defendant, he could not identify the other
    man and did not attempt to catch him.
    On redirect examination, Davis maintained that he did not give the Defendant or anyone else
    permission to enter his garage. He also stated that he did not give anyone permission to break the
    lock and open the door. On recross examination, Davis stated that prior to catching the Defendant,
    Davis had been in the garage earlier that day or on the previous day to get a hoe.
    The Defendant testified that he was formerly married to Everett Davis’ sister. He stated that
    Davis’ mother owned a garage near Davis’ home and that he had a key to the garage. He reported
    that on April 5, 2000, he was “above” the garage, but he did not try to enter the garage. The
    Defendant asserted that he owned a motor and some tools that were stored in the garage.
    The Defendant testified that on the night of the offense, he was walking down the road
    towards his former wife’s house when Everett Davis approached him. The Defendant recalled that
    Davis shined a flashlight in his face and threatened him. According to the Defendant, Davis told him
    to “get down the damned road.” The Defendant testified that he told Davis that he did not want any
    problems and then started walking down the road. He stated that the only thing he had with him was
    his coat.
    On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that he did not have a key to the garage with
    him in court, but he stated that it was “either over at the annex or” with his former wife. The trial
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    court then asked the Defendant if he was in Davis’ garage. The Defendant responded that he was
    “above” the garage, but he maintained that he was not inside the garage on April 5, 2000. He
    testified that he was not intoxicated on the night he was arrested and that he does not drink alcohol.
    On redirect examination, the Defendant testified that his former mother-in-law actually
    owned the garage. He claimed that she allowed him to go into the garage “all the time” and
    maintained that she had given him permission to go into the garage at any time. On recross
    examination, the Defendant stated that he did not cut the chain on the garage door. He also stated
    that he did not pry open the toolbox.
    Following the Defendant’s testimony, Everett Davis was recalled to testify. He testified that
    he found the Defendant inside the garage, and he maintained that the Defendant did not have
    permission to enter the garage. When asked if the Defendant’s former mother-in-law gave the
    Defendant permission to enter the garage, Davis stated, “She’s eighty-three year[s] old; she’s not
    capable of making a decision on her own as far as giving anybody permission to do anything.” Davis
    testified that the garage was formerly owned by his father. He stated that when his father died, the
    property passed to his mother. However, Davis claimed that he was “in charge” of the property
    because his mother is incapable of taking care of the property herself. Davis testified that he lives
    on the property where the garage is located. Davis testified that although the Defendant may have
    had a key when Davis’ father was alive, he was not aware of the Defendant’s having a key when the
    offense occurred. Davis testified that the chain on the door of the garage was broken, and that the
    door on the toolbox was broken because it had been pried open.
    II. ANALYSIS
    The Defendant argues that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to convict him of
    attempted burglary. Specifically, the Defendant contends that he had a proprietary interest in the
    building which he allegedly burglarized and that he had permission from the actual owner to enter
    the building. The Defendant also contends that the prosecution did not prove that he attempted to
    take anything from the garage. When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, an
    appellate court’s standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 324
    (1979); State v. Duncan, 
    698 S.W.2d 63
    , 67 (Tenn. 1985). This rule applies to findings of guilt
    based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and
    circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 
    13 S.W.3d 389
    , 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
    In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or re-evaluate
    the evidence. State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Nor may this
    Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the evidence. State v. Buggs,
    
    995 S.W.2d 102
    , 105 (Tenn. 1999); Liakas v. State, 
    286 S.W.2d 856
    , 859 (Tenn. 1956). Questions
    concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all
    factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact. Liakas, 
    286 S.W.2d at 859
    .
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    This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate view of the evidence
    contained in the record, as well as all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.
    State v. Evans, 
    838 S.W.2d 185
    , 191 (Tenn. 1992). Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant
    removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal
    defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty
    verdict. 
    Id.
    We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to convict the Defendant of attempted
    burglary of a building. Burglary is committed when a person, without the effective consent of the
    property owner, enters a building with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402
    (a)(1). The criminal attempt of a burglary occurs when one acting with the
    requisite intent engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the
    offense. 
    Id.
     § 39-12-101(a)(3).
    A “property owner” is defined as one in lawful possession of the property. Id. § 39-14-
    401(3). The proof at trial established that Everett Davis’ mother, Sue Davis, was the actual owner
    of the garage in question. Everett Davis testified that because of his mother’s age, he had control
    over the property and was in fact living on the property. No evidence was presented at trial that
    Everett Davis did not have control over the garage. Everett Davis was in lawful possession of the
    garage, and thus he was the “property owner” for purposes of our analysis.
    Everett Davis testified that around 12:00 a.m. on April 5, 2000, he found the Defendant in
    his garage. He stated that he detained the Defendant momentarily and then called police. Davis
    reported that the chain and lock on the door of the garage had been broken and that the latch on a box
    of tools inside the garage was also broken. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    State, the evidence established that the Defendant entered Davis’ garage with the intent to commit
    a felony and that he took a substantial step towards committing a felony by breaking into the toolbox.
    Although the Defendant claimed that he had permission to enter the garage at anytime, he
    failed to present any proof to substantiate his claim. In addition, the Defendant claimed that he had
    been given a key to the garage. However, the Defendant was unable to present such a key at trial.
    We reiterate that issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be ascribed
    to their testimony are matters entrusted to the trier of fact and are not issues for appellate analysis.
    Liakas, 
    286 S.W.2d at 859
    . We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to
    convict the Defendant of attempted burglary. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    ___________________________________
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
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