State of Tennessee v. Melvin Waters ( 2001 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs August 21, 2001
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MELVIN WATERS
    Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
    No. 2000-A-18    Steve R. Dozier, Judge
    No. M2000-03224-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 5, 2001
    The defendant appeals from his convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery, aggravated
    assault, resisting arrest and criminal impersonation. The only issue raised by the defendant is
    whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault. Based on
    our review of the evidence, we conclude that the co-defendant’s conduct amounted to aggravated
    assault and that the defendant, as a party to the offense, was criminally responsible for that
    conduct. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON and
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JJ., joined.
    Daniel L. McMurtry, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Melvin Waters.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Laura McMullen Ford, Assistant Attorney
    General; Victor S. (Torry) Johnson III, District Attorney General; and Brian K. Holmgren,
    Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    The defendant, Melvin Waters, was indicted for the aggravated robbery of Dalton Pitts,
    Count One; the aggravated assault of Fatima Jones, Count Two; disorderly conduct, Count
    Three; resisting arrest, Count Four; and criminal impersonation, Count Five. A co-defendant,
    Quawn Lillard, was also named in the indictment for Counts One and Two.
    The defendant was tried by a jury and found guilty of the lesser included offense of
    facilitation of aggravated robbery on Count One, not guilty of Count Three and guilty as charged
    in the indictments on Counts Two, Four and Five. The defendant is a Range II multiple
    offender. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twelve (12) years for the facilitation of
    aggravated robbery conviction, six (6) years for the aggravated assault conviction, and six (6)
    months each for the resisting arrest and criminal impersonation convictions. The trial court
    ordered the sentences to be served concurrently.
    The trial court denied the defendant’s timely motion for judgment of acquittal and motion
    for a new trial and a timely notice of appeal followed. The defendant raises a single issue on
    appeal: whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for the aggravated
    assault of Fatima Jones, Count Two.
    Facts
    The defendant and a co-defendant were tried jointly for the aggravated robbery of Dalton
    Pitts and the aggravated assault of Fatima Jones based on events that occurred in August of
    1999. Both Mr. Pitts and Ms. Jones, the victim, testified at the trial. Mr. Pitts was at the
    victim’s home on the evening of August 20, 1999. Early in the evening, Mr. Pitts told the victim
    that he needed change for a one-hundred-dollar bill in order to pay for bus fare to work in the
    morning. The victim left the house to get change for Mr. Pitts but returned without success
    because the store was closed. Later, the victim and Mr. Pitts were in her bedroom and she was
    lying on her bed. Mr. Pitts was sitting on the bed playing video games when the defendant and
    the co-defendant entered the bedroom. The co-defendant asked if Mr. Pitts wanted to go to the
    store with him and the defendant to get change. Mr. Pitts declined to go to the store with the
    defendant and the co-defendant because he did not know them.
    A short time later, the defendant and the co-defendant returned to the victim’s bedroom.
    Mr. Pitts noticed that the defendant had a sawed off shotgun in his pants. The co-defendant
    demanded that Mr. Pitts give him money. Mr. Pitts refused the co-defendant’s repeated requests
    for money at which point the co-defendant asked the defendant to give him the gun. The
    defendant gave the gun to the co-defendant and the co-defendant asked once again for Mr. Pitt’s
    money. Mr. Pitts refused and the co-defendant fired the shotgun into the mattress of the bed.
    Mr. Pitts then gave the co-defendant the one-hundred-dollar bill in his pocket. The co-defendant
    handed the money to the defendant and the two men left. Both men ran out of the house, nearly
    knocking down the victim’s mother as they left.
    The victim’s perception of the events differed slightly from that of Mr. Pitts. She
    testified that she was lying on her bed while Mr. Pitts played video games. She noticed that
    someone entered the room but was not concerned when she saw that it was the co-defendant
    because she knew him. At first the victim did not pay attention to the conversation between Mr.
    Pitts and the two defendants. Upon hearing the co-defendant say, “give me your money” and
    “I’m not playing with you,” the victim turned to look at the co-defendant and the defendant. The
    victim saw the co-defendant pull out a gun and hold it pointing toward the floor. Scared that the
    co-defendant was going to shoot, the victim jumped from the bed and ran out of the bedroom.
    The victim heard a gunshot after she went outside the house to tell her mother what was
    happening inside. The victim testified that she never saw the defendant with a gun, nor did she
    hear him say anything in her presence. She did, however, observe the defendant run from the
    home with the co-defendant.
    -2-
    The victim’s mother reported the incident to the police. When the police arrived at the
    scene, the co-defendant’s sister made a statement to police, which implicated the co-defendant.
    In addition, the victim identified both the defendant and the co-defendant from a photographic
    lineup. Mr. Pitts only identified the defendant from the photographic lineup. Mr. Pitts explained
    during his trial testimony that the co-defendant was bald on the night of the crime but had hair in
    the photograph, which was why he was not able to identify the co-defendant from the
    photographic lineup. The defendant and the co-defendant were both charged with the aggravated
    robbery of Mr. Pitts and the aggravated assault of the victim.
    Analysis
    The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
    the aggravated assault of Fatima Jones. When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the
    convicting evidence, the standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
    the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 322-25, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
     (1979), 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
    . Questions concerning the credibility of
    the witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised
    by the evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact, not this court. State v. Pappas, 
    754 S.W.2d 620
    ,
    623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
    On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
    reasonable inferences therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1978). This
    court may not substitute its own inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from
    circumstantial evidence. State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
    Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a
    presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of illustrating why the evidence is
    insufficient to support the jury verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v. Tuggle, 
    639 S.W.2d 913
    , 914 (Tenn. 1982).
    The defendant claims that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support his
    conviction for aggravated assault because the victim’s testimony did not indicate that the
    defendant’s conduct caused her to fear imminent bodily injury. We disagree. The victim
    testified that she was lying on her bed when the defendant and the co-defendant entered her
    bedroom. She testified that her boyfriend was also in the room and that he was sitting on the bed
    playing a video game. The victim stated that when she first noticed the co-defendant she was
    not concerned because she knew him. The victim did become concerned, however, when she
    heard the co-defendant yell to her boyfriend, “Give me your money!” At this point the victim
    turned to look in the direction of the defendant and the co-defendant, and saw the co-defendant
    pull out a gun. The victim testified that she immediately jumped up and ran from the room
    because she was scared that they would shoot.
    In order to support a conviction for aggravated assault the state must prove that the
    defendant committed a knowing or intentional assault, as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated
    section 39-13-101, and caused serious bodily injury or used or displayed a deadly weapon. Tenn.
    -3-
    Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)-(B). A person commits an assault if he intentionally or
    knowingly causes bodily injury or causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101
    (a)(1) - (2). A person acts intentionally “with respect to the nature
    of the conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is the person's conscious objective or desire to
    engage in the conduct or cause the result.” 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302
    (a). One acts
    knowingly when “with respect to a result of the person's conduct when the person is aware that
    the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302
    (b).
    According to the indictment, the defendant and his co-defendant “intentionally or
    knowingly did cause Fatima Y. Jones to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury . . . and did use
    or display a deadly weapon, to-wit: a short-barrel shotgun, in violation of Tennessee Code
    Annotated 39-13-102.”
    Viewing the victim’s testimony in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude that
    it was sufficient to establish the elements of aggravated assault and support the jury’s finding of
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The victim’s testimony that she ran from the room because she
    was afraid that the co-defendant would shoot supports a finding that she was in fear of imminent
    bodily injury. Additionally, the victim testified that the co-defendant displayed a deadly
    weapon, which established that the assault was aggravated.
    With respect to whether the defendant’s conduct constituted aggravated assault of Ms.
    Jones, the state points out that the defendant, as a party to the offense, is criminally responsible
    for the conduct of the co-defendant. We agree. A defendant may be found criminally
    responsible for the conduct of another if, “[a]cting with intent to promote or assist the
    commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, [he] solicits,
    directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense.” 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402
    (2) (1997). Thus, “‘it is necessary that [the] accused in some sort associate himself
    with the venture, act with knowledge that an offense is to be committed, and share in the
    criminal intent of the principal in the first degree; the same criminal intent must exist in the
    minds of both.’” State v. Carson, 
    950 S.W.2d 951
    , 954 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Jenkins v. State,
    
    509 S.W.2d 240
    , 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974)).
    Although a defendant's mere presence during the commission of a crime will not render
    him criminally responsible for the conduct of another, “[n]o particular act [by the defendant]
    need be shown.” State v. Jones, 
    15 S.W.3d 880
    , 890 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). That is to say, it
    is not necessary that the defendant took physical part in the crime; “[e]ncouragement of the
    principal is sufficient.” 
    Id.
     Moreover, “[p]resence and companionship with the perpetrator of a
    felony before and after the commission of the offense are circumstances from which one's
    participation in the crime may be inferred.” State v. Ball, 
    973 S.W.2d 288
    , 293 (Tenn. Crim.
    App. 1998).
    The evidence in the instant case was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant was
    criminally responsible for the conduct of the co-defendant. According to the victim’s testimony,
    the defendant and the co-defendant entered her bedroom together. The victim testified that the
    defendant stood beside the co-defendant while he demanded money from her boyfriend and
    -4-
    while he displayed the gun. The defendant remained with the co-defendant after the victim ran
    from the room. Additionally, the victim testified that the defendant and the co-defendant ran out
    of the house together, ran down a hill, and “disappeared in the dark.” Furthermore, the victim’s
    boyfriend, Dalton Pitts, testified that the defendant, and not the co-defendant, was the person
    who entered the room with the gun in his pants. Mr. Pitts testified that the co-defendant asked
    for his money. When Mr. Pitts refused to give it to him, the co-defendant asked the defendant
    for the gun. Mr. Pitts testified that the defendant complied and remained with the co-defendant
    while he fired the gun into the mattress beside Mr. Pitts and then took his money. Mr. Pitts also
    testified that the co-defendant handed the money to the defendant and they both ran from the
    room and out of the house.
    We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for the
    aggravated assault of Ms. Jones. It is evident from the testimony of Ms. Jones and Mr. Pitts that
    the defendant was acting in concert with the co-defendant and thus is criminally responsible for
    the conduct of the co-defendant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ___________________________________
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2000-03224-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge John Everett Williams

Filed Date: 12/5/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014