State v. Jones ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
DECEMB ER SESSION, 1997 February 3, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
GEO RGE F. JON ES, JR ., ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9702-CR-00062
)
Appe llant, )
) JOHNSON COUNTY
)
V. )
) HON. LYNN W. BROWN, JUDGE
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee. ) (HABEAS COR PUS)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
GEORGE F. JONES, JR., pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP
#163274 NECC Attorney General & Reporter
P.O. Box 5000
Mountain City, TN 37683-5000 SANDY COPOUS PATRICK
Assistant Attorney General
2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
DAVID CROCKETT
District Attorney General
Route 19, Box 99
Johnson City, TN 37601
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petitioner, G eorge F . Jones, J r., appea ls as of right the trial cou rt’s
dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. We affirm the judgment of
the trial cou rt.
Petitioner was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated rape in violation of
Tennessee Code A nnotated se ction 39-13-50 2. All offenses we re alleged to have
been committed in November of 1989. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was
convicted on four (4) counts of aggravated rape and sentenced to four (4) concurrent
sentences of twenty (20) years. On December 5, 1996, Petitioner filed a petition for
habeas corpus relief in the Johnson County Criminal Court which is the subject of
this appeal. In essence, Petitioner argues that his sentence is void because the
culpa ble mental state for the offense of aggravated rape was not alleged in the
indictme nts.
In support of his argument, Petitioner relies upon the de cision of this C ourt in
State v. Rog er Da le Hill, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267, Wayne County (Tenn.
Crim. App., Nashville, Jun e 20, 1 996). H owev er, our supre me c ourt re verse d this
Cou rt’s decision in Hill. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). The
Tennessee Supreme Court held in Hill as follows :
[F]or offenses which neither expressly require nor plainly d ispense with
the requirement for a culpable mental state, an ind ictme nt whic h fails
to allege such mental state will be sufficient to support prosecution and
conviction for that offense so long as
(1) the language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the
constitutional requirements of notice to the accused of the
charge against which the accused must defen d, ade quate basis
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for entry of a proper jud gme nt, and protec tion from doub le
jeopardy;
(2) the form of the indictment meets the requirements of Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-13-202; and
(3) the mental state can be logically inferred from the conduct
alleged.
Id. at 726-2 7.
The issue b efore th is Cou rt is the same issue addressed by the suprem e court
in Hill, that is, w hethe r an ind ictme nt cha rging a ggrav ated ra pe wa s void for failure
to allege a culpable mental state. Tennessee Code Annotated section § 39-13-
502(a)(3)(A) defines aggravated rape as the “un lawful s exual p enetra tion of a victim
by the defendant” where the “defendant is aided or abetted by one (1) or more other
persons; and [f]orce or coercion is used to accomplish the act.” This statute does
not specify a me ntal state, but the required mental state may be inferred from the
nature of the criminal conduct alleged in the indictments in the Petitioner’s case.
The indictments alleg ed that Petitioner o n four different d ays did “unlaw fully, sex ually
penetra te [the victim] by force or coercion while aided and abetted by one or more
persons, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-50 2, contrary to the statute, and against the
peace and dign ity of the State of Tenn essee ." Obviously, the act for which Petitioner
is indicted, “unlawfully, sexually penetrat[ing]” a victim, is “committable only if the
principal actor’s mens rea is intentional, knowing , or reckless.” Hill, 954 S.W.2d at
729. Also, the language of the indictment sufficiently apprised Defendant of the
offenses charged, and were stated in ordinary and co ncise lan guage so that a
person of common understanding would know what was intended. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-13-2 02. Furth ermor e, the language in the indictme nts ade quately p rotects
Defendant against subsequent reprosecution for this sam e offense . Hill, 954 S.W.2d
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at 727, 729. Therefore, the indictments in this case meet constitutional and statutory
requirements of notice and form and are, therefore, valid.
Petition er’s petition may be dism issed su mm arily if the petition fails to state
a cogniza ble claim . See Passa rella v. State , 891 S.W .2d 619 , 627 (T enn. Crim.
App. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109. The trial court properly dismissed
Petitioner’s petition.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES , Judge
___________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
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