Darren Ray Case v. State of Tennessee ( 2005 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    DARREN RAY CASE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wayne County
    No. 13428     Robert L. Jones, Judge
    No. M2004-01727-CCA-R3-HC - Filed March 10, 2005
    The Petitioner, Darren Ray Case, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas
    corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief
    pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State’s motion has merit.
    Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court
    of Criminal Appeals.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed Pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the
    Court of Criminal Appeals
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES, and
    JERRY L. SMITH , JJ, joined.
    Darren Ray Case, pro se, Clifton, Tennessee.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Elizabeth T. Ryan, Assistant Attorney General,
    for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    On July 15, 2003, the Petitioner pled guilty to one count of sale of a Schedule I narcotic, two
    counts of vehicular assault, and two counts of aggravated assault. Petitioner received an eight year
    sentence for the sale of a Schedule I narcotic conviction, a two year sentence for each of the vehicular
    assault convictions, and a three year sentence for each of the aggravated assault convictions. The
    judgment form for the sale of a Schedule I narcotic shows that it was ordered to run consecutively to
    the aggravated assault counts and any prior convictions. The judgment forms for the vehicular assault
    convictions order that they are to run consecutively to the sale count and the aggravated assault
    conviction, however, the judgment does not indicate whether the vehicular assaults are to run
    concurrently or consecutively to each other. The judgment form for one of the aggravated assault
    convictions states that it is to run consecutively to the sale count and to the first count of vehicular
    assault.
    On October 1, 2003, the trial court entered two amended judgments that showed that the
    Petitioner pled nolo contendere, instead of pleading guilty, to the sale of a Schedule I narcotic and to
    the first count of aggravated assault. The amended judgment reflects that the sale of a Schedule I
    narcotic sentence should run consecutively to the aggravated assault sentences.
    On April 23, 2004, the Petitioner filed, pro se, a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in the
    Wayne County Circuit Court. He asserted that his conviction is void because his plea agreement was
    not honored by the entry of an amended judgment on the sale of a Schedule I narcotic count. On June
    12, 2004, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Petitioner’s application for habeas corpus
    relief. The Petitioner filed his notice of appeal in the trial court on July 3, 2004.
    The grounds upon which a writ of habeas corpus may be issued are very narrow. McLaney
    v. Bell, 
    59 S.W.3d 90
    , 92 (Tenn. 2001). A writ of habeas corpus is available only when it appears
    from the face of the judgment or record that either the convicting court was without jurisdiction to
    convict or sentence the petitioner, or the petitioner’s sentence has expired. Archer v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 157
    , 164 (Tenn. 1993); Potts v. State, 
    833 S.W.2d 60
    , 62 (Tenn. 1992). In other words,
    habeas corpus relief may only be sought when the judgment is void, not merely voidable. Taylor v.
    State, 
    995 S.W.2d 78
    , 83 (Tenn. 1999).
    The Petitioner has failed to set forth any allegations that would indicated that the trial court
    lacked jurisdiction to convict or sentence him or that he is unlawfully “restrained” for a sentence that
    has expired. As this court has recognized, Petitioner’s claim that his plea agreement was not honored
    in the judgment entered or sentence imposed “presents at most a claim of a merely voidable, and not
    void, judgment or sentence.” Jeffrey Miller v. State of Tennessee, No. E2000-01192-CCA-R3-CD,
    
    2001 WL 987154
    , *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Aug. 29, 2001) (citing Paul v. Barnett v. State,
    No. E1999-01583-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2000 WL 782048
     (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, June 20, 2000);
    see also Roger T. Johnson v. State, No. M2002-02902-CCA-R3-CO, 
    2004 WL 443971
    , *1 (Tenn.
    Crim. App., at Nashville, March 5, 2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2004).
    The Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction
    is void or his term of imprisonment has expired. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted. The
    judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal
    Appeals.
    ___________________________________
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2004-01727-CCA-R3-HC

Judges: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer

Filed Date: 3/10/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014