State of Tennessee v. Newt Carter ( 2010 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    Assigned on Briefs January 5, 2010
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. NEWT CARTER
    Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County
    No. 07-498    Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge
    No. W2009-00600-CCA-R3-CD - Filed June 11, 2010
    A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Newt Carter, of aggravated rape, a Class
    A felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant
    as a Range I standard offender to twenty years at 100% for aggravated rape consecutive to
    five years at 30% for aggravated burglary, to be served in the Tennessee Department of
    Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to
    support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant by
    misapplying enhancement factors and ordering the defendant to serve the sentences
    consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    J.C. M CL IN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which A LAN E. G LENN and C AMILLE R.
    M CM ULLEN, JJ., joined.
    Joseph T. Howell (on appeal), and Angela J. Hopson and Ramsdale O’Deneal (at trial),
    Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Newt Carter.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Rachel West Harmon, Assistant
    Attorney General; Jerry Woodall, District Attorney General; and Jody S. Pickens, Assistant
    District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    Background
    In September 2007, a Madison County grand jury indicted the defendant, Newt Carter,
    for aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The
    Madison County Circuit Court, the Honorable Roy B. Morgan, Jr., presiding, held a jury trial
    on May 13, 2008. The parties presented the following evidence at trial.
    State’s Proof
    The victim testified that she was fifty years old at the time of trial. On July 1, 2006,
    the victim lived in the Lincoln Courts apartment complex in Jackson, Tennessee. During the
    preceding evening, she spent time with her daughter, her daughter’s children, and her
    daughter’s boyfriend, the defendant, at her daughter’s apartment, which was across the street
    from her own. They drank alcohol and talked until 2:00 a.m. During that evening, the
    defendant mentioned that rapists entered homes through windows and forced their victims
    to wash themselves after the rape. When the victim decided to go home, the defendant
    accompanied her across the street. They entered her apartment together, and he waited while
    she checked her windows to ensure that they were locked. Then, he left, saying that he
    would return to check on her. She locked the door and went to her bedroom to watch a
    movie. At approximately 3:30 a.m., the defendant knocked on her bedroom door, which was
    partially open. He asked if she was okay, and she replied, “Yes, I’m fine. . . . You don’t have
    to come back anymore.” The victim testified that she was concerned at that point because
    the defendant was smiling and because she had previously told him that she would be fine.
    At 5:00 a.m., the victim awoke to a man tapping her temple with a gun. The man
    wore a stocking cap over his face and was otherwise naked. He whispered to her to “drop
    ‘em.” When she hesitated to remove her clothes, he told her to “[h]urry up.” She did not
    recognize his voice, and she could not tell what race the man was. She removed her clothes,
    and the man instructed her to lie down on the bed. He fondled her breast and moved his hand
    between her legs. Then, he told her to “suck it.” She performed oral sex on him until he told
    her to get on her knees on the bed. The victim testified that he penetrated her vagina with
    his penis. She was unable to tell whether he wore a condom. After approximately five
    minutes, he stopped and laid down, ordering her to get on top of him. He penetrated her
    again. The victim said that after he was finished, he ordered her to clean up. Throughout the
    rape, he pointed the gun at her head. She went into her bathroom and washed her vaginal
    area. The victim testified that she was able to see at that point that the man was dark-skinned
    and five feet, ten inches, tall. He told her to “[g]et on up in there[,]” and she complied by
    washing the interior of her vaginal area with a washcloth. While she washed, the man ran
    downstairs and out the back door. She waited before she went downstairs and locked the
    door.
    After she locked the door, she returned upstairs and began calling her daughter. She
    heard a noise at her window and shut off her phone before completing the call. The victim
    said that she took a bat out of her bedroom closet and stood in her room until she gathered
    the courage to call her daughter. When she called, her daughter answered the phone, but the
    -2-
    defendant “grabbed the phone.” She told him what happened to her. He arrived at her
    apartment, letting himself in with a key. The victim said that she was unsure what time the
    police arrived because she was hysterical. The police took her to the emergency room, where
    hospital personnel examined her utilizing a rape kit, which involved taking her blood and
    examining her genital area. The victim testified that she had known the defendant for six
    years. She had never had a sexual relationship with him.
    On cross-examination, the victim testified that her daughter, the defendant, and their
    children lived with her for a time prior to 2006. She said that she wears glasses and cannot
    see well without them. The victim agreed that she told the investigator that she had her
    glasses on during the rape. The victim said that her assailant had on black army shoes and
    a beige stocking cap. She said that she could not tell what race the man was because she
    averted her eyes from him as much as possible. She did not see any identifying features on
    the man and said that she closed her eyes while she was on top of him. The victim testified
    that the assailant had the gun wrapped in a towel, but she felt the cold barrel. The victim said
    that she might have told a different version of what happened to the police because she was
    hysterical. She described the defendant as having a slim build and dark skin. The victim
    testified that she brushed her teeth after her assailant left, before anyone else arrived at her
    apartment. She said that, as far as she knew, the defendant did not often let himself into her
    apartment. The victim agreed that she never told the defendant that he could not come into
    her house or ask him to give her the key he used. The victim testified that she drank one beer
    at her daughter’s apartment, and the defendant walked her home because of the number of
    men standing outside the apartments. She agreed that, on the day of the rape, she did not
    identify the defendant as a suspect. When she began to suspect him, she did not tell
    investigators but did tell her daughter.
    On redirect examination, the victim testified that she began to suspect the defendant
    “because he was acting funny, and he said, ‘They can’t get me. . . . They can’t get me for
    that.’”
    Jackson Police Officer Karrie Hart testified that she responded to a burglary and rape
    call at the victim’s residence on July 1, 2006. The defendant met her at the front door when
    she arrived and told her the victim was upstairs. As Officer Hart walked up the stairs, she
    heard the victim “screaming and crying.” When Officer Hart entered the victim’s bedroom,
    she saw the victim on her hands and knees, dressed in a bra and sweatpants. She urged the
    victim to finish dressing. Officer Hart said the victim was “extremely upset.” The victim
    found a shirt and began putting it on when the defendant entered the room. “[H]e started
    pulling her arm, and [Officer Hart] told him to wait a minute.” The defendant gave the
    officer “an agitated look.” The victim finished dressing and began telling the officer what
    happened. The defendant interjected, saying that everything was locked except for a
    -3-
    window. Officer Hart instructed the victim to continue, and the victim began her story again
    but began crying. The officer asked the defendant to leave the room, which he did, “but he
    didn’t appear to be happy about it.”
    The victim told Officer Hart that a man came into her room and whispered to her to
    take off her clothes. He penetrated her from behind. The victim told Officer Hart that the
    man wore a stocking cap and boots. After the rape, he told her to wash. The victim said that
    she used tissues to wipe herself, which were in the bathroom trash can. Officer Hart
    collected the tissues as evidence. The victim also spit into several tissues, which another
    officer collected. Officer Hart took the victim to Jackson-Madison County General
    Hospital’s emergency room for an examination with a rape kit. On the way, the victim also
    told Officer Hart that she had spent the evening with her daughter and the defendant, and the
    defendant had warned her about a rapist that entered through windows and forced women
    to wash after the rape. Officer Hart testified that, based on her experience and common
    sense, she considered the defendant’s behavior to be suspicious.
    On cross-examination, Officer Hart testified that the victim told Investigator Danielle
    Jones the same thing that the victim told her, except that the victim did not tell Officer Hart
    that the man penetrated her while she was on top of him. The victim also told her that the
    man was putting on clothes while she was washing.
    Jackson Police Officer Marvent Brooks, a crime scene technician, testified that he
    photographed and collected evidence from the victim’s apartment. He collected her clothing;
    tissues into which she had spat; the face towel with which she had washed herself; the
    bedsheets; the victim’s toothbrush; and swabs from the apartment’s back door, bathroom
    door, and bathroom floor. Officer Brooks identified pictures showing that the window in the
    victim’s bathroom was open, but the screen was intact. He testified that there were no
    indications of forced entry into the apartment. Officer Brooks said that the defendant was
    “excessively helpful” when he arrived at the scene.
    Dr. Jim Craig, an emergency room physician at Jackson-Madison County General
    Hospital, testified that he collected samples from the victim on July 1, 2006, for a sexual
    assault kit. The samples included oral, anal, and vaginal swabs, as well as a blood sample.
    Dr. Craig testified that the victim was uninjured but said that individuals “can be assaulted
    with no injury.”
    Lisa Mitchell, a registered nurse employed at Jackson-Madison County General
    Hospital, testified that she was a sexual assault nurse examiner. Ms. Mitchell treated the
    victim in the emergency room on July 1, 2006. She observed that the victim was “very calm
    and very cooperative.” Ms. Mitchell documented the victim’s version of events as part of
    -4-
    her medical history. The victim told her that a man, whose head was covered with hosiery,
    held a gun to her head and penetrated her vagina with his penis while she was on her back,
    on her knees, and on top of him. The victim also told her that she performed oral sex on him,
    and he made her wash her genitals.
    On cross-examination, Ms. Mitchell testified that the victim did not know the man’s
    race. The victim said that the man was a stranger.
    Jackson Police Investigator Danielle Jones testified that she first met the victim at the
    hospital on July 1, 2006. Later on the same day, she spoke with the defendant. She
    considered him to be a possible witness because he was the last person to have contact with
    the victim, he was the first person on the scene after the rape, and the responding officers
    considered his behavior to be suspicious. Investigator Jones obtained a DNA sample from
    the defendant by swabbing the inside of his cheeks. She sent the victim’s sexual assault kit
    and the defendant’s oral swabs to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) laboratory
    in Nashville for comparison. She said the victim gave her a “supplemental description” that
    her assailant was dark-skinned and five feet, ten inches tall.
    On cross-examination, Investigator Jones testified that the victim told her that the
    assailant forced her to perform fellatio on him and penetrated her while she was on her back,
    from behind while she was on her knees, and while she was on top of him.
    Agent Michael Turbeville, of the TBI, testified that he received evidence from the
    Jackson Police Department in regards to this case, including the victim’s sexual assault kit,
    the evidence collected from her apartment, and the defendant’s oral swabs. He sent the items
    to Bode Technology in Lorton, Virginia, for testing due to a backlog in cases at the TBI.
    Frank Basile, a forensic scientist at Bode Technology, testified that he analyzed
    evidence received from the TBI in relation to this case. He confirmed the presence of semen
    on the victim’s vaginal swabs, her panties, the face towel, and the bedsheets.
    Sara Shields, a DNA analyst at Bode Technology, testified that she analyzed the
    evidence received from the TBI regarding this case. She used the victim’s blood sample and
    the defendant’s oral swabs to create DNA profiles for comparison to the evidence. Ms.
    Shields testified that the victim’s vaginal swab, her panties, the towel, and the bedsheets
    contained two DNA profiles, that of the victim and that of the defendant. She testified that
    the possibility that any person was the source of the male DNA profile, other than the
    defendant, exceeded the current world population.
    -5-
    Jackson Police Officer Robert Faulkner testified that, on July 8, 2006, he collected
    evidence on the ground outside of the victim’s apartment, including a window screen and an
    “apparatus associated with a window.” The parties stipulated “that fingerprints were
    attempted to be lifted from those items . . . and none were found.”
    Defense Proof
    Tiffany Hill, the victim’s daughter, testified that she had four children with the
    defendant, and at the time of trial, they were no longer in a relationship. She said that on July
    1, 2006, she, the defendant, and the victim were drinking and talking at Ms. Hill’s apartment.
    The defendant said that he had heard about a woman being raped and the rapist telling her
    to brush her teeth and take a bath afterwards. At midnight, Ms. Hill asked the defendant to
    walk the victim home because the victim was “tipsy.” She sent him to check on her at 2:00
    a.m. A couple of hours later, her mother called her, and the defendant answered. The victim
    was crying and immediately hung up the phone. Ms. Hill asked the defendant to go check
    on the victim, and she gave him her keys. Then, she called the victim back. The victim told
    her that she had been raped and asked her to call the police. Ms. Hill testified that when the
    defendant answered the phone, “[h]e was just getting up to go use the bathroom.” She
    assumed that he had been in bed prior to that but was unsure because she was asleep. She
    fell asleep lying on his chest, but she said that because she was drunk, she would not have
    known if he moved. Ms. Hill testified that she never discussed the details of the rape with
    the victim.
    On cross-examination, Ms. Hill testified that the defendant went to Chattanooga,
    Tennessee, to avoid arrest after the authorities issued a warrant for him in this case.
    On redirect examination, Ms. Hill agreed that she told the investigators that the
    defendant was with her at the time of the rape, but she said that once she fell asleep, she did
    not know where he was.
    The defendant testified that he did not rape the victim nor did he enter her home
    without permission. He said that between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., on June 30, 2006, he
    had consensual sex with the victim at her apartment. He did not use a condom, and
    afterwards, he washed with a towel in her bathroom. The defendant testified that he and the
    victim had been in an ongoing sexual relationship since he graduated from high school. On
    June 30, 2006, he told the victim that he wanted to end the relationship because he did not
    want Tiffany Hill to find out about their relationship. The victim promised that she would
    “never admit that [they] had sex.” He spent the evening of June 30 at his and Ms. Hill’s
    apartment, talking with Ms. Hill and the victim. He told them that, while he was
    incarcerated, he heard how a man raped one of their neighbors. The defendant walked the
    victim home at midnight. Between 2:00 a.m. and 2:30 a.m., Ms. Hill tried to call the victim,
    -6-
    but she did not answer her phone. Ms. Hill sent the defendant over to the victim’s apartment
    to check on her. He entered the back door and went to her bedroom. She said that she was
    fine, so he left through the back door and returned home. The defendant testified that he fell
    asleep while he watched a movie with Ms. Hill.
    Later, the victim called Ms. Hill’s phone, and the defendant answered it. The victim
    was crying and hung up immediately. Ms. Hill gave the defendant her key to the victim’s
    house and asked him to check on the victim. He went over to the victim’s apartment while
    Ms. Hill called the victim. The defendant entered the victim’s apartment and went upstairs.
    He testified that the victim was calmly brushing her teeth when he walked into her bedroom.
    The victim told him what happened and that Ms. Hill had called the police. He went
    downstairs to wait for the police and let them in as they arrived. The victim began crying and
    screaming when the police arrived. The defendant said that he watched as the police talked
    to the victim because he was curious. The defendant said that he did not own black army
    boots, and he said that the victim gave him permission to enter her apartment with Ms. Hill’s
    key. He testified that he has tattoos on his arm and shoulder, and the victim knew that he had
    the tattoos. The defendant said that he cooperated with the police in their investigation by
    giving his consent for them to take his DNA and answering all of their questions.
    On cross-examination, the defendant testified that he told people about his relationship
    with the victim, but he did not tell law enforcement. He told Ms. Hill about the relationship
    after he received the DNA report in which the analysts confirmed the presence of his semen
    on the evidence. The defendant said that he believed that someone raped the victim, but he
    was not responsible. The defendant admitted that he went to Chattanooga, Tennessee, after
    the grand jury indicted him. He admitted that he ran from police in Chattanooga and gave
    them a false name, resulting in a conviction for criminal impersonation.1
    State’s Rebuttal Proof
    Dr. Craig testified that semen could be present in a person’s body eighteen hours after
    ejaculation. On cross-examination, he agreed that semen could be present in a person’s body
    for up to seventy-two hours after ejaculation.
    Following deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged of aggravated
    rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony.
    Sentencing
    1
    The record reveals that the defendant also received a conviction for resisting arrest in connection
    with this incident.
    -7-
    The trial court held a sentencing hearing on July 7, 2008. The parties agreed that the
    defendant was a Range I standard offender. The trial court admitted the defendant’s
    presentence report as evidence and heard testimony from the defendant, the defendant’s
    pastor, and the defendant’s mother. The defendant maintained that he was innocent of the
    offenses for which the jury convicted him. The defendant’s pastor testified that he knew the
    defendant to be a “quiet person” and asked the court for leniency in sentencing because he
    believed the defendant could be rehabilitated. The pastor acknowledged that he was unaware
    of the defendant’s prior convictions and drug use. The defendant’s mother asked the court
    for leniency so that the defendant could raise his children.
    The trial court found that no mitigating factors applied to the defendant’s case. It
    further found that the following enhancement factors applied: (1) the defendant had a history
    of criminal convictions in addition to those necessary to establish the sentencing range; (2)
    the defendant failed to comply with conditions of a sentence involving release into the
    community; (3) the defendant was on probation when he committed the instant felonies. The
    court sentenced the defendant to twenty years at 100% for aggravated rape and to five years
    at 30% for aggravated burglary. The court ordered that the defendant serve the sentences
    consecutively to each other and to his sentence for a prior robbery conviction because he
    committed the instant offenses while on probation.
    The defendant did not file a motion for new trial nor a notice of appeal. However, the
    trial court granted a delayed appeal on March 17, 2009. The defendant filed a notice of
    appeal on March 18, 2009.
    Analysis
    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    On appeal, the defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
    his convictions for aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. He argues that (1) the state did
    not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with a gun during the
    rape, and (2) he had effective consent to enter the victim’s apartment at any time. The state
    responds that (1) the jury accredited the victim’s testimony that she felt a gun barrel pressed
    against her temple, and (2) the jury made a reasonable inference that the defendant did not
    have effective consent. We agree with the state.
    Our review begins with the well-established rule that once a jury finds a defendant
    guilty, his or her presumption of innocence is removed and replaced with a presumption of
    guilt. State v. Evans, 
    838 S.W.2d 185
    , 191 (Tenn. 1992). Therefore, on appeal, the
    convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating to this court why the evidence will not
    support the jury’s verdict. State v. Carruthers, 
    35 S.W.3d 516
    , 557-58 (Tenn. 2000); State
    -8-
    v. Tuggle, 
    639 S.W.2d 913
    , 914 (Tenn. 1982). To meet this burden, the defendant must
    establish that no “rational trier of fact” could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); State v. Evans,
    
    108 S.W.3d 231
    , 236 (Tenn. 2003); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). In contrast, the jury’s verdict
    approved by the trial judge accredits the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor
    of the state. State v. Harris, 
    839 S.W.2d 54
    , 75 (Tenn. 1992). The state is entitled to the
    strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn
    from that evidence. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at 558; Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914. Questions
    concerning the credibility of the witnesses, conflicts in trial testimony, the weight and value
    to be given the evidence, and all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier
    of fact and not this court. State v. Bland, 
    958 S.W.2d 651
    , 659 (Tenn. 1997). We do not
    attempt to re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. State v. Reid, 
    91 S.W.3d 247
    , 277 (Tenn.
    2002); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. Likewise, we do not replace the jury’s inferences drawn
    from the circumstantial evidence with our own inferences. See State v. Elkins, 
    102 S.W.3d 581
    , 582 (Tenn. 2003); Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 277.
    A. Aggravated Rape
    To sustain the defendant’s conviction for aggravated rape, the state had to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully, using force or coercion, sexually
    penetrated the victim and that “the defendant [was] armed with a weapon or any article used
    or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon[.]” Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 39-13-502(a)(1).
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence showed that the
    defendant entered the victim’s house when she was asleep and awakened her by tapping her
    head with what the victim testified was a gun. While the object was wrapped in a towel, she
    felt a cold barrel against her head. The defendant ordered her to disrobe and to perform
    fellatio on him before he penetrated her vagina with his penis. Analysts found the
    defendant’s semen in the victim, on her bedsheets, on her underwear, and on a towel in her
    bathroom. By finding the defendant guilty of aggravated rape, the jury accredited the
    victim’s testimony that her assailant was “armed with a weapon or any article used or
    fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon[.]” See id.
    It is irrelevant that the victim was unable to describe the weapon or that the police did not
    find a weapon in the course of their investigation. The jury resolved the factual issue in favor
    of the state, and this court is not free to re-evaluate the question. See Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 277;
    Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. We conclude that a rational jury could find that the defendant was
    armed during the rape beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, the defendant’s argument is
    without merit.
    B. Aggravated Burglary
    -9-
    The Tennessee Code Annotated defines aggravated burglary, in relevant part, as
    entering a habitation without the effective consent of the owner and with the intent to commit
    a felony, theft, or assault. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-402(a)(1), -403(a). A habitation is
    defined as “any structure . . . which is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation
    of persons[.]” Id. § 39-14-401(1)(A). Effective consent is defined as
    assent in fact, whether express or apparent, including assent by one legally
    authorized to act for another. Consent is not effective when:
    (A) Induced by deception or coercion;
    (B) Given by a person the defendant knows is not authorized to act as
    an agent;
    (C) Given by a person who, by reason of youth, mental disease or
    defect, or intoxication, is known by the defendant to be unable to make
    reasonable decisions regarding the subject matter; or
    (D) Given solely to detect the commission of an offense[.]
    Id. § 39-11-106(a)(9).
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence showed that the
    defendant did not have his own key to the victim’s house. When the defendant checked on
    the victim between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., she told him that he did not need to come back.
    While the victim did not explicitly deny the defendant permission to enter her house, she did
    not give him permission to come and go as he pleased. The jury inferred from the victim’s
    testimony that the defendant did not have effective consent. We do not replace the jury’s
    inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence with our own inferences. See Elkins, 102
    S.W.3d at 582; Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 277. We conclude that a rational jury could have found,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant entered the victim’s apartment without her
    consent with the intent to rape her. Therefore, the defendant is without relief as to this issue.
    II. Sentencing
    For his second issue, the defendant argues that his sentence was excessive because the
    trial court erred by applying overlapping enhancement factors and by ordering the sentences
    to run consecutively. The state responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
    sentencing the defendant.
    -10-
    An appellate court’s review of a challenged sentence is de novo on the record with a
    presumption the trial court’s determinations are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d).
    The Sentencing Commission Comments to this section of the statute indicate that the
    defendant bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is improper. When the trial court
    follows the statutory sentencing procedure and gives due consideration to the factors and
    principles relevant to sentencing, this court may not disturb the sentence. See State v. Carter,
    
    254 S.W.3d 335
    , 344-45 (Tenn. 2008).
    A. Enhancement Factors
    Prior to the 2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act, in sentencing a defendant,
    a court was to begin at the mid-point of the statutory range and then apply the appropriate
    enhancement and mitigating factors. Pursuant to the 2005 amendments, our Sentencing Act
    has abandoned the statutory minimum sentence and renders enhancement and mitigating
    factors advisory only. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-114, -35-210(c). The 2005
    amendments set forth certain “advisory sentencing guidelines” which the trial court is
    required to consider but is not bound by. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c). Although
    the application of factors is advisory, a court shall consider “[e]vidence and information
    offered by the parties on the mitigating and enhancement factors in §§ 40-35-113 and
    40-35-114.” Id. § 40-35-210(b)(5). The trial court is also required to place on the record
    “what enhancement or mitigating factors were considered, if any, as well as the reasons for
    the sentence, to ensure fair and consistent sentencing.” Id. § 40-35-210(d).
    The weight given to each enhancement or mitigating factor is in the discretion of the
    trial court, assuming that the trial court has complied with the purposes and principles of the
    sentencing act and its findings are supported by the record. See Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345.
    The statutes prescribe no particular weight for an enhancement or mitigating factor. State
    v. Gosnell, 
    62 S.W.3d 740
    , 750 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). Under the 2005 amendments, the
    trial court’s weighing of enhancement and mitigating factors is not a grounds for appeal.
    Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 344.
    Aggravated rape is a Class A felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502(b). As a Range
    I offender, the defendant was eligible for a sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years. Id. § 40-
    35-112(a)(1). Aggravated burglary is a Class C felony. Id. § 39-14-403(b). As a Range I
    offender, the defendant was eligible for a sentence of three to six years. The trial court found
    that three enhancement factors applied: (1) the defendant’s history of criminal convictions
    in addition to those necessary to establish the sentencing range; (2) the defendant’s failure
    to comply with conditions of a sentencing involving release into the community and (3) the
    defendant was on probation when he committed the instant felonies. See id. § 40-35-
    114(1),(8),(13)(B).
    -11-
    The record supports the trial court’s findings. The state listed eight prior convictions
    in its Notice to Seek Enhanced Punishment, each of which is documented in the defendant’s
    presentence report, supporting the trial court’s finding that the defendant had a history of
    criminal convictions in addition to those necessary to establish the sentencing range. The
    defendant committed five of his prior convictions while on probation for robbery, excluding
    the two convictions in the instant case, supporting the trial court’s finding that the defendant
    failed to comply with conditions of a sentence involving release into the community. Finally,
    when he committed the instant offenses, the defendant was serving five years of probation
    for a robbery to which he pled guilty in 2005. The defendant argues that enhancement
    factors eight and thirteen overlap; however, the defendant fails to recognize that the offenses
    for which he was sentenced were not the only offenses he committed while on probation.
    Additionally, he presents no authority supporting his contention that the trial court was
    prohibited from applying both factors. Because the record supports the trial court’s findings,
    we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement
    factors.
    B. Consecutive Sentences
    Generally, it is within the discretion of the trial court to impose consecutive sentences
    if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of the following statutory
    criteria apply:
    (1) [t]he defendant is a professional criminal who has knowingly
    devoted such defendant’s life to criminal acts as a major source
    of livelihood;
    (2) [t]he defendant is an offender whose record of criminal
    activity is extensive;
    (3) [t]he defendant is a dangerous mentally abnormal person so
    declared by a competent psychiatrist who concludes as a result
    of an investigation prior to sentencing that the defendant’s
    criminal conduct has been characterized by a pattern of
    repetitive or compulsive behavior with heedless indifference to
    consequences;
    (4) [t]he defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior
    indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation
    about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is
    high;
    (5) [t]he defendant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory
    offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor with consideration
    -12-
    of the aggravating circumstances arising from the relationship
    between the defendant and victim or victims, the time span of
    defendant’s undetected sexual activity, the nature and scope of
    the sexual acts and the extent of the residual, physical and
    mental damage to the victim or victims;
    (6) [t]he defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while
    on probation; or
    (7) [t]he defendant is sentenced for criminal contempt.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b).
    Specific findings that an extended sentence is necessary to protect society and is
    reasonably related to the severity of the offenses are prerequisites to consecutive sentencing
    under the “dangerous offender” category in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-
    115(b)(4). State v. Wilkerson, 
    905 S.W.2d 933
    , 939 (Tenn. 1995). However, such specific
    factual findings are not required for the other categories of Tennessee Code Annotated
    section 40-35-115(b). State v. Lane, 
    3 S.W.3d 456
    , 461 (Tenn. 1999). Nevertheless, the
    general principles of sentencing require that the length of the sentence be “justly deserved
    in relation to the seriousness of the offense” and “be no greater than that deserved for the
    offense committed.” State v. Imfeld, 
    70 S.W.3d 698
    , 708 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Tenn. Code
    Ann. §§ 40-35-102(1) and -103(2)).
    The trial court found that the defendant committed aggravated rape and aggravated
    burglary while on probation for robbery, which satisfies the statutory criteria for imposing
    consecutive sentences. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b). The defendant admits that the trial
    court properly considered this factor, but he contends that the trial court should not have
    imposed consecutive sentencing because the court did not find that the defendant was a
    professional criminal nor that his criminal activity was extensive. However, a trial court need
    only find the existence of one of the statutory criteria by a preponderance of the evidence in
    order to impose consecutive sentencing. State v. Black, 
    924 S.W.2d 912
    , 917 (Tenn. Crim.
    App. 1995). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the
    defendant to serve his sentences consecutively; therefore, the defendant is without relief as
    to this issue.
    Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    -13-
    ___________________________________
    J.C. McLIN, JUDGE
    -14-